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Abstract 
Worry, the cognitive component of anxiety, is present across the spectrum of anxiety 
disorders, however, the defining clinical features are most commonly studied in the 
context of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). Compared to other anxiety disorders 
research has focused considerably less on worry and GAD. Recent theoretical 
suggestions have highlighted that the application of dual-process theories have 
potential benefit for advancing the conceptualization and understand of worry/GAD 
and its associated processes (e.g., cognitive biases). However, there is as yet little 
empirical research to test the major tenets of these accounts. This is the major aim of 
this research. To this end, relationships between individual processing style - as 
described by Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1983; 1990)  - and 
patterns of information processing (i.e., relationships between attentional control and 
attention and interpretation biases) were examined in relation to self-report measures 
of worry (as assessed by the PSWQ and GADQ-IV). This research project consists of 
four empirical studies based on one sample of undergraduate university students. The 
first study was a self-report study that examined individual processing style and worry 
symptoms in a large sample (N = 302) of undergraduate students. In addition to self-
reported processing style, the remaining three studies examined a subsample from 
Study 1 (N = 106) and used experimental tasks to directly assess the processing styles 
of participants. The tasks examined reasoning (Study 2; deductive, inductive, and 
probabilistic reasoning tasks), attentional control (Study 3 and Study 4; Antisaccade 
task), and interpretation and attentional biases (Study 4; lexical decision task; 
modified dot probe task) in relation to levels of worry. Results demonstrated a 
relationship between self-reported processing style and worry; when individuals 
endorsing high levels of worry are faced with a situation in which they worry they 
!-vi- 
reported engaging in higher levels of rational processing, compared to individuals 
with low levels of worry (Study 1). However, the results of Study 2, which assessed 
actual rather than perceived reasoning ability, did not confirm differences between 
those high and low in worry. Indeed, Study 2 revealed that this was a self-perception, 
as actual strengths or deficits on reasoning tasks were unrelated to processing style 
and levels of worry. No significant relationships were found between implicit tasks, 
self-reported processing style, and worry (Studies 3 and 4); therefore, possible models 
could not be explored with Structural Equation Modeling. The failure to replicate 
previous findings, with regard to attention and interpretation biases, as well as 
attentional control, are discussed in the context of limitations inherent in implicit 
measures of psychological processes. While these results provide no support for the 
hypotheses derived from the dual-processing theories, there are a number of 
limitations that may account for the findings. For example, employing reaction time 
paradigms to examine attention and interpretation biases, the lack of a worry 
induction component, and the consecutive presentation of multiple tasks to each 
participant may have impacted the findings. The need for future research focusing on 
the examination of multiple processes is vital so as to synthesize existing worry 
related knowledge, in order to advance current limitations in the understanding of the 
processes involved in worry. 
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Introduction to the project  
 
This thesis is written as a series of four studies, each contained in its own 
chapter and consisting of an introduction, method, result, and discussion section. The 
rationale for this format is that it enables the presentation of this series of studies most 
efficently and effectively. A literature review and introduction to the thesis are first 
presented to give a background on current theoretical understandings of generalised 
anxiety and worry, as well as providing a rationale for the emperical studies and the 
methods and approach to analyses contained therein: 
Chapter 3 (Study 1)1:    Rational and experiential processing in individuals      
who worry 
Chapter 4 (Study 2):    Reasoning in individuals who worry 
Chapter 5 (Study3):    Attentional control in individuals who worry 
Chapter 6 (Study 4):    Biases of attention and interpretation in individuals  
who worry 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 7) will offer a summary of the major 
findings, limitations and strengths of the project, the implications, both theoretical and 
clinical, as well as future research directions. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Two samples were recruited for the current project. All participants who participated in the project 
were included in Study 1, however, Studies 2-4 consisted of a subsample of Sample 1 and all of the 
participants recruited in Sample 2 (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1, p. 67, for further details). 
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Chapter 1: Background and context of the project 
 
1.1   Worry  
1.1.1  Definition of the construct of worry 
 
Worry is most commonly defined as: “… a chain of thoughts and images, 
negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable; it represents an attempt to 
engage in mental problem-solving in an issue whose outcome is uncertain but 
contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes; consequently, worry 
relates closely to the fear process” (Borkovec et al., 1983, p. 10). Other definitions 
highlight the futility of worry and label it a state of ‘anxious apprehension’ (Stein, 
2004), a continual heightened awareness of possible future danger, which is 
repeatedly rehearsed but never resolved, or regard worry as a problem-solving 
strategy, which also prepares one to cope with or prevent catastrophe (Brown, 1997). 
Regardless of the definition, a uniformity exists in relation to the perception of the 
key features of worry; it is the specific cognitive component of anxiety that is separate 
from the physiological aspects of anxiety and it is verbally encoded with content 
(Brown, 1997).  
1.1.2  Current understanding of the phenomenon of worry 
Research exploring the phenomena of worry has found it to be verbal-
linguistic in nature (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; 
Hirsch, Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012). The abstract verbal nature of 
worry implies that it is not associated with sympathetic activation and is, therefore, 
inherently not closely tied to physiological responding (Borkovec, 1994; Vrana, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1989). Overall, the phenomena of worry involves rehearsing 
possible aversive events and their outcomes, whilst simultaneously looking for ways 
to avoid the projected outcomes in order to better cope as a result of being better 
 !
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prepared. As the nature and process of worry are compatible with successful problem-
solving, preparatory coping (i.e., problem-solving) can evolve into worry if no 
outcome or solution is found (Mathews, 1990). Szabo and Lovibond (2002) examined 
the content of worry and confirmed that worry in itself is not maladaptive, but rather 
it is an attempt to problem solve. Pathological worry was, therefore, suggested to be a 
failure to effectively resolve the problem-solving process (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 
1998; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002). 
 The function of worry is suggested to be a short term reduction in distress, as 
it enables avoidance of threatening imagery and distressing automatic activation 
(Mathews, 1990). Over time, this short-term stress reduction leads to deficits in 
emotional processing and the maintenance of anxiety related cognitions (Stein, 2004). 
Worry effects and consumes cognitive capacity and emotional resources (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mennin, 
Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005; Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009), and creates 
both anxious and depressed affect (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983), and is associated with information processing biases that 
favour the processing of threatening information (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). Worry is particularly insidious for several reasons. First, it is difficult to 
dismiss (Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991). Second, not only does worry act as 
an avenue of threat avoidance but the avoidance leads to inhibition of the emotional 
processing, which in turn prevents the activation of fear structures in memory 
(Brown, 1997; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mathews, 1990). It is the failure to access these 
fear structures that is thought to maintain anxiety, as they are necessary for the 
reduction of anxiety (Brown, 1997).  
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1.2 Transdiagnostic presence of worry 
Despite the futility of worry in reducing anxiety, it is highly prevalent. It is 
present across the full range of anxiety disorders, as well as in a number of other 
disorders, and is coming to be conceptualised as a transdiagnostic process (Borkovec 
et al., 1991; Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 
1989; Konstantellou, Campbell, Eisler, Simic, & Treasure, 2011; McLaughlin, 
Mennin, & Farach, 2007; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997; Turk & Mennin, 
2011).  As worry is suggested to represent a higher-order trait, which has an impact 
on both the origins and course of anxiety and mood disorders (Brown, 1997; Clark, 
Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Watson & Clark, 1984), it highlights the importance of 
research into worry and its associated processes. Understanding worry may allow 
transdiagnostic insights into a wide range of disorders and, therefore, result in more 
effective treatment programs and services based on a more accurate, in-depth, 
understanding of the etiology and maintaining factors.  
Overall, Worry is most closely linked to generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), 
where worry has come to be accepted as the central feature. Thus, in the process of 
examining worry, GAD cannot be ignored; first, because much of what we have come 
to know and understand about worry comes from the research literature examining 
worry is in the context of GAD, and, second, worry related research findings also 
have the strongest implications for GAD. Therefore, the next section will discuss 
GAD, its epidemiology, and its costs and effects on both a personal and societal level. 
1.3 Generalised anxiety disorder 
1.3.1 Diagnosis and characteristics of GAD 
Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is a disabling, often lifelong psychological  
 !
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condition that is characterized by pervasive symptoms of anxiety, which are driven by 
worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Davey & Levy, 1998; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002). GAD 
first appeared as a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-III (DSM-III; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1980). At this time, it was a residual category that 
was considered only when other psychiatric diagnoses had been disregarded. Thus, 
GAD was both poorly defined and lacking in reliability (Turk & Mennin, 2011). 
Chronic and pervasive worry only came to characterize GAD some seven years later, 
with the arrival of the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The 
introduction of worry as the central feature of GAD has resulted in a more cohesive 
and coherent understanding of the diagnosis emerging within the literature; presently 
the diagnosis of GAD has comparable reliability to that of depression (Brown, Di 
Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001).  
Currently, the diagnosis and classification standard for GAD, in the USA, 
Australia2 and for research purposes in Europe, is outlined in the recently published 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). GAD is defined as a chronic anxiety disorder that is characterized 
by persistent, excessive, and uncontrollable worry concerning a number of different 
domains (e.g., work, finances, relationships), which cause clinically significant 
distress and impairment for a defined period. Six criteria are proposed, which are 
necessary to either be met or accounted for in order for the diagnosis to be given. 
Most notably, the worry that is experienced is required to be focused on several 
themes and to be accompanied by at least three physiological symptoms, which are 
not accounted for by another disorder or circumstance.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Thus, the DSM system will be referred to for the purpose of this thesis!
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In terms of worry themes, individuals with GAD have commonly occurring 
clusters of worry themes centered on personal and emotional threats to the self, rather 
than dangers in a more abstract sense (Mathews, 1990). Specifically, close 
relationships, social confidence, life accomplishments, work competence, financial 
solvency and general world problems (Mathews, 1990). However, the content of 
worry is largely dependent on current life circumstances. For example, students 
reported worrying about academic progress and family/interpersonal aspects 
(Borkovec et al., 1983), whilst elderly individuals diagnosed with GAD appear more 
concerned with physical health (Wisocki, 1988). Compared to the general population, 
individuals with GAD do not differ in terms of the presence of worry (Mathews, 
1990). However, they are more sensitive to cues of future threat and tend to not only 
detect, but also select, more threatening interpretations in the processing of possible 
threat cues in their environment (Mathews, 1990).  
 In order for the diagnosis to be given, the intensity, duration, or frequency of 
the anxiety/worry must be disproportionate to that of the actual likelihood or impact 
of the feared event. Individuals with GAD have reported worrying and feeling 
anxious around 50% of the time (Sanderson & Barlow, 1990). A longitudinal 
descriptive study showed that, over a one-year period, individuals with GAD reported 
that few of their original worry themes had remitted (Constans, Barbee, Townsend, & 
Leffler, 2002). Specifically, only 7.4% of participants with a diagnosis of GAD were 
found to no longer engage in worry about domains presented at their initial interview 
(Constans et al., 2002). Furthermore, at the end of the one-year period 63% of the 
participants were found to have maintained worries about themes they had discussed 
in their initial evaluation (Constans et al., 2002).  
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Europe predominantly bases clinical diagnosis on the World Health 
Organization’s Tenth International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). Where this 
classification system differs to the DSM is its focus on the psychic component (e.g., 
worry), rather than the somatic (e.g., muscle tension) or autonomic symptoms (e.g., 
increased arousal). In addition, the DSM focuses on a 6-month symptom presence, 
whereas the ICD-10 does not conceptualize GAD as a chronic disorder (Allgulander, 
2006). These differences have been argued to result in ICD-10 diagnoses having more 
false positives and recognizing a different patient group to DSM diagnoses (Slade & 
Andrews, 2001). In contrast, DSM classifications are associated with higher levels of 
reported disability (Slade & Andrews, 2001). Concordance within and between 
classification systems requires improvement, especially in light of the reported high 
prevalence rates. 
Despite recognition of the validity of the diagnosis and its high prevalence 
rates, GAD is often poorly recognized both in primary care setting and in general 
population. Reports suggest that as few as 30% of people with GAD receive the 
correct diagnosis, with even fewer receiving appropriate treatment, and that up to 
70% of cases go undiagnosed (Allgulander, 2006; Bebbington et al., 2000; Hoehn-
Saric, 2005; Wittchen et al., 2002). Findings also suggest that between 28-66% of 
individuals with GAD seek treatment (Henderson, Andrews, & Hall, 2000; Wittchen, 
Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994), around a third (30%) of whom seek medical 
assistance for their numerous GAD related somatic ailments (Allgulander, 2006; Roy-
Byrne & Wagner, 2004). GAD is most commonly confused with insomnia and 
various functional somatic disorders including: palpitation, migraine, and irritable 
bowel syndrome (Allgulander, 2006). It is one of most common diagnoses of patients 
with unexplained symptoms causing a diagnostic procedure (Allgulander, 2006). For 
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example, one study found that the 23% of the atypical chest pain in an emergency 
department was accounted for by GAD (Wulsin, Arnold, & Hillard, 1991). GAD is 
also the most commonly occurring emotional disorder in individuals presenting for 
treatment of physical conditions associated with stress (Blanchard, Scharff, Schwarz, 
Suls, & et al., 1990; Shear & Schulberg, 1995), and is frequently associated with 
susceptibility to comorbid medical conditions (Bowen, Senthilselvan, & Barale, 2000; 
Harter, Conway, & Merikangas, 2003).  
Although the current conceptualization and understanding of GAD has 
evolved considerably over the last 30 years, GAD is considered the least stable and 
most open to change of all the anxiety disorders (Coutinho et al., 2010). This may 
reflect that, in contrast to the other anxiety disorders, GAD has only fairly recently 
been introduced as a diagnosis. Therefore, as research into GAD increases it can only 
be assumed that the concept of GAD as a diagnosis will continue to undergo 
refinement and take great strides forward in terms of scientific developments that 
offer a deeper understanding of the disorder. As such, it can be expected that the 
diagnosis of GAD will strengthen both in terms of its validity and reliability, which 
will lead to improved screening and more efficacious treatments (Turk & Mennin, 
2011). 
1.3.2 Comorbidity 
A key debate in the literature has been the suggestion that GAD may better 
serve as a prodrome, variant, residual, or severity marker of mood disorder (e.g., 
depression; Kessler, DuPont, Berglund, & Wittchen, 1999). This argument was 
strengthened by the high comorbidity found between major depression and GAD (58-
69.7%), and the limitations in terms of distinguishability of GAD from mood 
disorders; for example, the negative affect, physiological hyperarousal, and absence 
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of positive affect that are observed in both GAD and mood disorders (Goldberg, 
Krueger, Andrews, & Hobbs, 2009; Kessler & Wittchen, 2002; Maier et al., 2000). 
However, studies examining pure and comorbid GAD have argued that GAD is a 
disorder in its own right; GAD is usually the primary diagnosis in cases where it is 
comorbid with depression (Gorwood, 2004; Kessler, 2000; Olfson et al., 1997; Ormel, 
VonKorff, Ustun, Pini, & et al., 1994; Schonfeld et al., 1997). Furthermore, not only 
is GAD a significant predictor of subsequent depression, but the course of GAD has 
been observed to be independent of comorbidity (Gorwood, 2004; Kessler, 2000; 
Olfson et al., 1997; Ormel et al., 1994; Schonfeld et al., 1997). Finally, GAD has been 
found to have similar levels of comorbidity to other disorders (Grant et al., 2005), as 
well as having statistically significant independent associations with impairment 
(Kessler, DuPont, Berglund, & Wittchen, 1999), which offers further support that 
GAD is not a prodromal or residual form of another disorder.  
Comorbidity with other disorders is high and increases both the chronicity and 
debilitation of GAD (Grant et al., 2005; Wittchen et al., 1994). Only one third of 
individuals with a diagnosis of GAD do not have an additional ongoing psychiatric 
diagnosis, with comorbidity suggested to be between 80- 90% for those with a 
lifetime prevalence of GAD (Grant et al., 2005; Judd et al., 1998; Kessler, Chiu, 
Demler, & Walters, 2005; Wittchen et al., 1994). Major depressive disorder, 
dysthymia and posttraumatic stress disorder are most commonly comorbid with GAD 
(Turk & Mennin, 2011), although substance use/abuse (Shader & Greenblatt, 1993), 
panic disorder, mood disorders, social phobia and specific phobia are also frequently 
present (Grant et al., 2005; Massion, Warshaw, & Keller, 1993; Turk & Mennin, 
2011). Comorbidity has serious implications for impairment, recovery, and outcome 
and leads to 50% more help seeking behavior (Bland, Newman, & Orn, 1997). 
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Individuals with GAD and other comorbid psychological disorders report poorer 
physical health (Shader & Greenblatt, 1993), and increased medical/physical 
comorbidity (e.g., Bowen et al., 2000; Harter et al., 2003; Noyes, 2001). Overall, 
when GAD is comorbid with other disorders a profound functional impairment is 
present (Hunt, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2002; Stein, 2004); the greatest levels of 
impairment are observed when GAD presents as comorbid with major depression 
(Kessler et al., 1999; Kessler, Keller, & Wittchen, 2001; Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao, 
Nelson, & et al., 1994). However, remission is also less likely for GAD patients with 
poor interpersonal skills, cluster C personality traits (Yonkers, Dyck, Warshaw, & 
Keller, 2000), and comorbid alcolol/substance abuse (Bruce et al., 2005). In summary, 
the presence of comorbid disorders in individuals with GAD is high and has 
considerable negative consequences; not only does it increase the chronicity and 
debilitation of GAD, it also negatively impacts treatment effectiveness (Bruce et al., 
2005; Grant et al., 2005; Wittchen et al., 1994). In the next sections treatment 
effectiveness will be further discussed, in addition to prevalence rates, course and 
effects of GAD. 
1.3.3 The Epidemiology of Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
1.3.3.1 Prevalence and course of disorder 
Prevalence rates of anxiety disorders vary greatly between published 
epidemiological reports and are particularly challenging to accurately estimate in 
relation to GAD, due to the diverse and constantly evolving diagnostic criteria 
(Allgulander, 2006). Additionally, underreporting and the underrepresentation of 
important populations, including the homeless, those in institutions, and those who 
cannot speak English, also has an impact (Allgulander, 2006). Therefore, despite 
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GAD being reported to be the most prevalent anxiety disorder in primary care settings 
- accounting for almost a quarter of patients presenting with an anxiety condition - 
current estimates may be conservative (Allgulander, 2006; Maier et al., 2000; Wells, 
2009; Wittchen et al., 2002).  
Over a 12-month period, prevalence rates were reported at 3.6% in Australia 
(2.4% for men, 3.7% for women;  Henderson et al., 2000; Hunt et al., 2002; Statistics, 
2008), whilst in the United States they ranged from 2.1 to 3.3% (Grant et al., 2005; 
Somers, Goldner, Waraich, & Hsu, 2006), and were somewhat lower in other 
(particularly developing) countries: Europe 1.7%; Mexico 0.8%; China 0.8%; South 
Korea 1%; Japan 1.2%; and 1.4% in South Africa (Lewis-Fernandez et al., 2010). 
Lifetime prevalence rates are estimated to be slightly higher, for example, they range 
from 4.1% - 6.3% in American samples (Grant et al., 2005; Somers et al., 2006) and 
from 5.1 - 5.9% in Australia (Henderson et al., 2000; Hunt et al., 2002; Statistics, 
2008). Longitudinal studies suggest that 74% of GAD patients experienced their 
illness over a 12-year period (Bruce et al., 2005). Age has been found to impact 
prevalence rates, with onset being rare in children and adolescents (Wittchen, 
Lachner, Wunderlich, & Pfister, 1998); the majority of cases are observed in persons 
aged 20- 47-years (Turk & Mennin, 2011). Gender differences are also evident, with 
women more frequently diagnosed than men (Somers et al., 2006; Statistics, 2008).  
In terms of the course of the disorder, GAD is chronic (Brown, Barlow, & 
Liebowitz, 1994) with individuals often feeling anxious all their lives, and describing 
themselves as anxious or worry prone personalities (Allgulander, 2006). This is 
reflected in some conceptualizations of GAD as a temperamental predisposition, or an 
exaggeration of a normal personality disposition (Akiskal, 1998; Rapee, 1991). 
Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, and Barlow (1997) even went as far as to suggest that 
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GAD is best conceptualized as a trait, or a general vulnerability, rather than an Axis I 
diagnosis. Because of the proposed relationship with personality, and the chronic and 
constant fluctuations in symptoms over time in response to life stressors (Stein, 2004), 
GAD is commonly neither recognized nor referred for treatment (Brawman-Mintzer 
& Lydiard, 1996; Keller, 2002; Rapee, 1991). Thus, individuals often suffer for many 
years before being diagnosed (Brawman-Mintzer & Lydiard, 1996; Keller, 2002; 
Rapee, 1991).  
1.3.3.2 The effects of generalised anxiety disorder: Quality of  
        life and societal costs  
Due to the chronic and pervasive nature of GAD, the cost of GAD is high both 
in terms of individual burden and cost to society (Kessler et al., 1999; Ormel et al., 
1994). A diagnosis of GAD is an important predictor of disability, impaired quality of 
life, wellbeing, life satisfaction (Wittchen, 2002), poor outcomes (Hunt, et al., 2002; 
Stein, 2004; Roy-Byrne & Wagner, 2004), negative impacts on work and social 
functioning (Stein & Heimberg, 2004; Turk & Mennin, 2011), as well as being related 
to substantial societal and economic costs (Ballenger et al., 2001; Wittchen, 2002). 
For example, findings estimate that 53.2% of individuals with GAD expereince high 
to very high psychological distress, second only to the distress experienced by 
individuals with agoraphobia. Impairment and disability in GAD is considerable and 
is comparable to that of major depression (Kessler et al., 1999), pure mood disorders 
(Grant et al., 2005), and chronic conditions such as arthritis and diabetes (Kessler et 
al., 2001; Maier et al., 2000). Additionally, in an Australian sample, GAD was found 
to interfere in various aspects of life with respondents reporting interference in their 
home life (24.1%), their work/study (24.2%), their close relationships (31.8%), and 
their social life (37.8%; Statistics, 2007). Overall, in Australia, GAD has been found 
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to be associated with the highest level of interference at an individual and societal 
level comparative to other anxiety disorders. Of those diagnosed with GAD, 48% 
experienced severe or very severe interference in at least one of the four domains of 
life (Statistics, 2007). 
The societal cost of GAD results from reduced work productivity and 
increased healthcare costs. For example, in Australia, individuals with a diagnosis of 
GAD are reported to have decreased work productivity and to spend between 4.9 - 8.4 
days out of role over a one-month period, which accounts for 2.7 million person-days 
out of role per month due to GAD. This is higher than other mental health disorder, 
affective disorders (2.1 million) or substance abuse (1.1 million; Statistics, 2007; 
Henderson et al., 2000). Thus, it is associated with significant economic burden 
(Souĕtre et al., 1994). Other studies have estimated that over one-third of individuals 
diagnosed with GAD had more than a 10% decrease in work productivity and a 50% 
reduction in output, as well as being considered likely to be high users of primary 
healthcare (Wittchen et al., 2002). 
In terms of healthcare costs, the World Health Organization multicenter study 
across 14 countries estimated the prevalence rates to be 8% of all primary care users 
(Maier et al., 2000; Sartorius et al., 1990). In addition, patients with pure GAD were 
found to have twice as many primary care visits as patients with depression, even 
after physical illness was accounted for (Wittchen et al., 2002). The burden of illness 
related to GAD appears to far outweigh the capacity of mental health service 
providers (Somers et al., 2006). GAD patients often present as ‘frustrating’ and ‘high 
utilizes’ (Allgulander, 2006), which perhaps reflects the limitations with current 
theory and treatment models. Despite these overwhelming findings, only between 28 - 
66% of individuals with GAD have been found to seek help, which was much lower 
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than for other types of disorders (half the rate than for affective disorders; Henderson 
et al., 2000; Wittchen et al., 1994). !
1.3.3.3 Treatment effectiveness 
Despite GAD being a disorder that is prevalent, chronic, and has a large costs 
both at the individual and societal level, currently there is a pressing need for more 
effective treatments. Unfortunately, despite the growing evidence base for effective 
treatments in the research literature, the effectiveness of treatments appears to be 
limited; treatment has only been found to be effective for around 50% of patients 
(Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Gould, 
Safran, O'Neill Washington, & Otto, 2004), with women (46%) being less likely to 
attain remission following treatment in comparison to men (56%; Mancuso, 
Townsend, & Mercante, 1993; Yonkers, Bruce, Dyck, & Keller, 2003). 
Some authors (e.g., Mennin, 2004; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002) suggest that poor 
treatment outcomes in GAD are due to the symptoms of the disorder challenging 
traditional cognitive behavioral approaches to treatment (Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, 
Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006), whilst others argue that the poor outcomes are due to 
limitations in our conceptual models of the disorder (Koerner, 2014). Regardless, 
GAD remains the most treatment resistant of all the anxiety disorders; individuals 
with GAD, compared to other anxiety disorders, are more frequently left experiencing 
significant residual symptoms (Brown et al., 1994; Gould et al., 2004).  
1.4 Summary 
Although frequently present in all anxiety disorders, worry, the cognitive 
component of anxiety, is most commonly studied in the context of GAD (Borkovec et 
al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992; Craske et al., 1989; Konstantellou et al., 2011; 
McLaughlin et al., 2007; Roemer et al., 1997; Turk & Mennin, 2011). GAD has been 
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found to be prevalent, chronic, and debilitating with a large cost both at the individual 
and societal level (Kessler et al., 1999; Ormel et al., 1994; Roy-Byrne & Wagner, 
2004; Stein, 2004). When compared to the other anxiety disorders, research that aims 
to understand the mechanisms underlying worry (and thereby GAD) has been 
neglected (Boschen, 2008). This may go some way to explaining the poor 
effectiveness of current treatments, relative to treatments for other anxiety disorders 
(Koerner, 2014). A more comprehensive understanding of worry has the potential to 
offer insight into individual factors that may contribute to the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders, especially GAD (Kristalyn Salters-Pedneault, 
Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006; Boschen, 2008). An important first step is to 
better understanding factors and processes involved in the development and 
maintenance of worry at the theoretical level. Therefore, current theories and models 
of worry, and GAD - due to their incorporation of worry as the central feature - will 
be discussed in the next section. 
1.5 Theories and Models of Chronic Worry and Generalised Anxiety Disorder   
Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, and Staples (2009) argued that in order 
for us to develop new, more effective treatments, or to more effectively utilize 
existing treatments we must further understand the mechanisms underlying worry. 
The past two decades has seen a significant increase in the development of theories 
and models that have helped shape our current understanding of the etiology and 
maintaining factors of GAD, and the central role of worry. Although theories of 
worry/GAD share an emphasis on the avoidance of internal affective experience 
(thoughts, beliefs, and emotions), they can be grouped into three clusters or types 
depending on their specific focus; (1) experiential/emotional models, (2) cognitive 
models, and (3) integrated models (see: Behar et al., 2009, for review). Although 
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many of the theories have more similarities than differences, the key models that have 
an existing evidence base will be individually discussed - using the framework of the 
aforementioned three clusters - followed by a final summary section (Section 1.5.4, 
pp. 44-48), which will offer a synthesis of the models. 
1.5.1 Cognitive Models 
1.5.1.1 Description 
The models contained within the ‘cognitive models’ cluster include: the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998), the 
Anxious Apprehension/‘Basic’ Anxiety Model (Barlow, 1988), the Information 
Processing Model (Rapee, 1991), and The Metacognitive Model (Wells, 1995). Both 
Barlow (1988) and Rapee (1991) drew on the existing literature across several 
decades to develop their early models of GAD. They both conceptualised GAD as the 
‘basic’ anxiety disorder because its core features were thought to represent the 
fundamental processes of anxiety, and in fact all emotional disorders (Barlow, 2002; 
Rapee, 1991). However, this anxious apprehension process differs only in its content 
or focus, which determines the resulting psychopathology. 
Barlow’s (1988, 2002) Anxious Apprehension Model stipulates that the 
‘basic’ anxiety experienced in GAD is an ‘anxious apprehension’ - a future-orientated 
mood state where an individual is in a constant state of readiness to cope with 
potential upcoming negative events. Both physiological and biological reactions are 
argued to lead to an increase in self-focused attention and hypervigilance to threat, 
which in turn increases these physiological and biological reactions (Barlow, 2002). 
The strength of Barlow’s (1988) model is that it offers a framework from which to 
understand the key factors implicated in etiology, that is, how the development and 
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maintenance of GAD stems from a biological vulnerability, which combines with a 
psychological vulnerability. This vulnerability predisposes an individual to develop 
worry/GAD when they are faced with stressful negative life events.  
Similarly, Rapee’s (1991) Information Processing Model (IPM) also posits 
that GAD results from anxious, presumably automatic, responses to a variety of 
internal or external, physical or social cues. However, the central role Rapee gives to 
attention, in these automatic responses to cues, implicates the role of erroneous 
information processing as central to the development and maintenance of GAD. 
Specifically, when threat cues are perceived Rapee argues that a variety of associated 
information - which is stored in long-term memory - is accessed (see Figure 1.1). Due 
to the extensive attentional resources that are employed in the detection of threatening 
information, individuals with GAD have a lowered threshold for threat (see double 
arrows in Figure 1.1). Thus, threatening associations are more likely to be accessed, 
and the threatening meaning is, therefore, more likely to be processed. Rapee’s (1991) 
model presents the affect of anxiety as a unique informational representation; when 
information related to threat is accessed, this triggers an ‘anxiety node’, which in turn 
relays back to the threatening information to further lower the threshold. Additionally, 
when the ‘anxiety node’ is accessed it leads to the generation of potential responses. 
The potential responses are associated with internal representations of likely 
outcomes of such responses, particularly focusing on the perceived ability to manage 
and control the threat; if the management of the specific threat is perceived to be 
possible the ‘anxiety node’ is not activated. Individuals with GAD are thought to have 
more associations and reduced number of associations of threat controlling actions.  
In addition to Rapee’s (1991) model, the 1990s also led to the development of 
Meta-cognitive Model (Wells, 1995) and the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model  
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Figure 1.1: Rapee’s (1991) information-processing model of the maintenance of 
generalized anxiety disorder. 
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(IUM; Dugas et al., 1998). These models focus on the role of maladaptive beliefs in 
the development and maintenance of GAD. The IUM (see Figure 1.2) centralizes 
intolerance of uncertainty (IU) - a dispositional characteristic that includes 
maladaptive beliefs about uncertain situations and events (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 
2004; Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas, Letarte, Rheaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995; 
Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & et al., 1994) - as directly related to worry. The 
other components in the model, aside from IU, include a negative problem orientation 
(or a lack confidence in one’s ability to problem solve and the perception of problems 
as threatening), positive beliefs about worry (e.g., worry helps me cope), and 
cognitive avoidance. Unlike IU, the other components in the model are presented as 
being indirectly related to worry (Dugas et al., 1998; Maydeu-Olivares & D'Zurilla, 
1996); IU serves to precipitate the chain of worry (see Figure 1.2), as well as negative 
problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance, which are present in GAD (Behar et al., 
2009). Therefore, when faced with highly uncertain ambiguous situations individuals 
with GAD, due to their low tolerance for uncertainty, experience extreme distress and 
actively engage in worry in an attempt to cope or prevent aversive events from 
occurring (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). However, the worry and accompanying 
anxiety leads to a negative problem orientation and cognitive avoidance, which then 
maintain the cycle of worry. 
The Metacognitive Model (Wells, 1995) proposes that worry is maintained by 
positive reinforcement. The Metacognitive Model (MCM; see Figure 1.3) also 
proposes that worry is a strategy employed to allow individuals to cope with potential 
future problems, as well as being a response to “what if…” questioning 
(thoughts/doubts; Fisher & Wells, 2011). Worry is argued by the MCM to be 
triggered by intrusive negative thoughts and to be associated with a range of  
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Figure 1.2: The Intolerance of Uncertainty Model of GAD (Dugas et al., 1998) 
 
 
Figure 1. 3: Wells’ (1995) Metacognitive Model of GAD 
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ineffective strategies, aimed at avoidance of worry via behaviors aimed at control 
(Wells, 1999, 2004). Two types of worry are specified; encountering anxiety-
activating situations results in positive beliefs about worry/Type 1 worry (e.g., “worry 
helps me cope”), which stimulates an anxiety response that may lead to negative 
beliefs about worry/Type 2 or meta-worry (e.g., worry is uncontrollable). Positive 
beliefs do not have specificity to GAD or pathological worry, although they play a 
central role in GAD due to their flow on effect in activating negative beliefs about 
worry (Wells, 2009). It is Type 2 worry that is argued to be responsible for the 
persistence of worry. Due to worry being perceived as the main coping strategy it 
remains unchallenged, which results in the associated dysfunctional beliefs remaining 
stable. Overtime, these beliefs combine with behaviors, such as avoidance, 
suppression and mental distraction, which act to corroborate and maintain the cycle 
(Fisher & Wells, 2011; Wells, 2005). Because these beliefs and behaviours are 
ineffective coping strategies they do not allow individuals to access disconfirming 
evidence against their beliefs that worry is dangerous or uncontrollable (Wells, 1999). 
Therefore, these coping strategies serve to reinforce the unhelpful worry related 
beliefs. 
 1.5.1.2 Empirical Support for Cognitive Models 
Overall, evidence has been found in support of all the aforementioned models. 
Research suggests that GAD is associated with extremely high levels of trait anxiety  
(Szabo, 2011), and that negative life events increase the risk of GAD (Raskin, Peeke, 
Dickman, & Pinsker, 1982; Tweed, Schoenbach, George, & Blazer, 1989). These 
findings are consistent with Barlow’s (1988) model. Rapee’s (1991) model appears to 
have more extensive support than Barlow’s (1988) model; a considerable body of 
research indicates that GAD is associated with preferential attention towards threat, 
 !
-22- !
the requirement for greater attentional resources, as well as an inflated interpretation 
of subjective personal risk both in terms of the probability and cost of danger 
occurring (see: Barlow & Durand, 2003; Craske, 1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; 
Stapinski, Abbott, & Rapee, 2010). However, since the development of these models 
two decades ago, the research literature has developed significantly. Furthermore, 
research has shown a shift in focus away from the inflated perception of negative 
events per se, to also consider the core feature of perception of control (e.g., Chorpita 
& Barlow, 1998; Craske et al., 1989). Thus, research has begun to focus more 
intensely on aspects such as intolerance of uncertainty (IU) and metacognitions. 
Despite this shift in focus, considerable variation in findings from tests of the central 
assumptions of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (IUM) and Metacognition 
Model (MCM) has been observed. However, this may reflect a requirement for more 
robust methodologies. 
Although evidence of the specificity of intolerance of uncertainty and the 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Model’s associated constructs to GAD is mixed (Behar et 
al., 2009; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; Holaway, Heimberg, & 
Coles, 2006; Ladouceur et al., 1999; Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998; Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), there is some support for the model’s central 
assumptions. Higher levels of IU, perceived uncontrollability of experiences and 
consequent amplification of emotional distress have been observed in both analogue 
and clinical samples (Behar et al., 2009; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 1998; 
Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Dugas et al., 2007; Ladouceur, Blais, 
Freeston, & Dugas, 1998; Ladouceur et al., 1999). In addition, significantly greater 
difficulties with negative problem orientation (but not actual problem-solving), 
problem-solving confidence (Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; 
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Ladouceur et al., 1998; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a, 2005b), increased levels of 
positive beliefs about worry  (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 1998), and cognitive 
avoidance (thought suppression; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 1998) have also 
been demonstrated in participants with high levels of worry (Dugas et al., 2007). 
However, an overarching limitation with regard to research into the IUM is the lack of 
consistency in the assessment of the construct of ‘intolerance of uncertainty’. This 
highlights the need for further research with consistent operational definitions, in 
addition to studies that address other methodological limitations (e.g., reliance on 
self-report measures; Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). 
Significant limitations also exist with regard to the Meta-cognitive Model, 
particularly in terms of the lack of longitudinal data (Behar et al., 2009). However, 
there is some evidence in support of the MCM’s central predictions; no difference in 
engagement in Type 1 worry has been observed between participants with GAD, 
worriers without GAD (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004), and non-worried anxious 
individuals (Davis & Valentiner, 2000), although negative beliefs about worry and 
meta-worry/Type 2 worry have been found to differentiate individuals with and 
without pathological worry (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Davis & Valentiner, 2000; Ruscio & Borkovec, 
2004; Wells & Carter, 1999, 2001). Yet, it appears unclear as to whether these 
negative beliefs about worry are specific to individuals with GAD or whether they are 
characteristic of anxiety disorders in general. Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) found that 
negative beliefs may be relevant for all individuals with high levels of worry, not just 
those with GAD, as similar levels of negative beliefs about worry and meta-worry 
have been observed in individuals with GAD, OCD (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997), and panic disorder (Wells & Carter, 2001). Criticism has also been voiced with 
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regard to negative beliefs about worry and Type 2 worry. Although distinguished as 
two separate entities, they are not reliably distinguished by measures associated with 
the model (e.g., the Meta-cognitions questionnaire; Behar et al., 2009; Cartwright-
Hatton & Wells, 1997).  
Overall, an overarching limitation of the cognitive models is that emotional 
aspects are overlooked in favor of cognitive components (McLaughlin et al., 2007); 
studies have tended to examine only individual components implicated in the models 
(e.g., biases of attention or interpretation), rather than testing all factors within the 
model concurrently. This thesis will aim to overcome some of these limitations by 
simultaneously examining multiple processes implicated in worry/GAD using the 
framework of models that take an integrated approach to account for both the 
cognitive and emotional aspects.  
1.5.2 Emotional/Experiential Models 
1.5.2.1 Description 
The important role of emotions in the conceptualization and treatment of GAD 
is placed at the forefront in the emotional/experiential models of GAD: the Emotion 
Dysregulation Model (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002; Mennin et al., 2005) 
and the Acceptance-based Model (ABM) of GAD (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Roemer, 
Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005). Emotion regulation, that is, how individuals 
recognize, influence, manage, experience, give meaning to, and express their 
emotions in a context appropriate manner to effectively respond to life’s demands 
(Gross, 1998b), is the focus of the Emotion Dysregulation Model (EDM; Mennin et 
al., 2005). In contrast, the ABM conceptualizes GAD as a disorder characterized by 
experiential avoidance, whereby individuals with GAD are seen to have negative 
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reactions to their internal experiences (e.g., emotions) and, therefore, attempt to avoid 
these experiences by engaging in worry (Roemer et al., 2005). Overall, similar to the 
cognitive models, both emotional models perceive worry as an avoidant response 
(Mennin et al., 2002), and GAD as a multicomponent syndrome where worry acts as 
an attempt to control, avoid, or blunt the emotion that leads to the disruption of ones 
experience. Additionally, both models highlight the disconnection between internal 
states/emotions and one’s environment. For example, individuals diagnosed with 
GAD react negatively to their internal experiences (e.g., negative thoughts or meta-
emotions that the individual is unable to modulate), which lead to difficulties in 
awareness, monitoring, accepting, and interpreting emotions. Experiential avoidance 
strategies - avoidance of internal experiences that are perceived as threatening or 
aversive - are also integral to both models, whereby, in order to diminish the aversive 
internal experience individuals engage in avoidance strategies (e.g., worry).  
The Emotion Dysregulation Model (EDM; see Figure 1.4) accounts for both 
limited knowledge and skill in the management of emotional experiences and 
expression of appropriate responses (modulation of expression of emotion). In 
addition, the EDM accounts for engagement in counterproductive strategies 
(maladaptive emotional management), such as worry, as individuals attempt to 
regulate their own emotional experience (Mennin et al., 2005; Turk, Heimberg, 
Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). In contrast, the Acceptance-Based Model (ABM) 
(ABM; Roemer et al., 2005) focuses predominantly on the two mechanisms of 
avoidance that characterizes worry: perceived avoidance of low-probability future 
negative events (based on the belief that worry reduces likelihood of future negative 
events) and, experiential avoidance ( see Figure 1.5). According to the ABM, active 
engagement in worry in response to threatening stimuli is thought to increase distress  
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Figure 1.4: The Emotion Dysregulation Model of GAD (Mennin et al., 2002, 2005)  
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: The Acceptance-Based Model of GAD (Roemer et al., 2005)
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by interrupting the informative feedback an individual has with their environment, as 
well as leading to behavioural restriction (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Behavioral 
restriction - whereby participation in valued actions or activities that hold meaning for 
the individual are reduced, such as leisure activities or spending time with friends 
(Roemer & Orsillo, 2002) - is thought to decrease awareness of the present moment. 
This results in a cycle of becoming less engaged and, in turn, more distressed due to 
an increase in the present negative internal experiences (Behar et al., 2009). The 
Emotion Dysregulation Model focuses less on behavioural aspects and, instead, 
highlights that it is the difficulties with emotional modulation that lead to the 
experience of emotions being subjectively aversive, which precipitates the 
development of the unhelpful cycle of worry. Thus, engagement in worry is a 
cognitive control strategy, whereby an attempt is made to ‘fix’ the issues an 
individual has with regulatory processes. However, engagement in worry only acts to 
induce further dysregulation of emotional experience resulting in greater difficulty in 
managing emotional reactions to events during or immediately following periods of 
worry (McLaughlin et al., 2007).  
1.5.2.2 Empirical Support for Experiential/Emotional Models 
Although initial support was found for the EDM and the role of emotion 
dysregulation in individuals with GAD (Mennin et al., 2005), later findings have 
contradicted the key predictions of the model (Decker, Turk, Hess, & Murray, 2008; 
Novick-Kline, Turk, Mennin, Hoyt, & Gallagher, 2005). Research has found that 
individuals with GAD report emotion regulation deficits (Salters-Pedneault et al., 
2006). Notably, maladaptive, as opposed to adaptive emotion regulation strategies, 
have been found in a non-clinical population endorsing GAD symptomatology (Aldao 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011), and it appears to be the identification and labeling of 
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emotions that are most problematic. In addition, compared to their non-anxious 
counterparts, individuals with GAD report their emotional experiences as more 
intense (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Mennin et al., 2005; Turk et al., 2005), and 
regardless of active engagement in worry, they also have greater negative reactivity to 
emotions, as well as poorer emotional management skills (McLaughlin et al., 2007; 
Mennin et al., 2005; Turk et al., 2005).  
In contrast, other studies have found emotional awareness and negative 
expressivity to be unrelated to chronic worry (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Salters-
Pedneault et al., 2006). Furthermore, participants with GAD were not found to differ 
in the emotion regulation strategies they used, nor to report using them more 
frequently, compared to non-anxious controls (Novick-Kline et al., 2005). However, 
participants with GAD were found to have more nuanced descriptions of emotional 
reactions and to work harder than control participants to regulate emotions, such as 
engage in self-soothing strategies (Novick-Kline et al., 2005). This research builds a 
case that although individuals with GAD perceive their ability to differentiate 
emotions as limited, these perceptions do not reflect their capabilities (Novick-Kline 
et al., 2005). Despite the possibility that GAD leads to emotion dysregulation, studies 
are yet to directly test if emotion dysregulation deficits precede the development of 
chronic worry (Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006). 
The ABM has a smaller research base, with only partial support offered for the 
central tenet that distress and avoidance of internal experiences contribute to the 
development and maintenance of GAD (Lee, Orsillo, Roemer, & Allen, 2010). 
Evidence suggests that experiential avoidance has been associated with chronic worry 
and GAD severity in clinical and non-clinical samples (Roemer et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, associations have been observed between emotion regulation difficulties 
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or lower levels of mindfulness, and GAD symptom severity or diagnosis (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Freeston et al., 1994; Lee, Orsillo, 
et al., 2010). However, the behavioral restriction component of the ABM has been 
largely overlooked in research. According to the ABM values-consistent behavior 
(i.e., valued action) is particularly important in understanding quality of life 
impairment in GAD (Michelson, Lee, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2011). Preliminary findings 
indicate that individuals with GAD reported less engagement in valued action, 
compared to healthy control participants, with valued action being found to be 
correlated with measures of experiential avoidance, distress about emotions, and 
quality of life (Michelson et al., 2011). Michelson et al. (2011) reported that 
restrictions in valued actions contributed unique variance to diminished quality of life 
over and above gender, GAD severity, experiential avoidance, distress about 
emotions, and depression comorbidity (Michelson et al., 2011).  
Due to the limitations with self-report measures, particularly when examining 
unconscious processes, experimental methodologies are required to further examine 
the central features of the ABM and whether threatening associations and avoidance 
are outside of conscious awareness. This is important in order to clarify the temporal 
relationship between the model’s constructs, to evaluate the key tenets of the model, 
and to determine causal relationships with more rigorous methodologies. 
Furthermore, significant theoretical overlap exists between the operationalization of 
constructs, as well as an acceptance-based behavioral approach and mechanisms of 
action suggested by other models, such as the emotion dysregulation model (e.g., 
Behar et al., 2009; Mennin et al., 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Roemer et al., 
2005). 
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In terms of limitations, the EDM proposes that emotions are aversive to GAD 
patients due to their deficits in emotional regulation (Mennin, 2004), however, there is 
currently no research that has examined this proposal. Additionally, research has yet 
to examine the dynamic nature of emotion dysregulation, which involves several 
processes that are expressed over time (Gross, 1998a; Rottenberg & Gross, 2003; 
Thompson, 1994). Currently, research exploring emotion dysregulation could reflect 
possible problems in a number of processes, such as the initial generation of 
emotions, or interpretation and use of these emotions (Lynch, Robins, Morse, & 
MorKrause, 2001; Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007). This may 
go some way to explaining the discrepant findings in the current research. Overall, 
research in support of the EDM is tentative, the proportion of variance accounted for 
by its factors in explaining GAD is modest, and the measurement of constructs needs 
to be improved (Mennin et al., 2007). Although both experiential models of GAD 
have promising findings in their support, they are still in the preliminary phases of 
investigation (Lee, Abegg, Rodriguez, Koehn, & Barton, 2010; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2002; Roemer et al., 2005; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006). 
Limitations relevant to both experiential models include the presence of small 
sample sizes and the reliance on self-report measures. Self-report measures present a 
significant problem, as there is evidence that we are unreliable when required to offer 
insight into our internal processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Furthermore, the 
presence of chronic worry and GAD has been associated with difficulties in accessing 
and reporting emotional and cognitive experiences (Mennin, 2004). Therefore, the 
ability of self-report measures to capture the constructs of interest is questionable; 
participants’ perceptions may not reflect actual difficulties with emotion regulation or 
mindfulness skills. In light of the current limitation in research methodologies it is not 
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clear whether the measured constructs (e.g., experiential avoidance and fear of 
emotional responding) are specific to GAD or whether the results are due to co-
occurring psychopathology, such as depression, or trait anxiety (Lee, Abegg, et al., 
2010). In order to overcome these limitations, the studies included in this thesis will 
engage a large sample and predominantly employ experimental and implicit measures 
of the variables of interest, rather than relying solely on self-report measures. 
1.5.3 Integrated Models 
1.5.3.1 Description 
The final models to be discussed are the integrated models, which include  
Borkovec’s Cognitive Avoidance Model of Worry (AMW; Borkovec, 1994; 
Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004), Ouimet, Gawronski and Dozois’ (2009) 
Integrated Model, and Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) cognitive model of pathological 
worry. The integrated models are perhaps the most compelling as they build on the 
aforementioned cognitive and emotional models by incorporating both cognitive and 
affective aspects. Furthermore, research examining the key assumptions of the 
integrated models employs rigorous psychophysiological experimental methodologies 
and, therefore, provides greater confidence in the research findings.  
Borkovec’s model (see Figure 1.6) conceptualizes worry as a verbal linguistic, 
thought based activity (Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005; Borkovec et al., 2004; 
Borkovec & Inz, 1990) that acts to suppress mental imagery associated with somatic 
and emotional activation (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). 
This suppression leads to a disabling of the emotional processing of fear that would 
be necessary for habituation and extinction to be achieved (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 
2006; Foa & Kozak, 1986). Thus, pathological worry is viewed as a perseverative, 
 !
-32- !
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: The Avoidance Model of Worry and GAD (Borkovec, 1994) 
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cognitive activity that serves as avoidance. Specifically, catastrophic images are 
swapped for less distressing and somatically activating verbal linguistic activity, with 
worry acting as a cognitive attempt to problem solve and remove possible future 
threat, or to keep thinking about more distressing topics (e.g., interpersonal and 
difficult childhood experiences; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). In this way, the aversive 
somatic and emotional experiences that accompany the process of fear are avoided 
and one is able to approach emotional topics at an abstract, conceptual level and avoid 
- in the short term - the aversive images, autonomic arousal, and intense negative 
emotions (Borkovec et al., 2004). As worry reduces arousal and stops activation of 
fear structures in memory, emotional processing is prevented, (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; 
Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Vrana et al., 1986, 1989) which, over time, leads to a more 
intense experience of anxiety and increasing engagement in worry to ‘dull’ and avoid 
distressing stimuli (Fisher & Wells, 2011). Worry is, therefore, an ineffective strategy 
that serves to perpetuate the cycle of anxiety by preventing emotional processing.  
Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model (see Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8) is 
somewhat different in its approach, whereby, an individual with pathological worry is 
argued to have an internal representation of threat that is activated more strongly, as a 
result of the increased influence of involuntary bottom-up processes (e.g., emotional 
processing biases and habits of thought). Thus, for worry prone individuals, negative 
thoughts intrude into consciousness due to the influence of involuntary processes, 
which activate stronger internal representation of threat. These in turn are unable to be 
inhibited due to insufficient voluntary control, which is required in order to overcome 
competing threat representations, resulting in poor maintenance of attention away 
from threat. In this way bottom-up processes - such as habitual biases of attention and 
interpretation - interact with deficits in top down processes (e.g., attentional 
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Figure 1.7: Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model as applied to non-anxious individuals 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model as applied to worry-prone individuals
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control) resulting in lowered maintenance of attention and enhanced threat 
representations, which intrude into consciousness and develop into worry. Thus, a 
processing style develops whereby habits develop and (i) become automated and 
repetitive; (ii) tend to persist; and (iii) lead to increased future intrusions. Cognitive 
biases for threat then develop that activate representations of threat and lead to 
protracted worry, as deficits in attentional control processes result in being unable to 
maintain focus on the intended task. Motivation to refocus attention is also thought to 
be reduced by beliefs that worry is uncontrollable or useful. Hirsch and Mathews’ 
(2012) model suggests that the more threatening the thought, or the more catastrophic 
the interpretation, the more unlikely attentional control will be utilized, and the more 
likely the worry episode will escalate. The worry episode, in turn, results in more 
catastrophic interpretations and more attentional capture. In individuals with high 
levels of worry, attentional control is unable to restrain this process, and the cognitive 
resources required to refocus attention are consumed and unable to be engaged.  
Commonalities can be observed between Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model 
and the other cognitive models, as they also propose that cognitive characteristics 
(i.e., biases in the processing of emotional information, difficulties with executive 
control of attention, and the quasi-verbal nature of worry) contribute to the 
development and maintenance of pathological worry/GAD. However, cognitive and 
affective processes are incorporated in that voluntary and involuntary processes are 
accounted for. Therefore, Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model has the most obvious 
parallels with Ouimet et al.’s (2009) model; both models focus on voluntary top down 
processes and involuntary bottom-up processes as central to the development of 
anxiety/worry of pathological worry. 
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Although Ouimet et al.’s (2009) recent Integrative Model focused on a 
vulnerability to anxiety more generally, rather than being specific to worry, it 
implicates similar processes (e.g., information processing biases executive 
functioning and the relationship between voluntary and involuntary processes) as 
those described in Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model of worry. Due to these 
similarities, as well as the presence of worry across anxiety disorders, and the novel 
approach of examining the relationship of dual-process theory to worry, it was 
decided to include this model in the current discussion. Ouimet et al. (2009) highlight 
dual-processing systems as fundamental to psychopathology. They argue that it is the 
strength of threat-related associations (associative processes) and the strategies 
employed to invalidate such associations (rule based processes), in additon to 
individual differences in executive functioning, which are central to the development 
and maintenance of anxiety.  
Specifically, it is argued that response or self-regulatory conflicts (e.g., 
impaired attentional disengagment) result from a conflict between responses elicited 
by the associative system and rule-based systems (Ouimet et al., 2009). For example, 
impaired attentional disengagement results from a conflict between an individual’s 
associative fear network, which may become activated by an anxiety provoking 
situation (engagement responses), whilst concurrently avoidance responses are 
generated by the rule-based system (engagement in active worry; Ouimet et al., 2009; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Intuitive judgment and behavior are argued to be 
determined by an interplay between associative and rule- based processes. However, 
worry does not allow for the emotional experience to be processed and, thus, there is 
no dampening of the overactivation of the associative fear network; it remains active 
and enhances the likelihood of a threatening interpretations by the rule-based system. 
 !
-37- !
Although there are striking parallels between the models, Hirsch and 
Mathews’ (2012) model specifically implicates deficits in attentional control, whilst 
Ouimet et al (2009) propose executive control processes more generally. In contrast, 
aside from implicating processes that could be classified as either automatic or 
controlled, Borkovec’s AMW has little in common with both Hirsch and Mathews 
(2012) and Ouimet et al.’s (2009) models. The latter two integrated models are based 
on the distinction between automatic and controlled processes, that are central to dual-
process models, which have until recently been largely overlooked in relation to 
models of anxiety and pathological worry (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; McNally, 1995). 
This seems surprising in light of the extensive research that has provided strong 
evidence for the fundamental role of cognitive dysfunction and information 
processing deficits (e.g., biases in attention and interpretation) in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety and GAD (Beck & Clark, 1997; Hutton, 2008; Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
Ouimet et al. (2009) distinguish each stage of processing as either associative 
(bottom up) or rule-based (top down) processes and stipulate that it is individual 
differences in the interplay between these processes that contribute to a cognitive 
vulnerability to various types of anxiety disorders. Associative and rule-based 
processes are proposed to contribute to all stages of processing of threat-related 
stimuli in anxious individuals. Ouimet et al. (2009) provide a conceptual integration 
of anxiety-related cognitive biases by linking anxiety symptoms to basic information 
processes (including: orientation, engagement, disengagement, avoidance and 
interpretation; see Figure 1.9). The model stipulates that potential cognitive 
vulnerability to anxiety specifically arises from the activation of threat-related 
associations, the invalidation of threat strategy (i.e., via reappraisal), and the  
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Figure 1.9: Ouimet et al.’s (2009) Multi-process model of cognitive vulnerability to 
anxiety3.  
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effectiveness of executive control. In this way, Ouimet et al. (2009) argue that 
contemporary dual-systems models of information processing may offer a useful 
framework for future research aimed at understanding and conceptualizing anxiety, as 
well as the development of effective evidence based treatments.  
1.5.3.2 Empirical Support for Integrated Models 
In support of Borkovec’s model, studies have shown that in anxious 
individuals worry increases intrusive thoughts (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995; Wells 
& Papageorgiou, 1995), is predominantly a verbal linguistic, thought based activity 
(Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston et al., 1996), which serves an 
avoidant function (McLaughlin et al., 2007). As worry serves an avoidant function it 
is associated with lower levels of emotional arousal, as it prevents emotional 
processing by interfering with the physiological (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Thayer, 
Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996; Vrana et al., 1986) and the subjective (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006; Vrana et al., 1986; Wells & Papageorgiou, 
1995) components of emotional response. As discussed earlier in relation to the MCM 
and the IUM, evidence also strongly supports the notion of worry as a coping strategy 
designed to avoid or prepare an individual for aversive future events. Additionally, 
individuals with GAD have also been found to report having beliefs that worry is both 
helpful and useful to them (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Freeston et al., 1994; 
Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998), even though such 
beliefs act to further reinforce the worry process due to its role in the avoidance of 
emotional experiences (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). Unfortunately, the observation of 
an inhibitory effect of worry on somatic arousal, as per Borkovec’s model, has been 
inconsistent (Behar et al., 2009).  A further a limitation of Borkovec’s model is the 
lack of explanation as to why emotional experiences are aversive, or why individuals 
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with GAD want to avoid emotional experience (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Mennin 
et al., 2005; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006).   
Ouimet et al.’s (2009) and Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) models have yet to be 
tested directly, however, the role of cognitive biases - specifically in attention (see: 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for meta-analysis) and interpretation (Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 
2005; Halberstadt, Niedenthal, & Kushner, 1995; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 
1989; Mogg, Bradley, Miller, Potts, & et al., 1994) - have been confirmed. In terms of 
attentional bias, findings show that anxious, compared to non-anxious individuals, 
demonstrate preferential attention to threatening compared to non-threatening stimuli, 
for both subliminal (Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, 
Williams, & Mathews, 1993) and supraliminal presentations (Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom, & de Bono, 1999; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; 
Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) undertook a meta-analysis of 
172 studies of attentional bias in anxious and non-anxious participants and, overall, 
found clear evidence of highly anxious participants prioritizing the processing of 
threatening information significantly more than non-anxious participants. With regard 
to worry and GAD specifically, the meta-analysis identified 11 studies that reported 
the presence of attentional biases in adult individuals with chronic worry, compared to 
those low in chronic worry.  
Additionally, working memory and the process of attentional control is also 
gaining increasing interest. For example, the ability to engage attentional control in 
order to switch attention from one stimulus to another is thought to be limited for 
anxious individuals when faced with threat-relevant stimuli (Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Preliminary findings demonstrate that individuals with 
high levels of worry are less able to control their attention when compared to those 
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with low levels of worry (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, 
Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014). It is the combination of low attentional control and 
psychopathology that is suggested to be particularly problematic (Bardeen & Orcutt, 
2011; Schoorl, Putman, Van Der Werff, & Van Der Does, 2014); higher levels of 
attentional control facilitate disengagement from threat, which in turn may improve 
emotional well-being (Fergus, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2012). Therefore, greater 
attentional control may act as a protective function to increase functioning of top-
down control processes to reduce negative emotional arousal, which leads to 
enhanced engagement and habituation to anxiety provoking stimuli (Bardeen, Tull, 
Stevens, & Gratz, 2014; Fergus et al., 2012).  Furthermore, individual differences in 
top-down attentional control are argued to be of considerable importance in the 
expression of attentional bias in anxious psychopathology (Schoorl et al., 2014). For 
example, recent evidence suggests that attentional control moderates the relationship 
between attentional bias and worry (Bardeen et al., 2014). 
In their review of the influence of affect on higher level cognition, Blanchette 
and Richards (2010) argue that both attentional and interpretation biases have been 
found to result from the competition between preattentive (bottom-up) threat 
evaluation mechanisms and top-down attentional control mechanisms. The focus on 
automatic and strategic biases is also reflected in more recent models of anxiety and 
GAD, which incorporate dual-process theory in their principals. For example, as 
stipulated previously, Hirsch and Mathews (2012; see Section 1.5.3, pp 31-35 for 
further details) propose that habitual biases, particularly in attention and 
interpretation, in conjunction with impairment of attentional control combine to result 
in the emergence of pathological worry.  
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In sum, prominent models of anxiety, and the growing body of research 
examining cognitive biases, point to the value of simultaneously examining biases of 
attention and interpretation (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005; Reid, Salmon, & Lovibond, 2006; Teachman, 2005; Teachman, Smith-Janik, & 
Saporito, 2007; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011). However, research to 
date has predominantly focused on examining information processing biases 
separately (e.g., attention or interpretation), despite this not accurately testing 
theoretical proposals that implicate multiple processing biases in the development and 
maintenance of worry/GAD (Teachman et al., 2007). Several studies have 
demonstrated that systematic changes in one cognitive bias affect other cognitive 
biases (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 2010; White 
et al., 2011). Exploring the temporal relationship of attentional bias to interpretation 
bias has been argued to be important, as more elaborate processing may override 
initial threat-related interpretive bias (White et al., 2011). In order to understand 
whether attentional and interpretation process are the result of a common underlying 
processing mechanism, or two distinct, orthogonal aspects of information processing 
with distinct effects on individual differences in anxiety, it is important to clarify the 
relationship between the biases and whether they related to early or late stage 
processing (White et al., 2011). 
Of the studies that have simultaneously explored the pattern of biases in 
psychopathology (e.g., Teachman, 2005; Teachman et al., 2007), only one has 
studied GAD, and this was not in an adult population. Rozenman, Amir, and 
Weersing (2014) found attentional bias to be correlated with negative interpretations 
(threat-valence judgments and speed of responding), which, in turn, were the 
strongest predictor of anxiety symptoms in a small sample (N = 26) of children and 
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adolescents with a diagnosis of GAD. However, it was not clear whether 
interpretation biases were associated with different stages of attention (e.g. early 
versus later stage processing). Although models of worry/GAD implicate multiple 
cognitive biases (i.e., biases of attention and interpretation) in individuals with 
chronic worry (e.g., Hirsch and Mathews’, 2012, model), the prolific research on 
cognitive biases in anxiety has rarely simultaneously examined cognitive biases of 
different modalities (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Reid et al., 2006; Teachman, 2005; 
Teachman et al., 2007). Undertaking such research would be beneficial to clarify 
which aspect of information processing is fundamental (Ouimet et al., 2009); 
different theories place an emphasis on different stages of information processing. 
For example, attentional biases are argued as central by some authors (e.g., Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007), whilst others 
place the focus on interpretative biases (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; Mathews et 
al., 1989). Others still, argue that both are responsible due to the same cognitive 
mechanisms underlying both attentional and interpretive biases (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002). Specifically, Hirsch and Mathews (2012) stipulate that early stage 
attentional processes (< 200 msec) are driven by bottom up processes and, therefore, 
should not be related to interpretation bias, which is thought to only affect late stage 
attentional processes affected by top-down control. Furthermore, Ouimet et al.’s 
model (2009) proposes that late stage attentional bias, namely avoidance processes, 
result from interpretation bias. Given these gaps in understanding, this thesis will 
examine how the biases might interact to increase vulnerability to, and maintenance 
of, worry through testing the tenets of Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) and Ouimet et 
al’s (2009) models and, overall, testing the applicability of dual-process models to 
worry. 
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1.5.4 Summary of Models  
There are no shortage of models offering a conceptual account for the etiology 
and maintenance of GAD. Yet, although the aforementioned models focus on 
different psychological processes, there are similarities and significant overlaps (see: 
Behar et al., 2009, for review). Overall, models of worry/GAD predominantly view 
worry as a form of preservative thinking in response to a trigger (e.g., thoughts, 
feelings, events), which involves thinking about and coping with future aversive 
events. Other areas of overlap include the perception of worry as negatively impacting 
emotional processing, disrupting coping, and heightening and maintaining anxiety. 
Although not universally recognized, positive beliefs about the role of worry in 
maintaining GAD (e.g., AMW, IUM, and MCM), as well as worry as avoidance (e.g., 
ABM, EDM, Borkovec’s AMW, and Ouimet et al.’s integrated model) are common 
across many of the models. Overall, the models consistently view worry as interfering 
in the self-regulation of cognition and emotion, with findings providing evidence that 
worry, in response to threat, increases intrusive imagery and intensifies anxiety 
(Butler et al., 1995; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). 
The models within each category (cognitive, emotional/experiential, 
integrated) share the most overlap. However, of all the models, Roemer and Orsillo’s 
(2002) ABM draws most directly from the concepts described in other models. There 
are theoretical overlaps between an acceptance-based behavioral approach and 
mechanisms of action suggested by both Roemer and Orsillo  (2002; 2005; 
Acceptance-based Model) and Mennin et al. (2002; Emotion Dysregulation Model). 
Specifically, with regard to mechanisms focused on the difficulties that arise from 
maladaptive attempts at emotion regulation and intense distress about, and avoidance 
of, emotional experiences (Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 
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2011). Additionally, similarities are also apparent between mindfulness, a focus of 
ABM, and the key tenant of intolerance of uncertainty in the IUM (Dugas & Koerner, 
2005).  
The integrative nature of Borkovec’s AMW means it can also be viewed 
alongside the ABM and EDM, within an emotion regulatory framework; worry is 
viewed as a cognitive control strategy employed to attempt to manage regulatory 
problems associated with subjectively distressing emotional experience (Mennin et 
al., 2005). The remaining integrated models (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012) reflect most clearly the central information processing components in Rapee’s 
(1991) model. However, they have advanced to incorporate more recent research 
highlighting information processing components implicated in chronic worry, over 
and above attentional processes. Thereby, they account for both voluntary and 
involuntary processes. There are also features that distinguish between the models. 
For example, the AMW uniquely incorporates the behavioral analysis of worry and 
GAD, whilst the IUM focuses specifically on cognitive or schema-based concepts, the 
MCM centers on metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger, and the 
EDM is unique in accounting for deficits in the ability to accurately identify and label 
emotional states. Differences are also apparent in how the models account for the 
process by which worry becomes excessive, generalized, and uncontrollable.  
Despite the development of this range of models, and the body of supportive 
evidence for these models, several questions remain. First, if worry and negative 
affect are found across the anxiety disorders, what are the factors that lead specifically 
to an individual developing GAD, as opposed to another anxiety disorder. Second, 
which of the models or constructs best fit GAD, and, therefore, provides the best 
insight into effective treatment strategies (Fisher & Wells, 2011). Despite the 
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proliferation of models, there is insufficient evidence for a single robust model of 
GAD, and one possible explanation is that the majority of studies examining models 
of GAD have employed self-report measures (Behar et al., 2009). However, the 
integrated models have begun to employ more experimental measures and, therefore, 
are advanced our understanding of GAD, which is leading to a body of research that 
employs rigorous psychophysiological experimental methodologies that provide 
greater confidence in the conclusions that can be drawn. 
Although it has been argued in this thesis that Ouimet et al.’s (2009) and 
Hirsch and Mathews’ (2013) models are as yet untested, these models provide 
significant promise. Both models suggest that the basic tenets of dual-systems models 
may support the development of a theory of GAD, which is able to subsume most of 
the broader concepts presented in the existing models of worry and GAD. For 
example, Ouimet et al. (2009) suggest that reinterpreting threat-relevant attentional 
and interpretive biases (which they equate to vulnerability to anxiety) using the core 
assumptions of dual-systems models may help elucidate the nature of the relationship 
between cognitive biases within anxiety disorders, such as the stage of attentional bias 
(early versus later stage) associated with interpretation bias, or whether these 
processes are related to either the associative or rule-based system. Therefore, the 
application of dual-process models to pathological worry may be worthy for several 
reasons. First, many of the concepts found within models of GAD fit well with the 
broader concepts of voluntary and involuntary processes accounted for by dual-
process models. Second, the application of dual-process models may lead to a more 
integrative understanding of worry/GAD, which is necessary in order to advance 
limited treatment outcomes.  
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Employing an adult sample, this thesis will examine the relationship between 
attention and interpretation biases at a range of early and late stages of processing to 
better understand how the biases might be interpreted in a dual-process framework, so 
as to better understand what leads to a vulnerability to, and maintenance of, worry. 
Specifically, the current project will employ tasks that examine attention (dotprobe 
task) and interpretation (homophone semantic priming task) biases in order to 
examine the associations between these biases. As previously mentioned, Hirsch and 
Mathews’ (2012) and Ouimet et al’s (2009) models suggest that the presence of, and 
association between, attention and interpretation biases are strongly implicated in 
anxiety and worry. Namely, the inability to overcome competing threat 
representations that contribute to worry arises from the relationship between “bottom-
up” (biases) processes (that will be measured by attention and interpretation biases 
task) that are suggested to activate representations of threat, and insufficient voluntary 
“top-down” control. Voluntary “top-down” control will be examined with an 
attentional control task (antisaccade task; Study 3 and Study 4). Furthermore, Ouimet 
et al (2009) argue that research has largely focused on the distinction between 
automatic and strategic processes, however, the relationship between these processes 
has been overlooked. Therefore, as previously mentioned, the relationship between 
the biases of attention and interpretation (automatic processes) will be examined in 
terms of their association to one another, as well as to attentional control (strategic 
processes).  
In addition to the aforementioned theories, Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential 
Self Theory (CEST) will also be examined to determine whether the rational and 
experiential processing styles (as measured by questionnaires and reasoning tasks) 
relate to worry (Study 1 and Study 2) and to associative (attention and interpretation 
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biases; Study 4) and strategic processes (attentional control; Study 3) as measured by 
experimental tasks (see Sections 2.2.5-2.3.3.1, pp. 73-90, for further discussion). In 
this way, the current project aims to examine the applicability of dual-process theories 
to worry. In the methodology section (Chapter 2, p. 64), as well as the aims and 
hypotheses section of each study, there will be a further description and discussion of 
the paradigms employed to test the various aspects of the models the study is aiming 
to examine.  
The studies included in this thesis will also aim to overcome the limitations of 
previous research by predominantly employing experimental and implicit measures, 
rather than relying on self-report measures. Overall, this thesis will examine a range 
of processes implicated in worry/GAD using the framework of dual-process models 
that take an integrated approach in accounting for both cognitive and emotional 
aspects in individuals who worry. The next section will describe dual-process theory 
more generally before discussing applications, including to psychopathology. 
1.6  Dual-Process Models 
Dual-process theories emerged in the literature over 30 years ago, yet, only in 
the last decade has research begun to fully explore the diversity of their possible 
applications. The key aspect of dual-process models is the distinction between 
automatic and strategic processes. Research has provided extensive evidence for the 
existence of two (dual) information-processing systems (see: Evans, 2008, for 
review); one (System 1, the experiential system) is rapid, associative, and automatic 
and the other (System 2, the rational system) is slow, rule-based, sequential, 
controlled and capacity limited. System 2 can be conceived of as broader than the 
concept of mental logic, as it also includes processes such as inhibition/the 
suppression of System 1 (Braine & O'Brien, 1998a, 1998b). Evans (2008) suggests 
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that the processes involved in System 2 are strategic processes, those that require 
access to a single, capacity-limited central executive and, therefore, they are processes 
that are correlated with individual differences in cognitive capacity and are disrupted 
by concurrent working memory load. The strategic processes of System 2 are rule-
based, are conscious, intentional, controllable, and inefficient in relation to 
employment of cognitive resources. System 2 processes can be described as the 
rational analysis of concepts and their relationship to each other on the basis of 
symbolic reasoning and syllogistic inference (Bargh, 1994; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Ouimet et al., 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).   
In contrast, System 1 is responsible for the organization of mental 
representations and categorization of stimuli on the basis of similarity and temporal 
contiguity (Sloman, 1996). The processes involved in System 1 do not require access 
to working memory (Evans & Over, 1996, 1997; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Reber, 
1993; Stanovich, 1999), are automatic processes, and are unconscious, unintentional, 
uncontrollable, and efficient in employing cognitive resources (Bargh, 1994). 
However, it may not be one unitary system, as more than one form of implicit 
processing may exist. As such, any discussion on dual-process models must highlight 
that there are at least two processing systems and, therefore, it may be more 
meaningful to describe System 1 as a set of autonomous subsystems (Stanovich, 
2004). Thus, one must understand the limitations inherent in current dual-process 
models and avoid oversimplifying dual-process models, for example, by 
conceptualizing them as separate systems (Keren & Schul, 2009). In addition, the two 
parallel processes highlighted by dual-process theories are thought by some theorists 
to interact; automatic unconscious processes control behavior without awareness and 
cause the enactment of strategic processes to explain and make sense of these 
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behaviors (Epstein, 1991b; Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 2004; Wilson & Dunn, 
2004). In this way, behavior is influenced by both systems with individual differences 
in motivation, and ability to engage in effortful processing, dictating which system is 
predominant (Ouimet et al., 2009). If there is a conflict or incompatibility between the 
systems, self-regulatory conflicts may result (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). For example, 
arousal will modulate both systems, as arousal that is either too high or too low will 
undermine strategic processing, which results in the domination of automatic 
processing (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Evans’ (2008) undertook a review aimed to determine whether the more-
researched dual-process models were accounting for similar concepts and were, 
therefore, interchangeable (see: Table 1.1 and Table 1.2).  As with previous attempts 
at merging the various dual-process models into one dual-system theory (Evans, 
2003; Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999), Evans (2008) also found that a single, 
generic dual-process theory was not comprehensive enough to achieve this. Although 
similarities between the models were evident - namely their distinction between 
cognitive processes, which are fast, automatic and unconscious, and those that are 
slow, deliberate, and conscious - there are differences in the multiple implicit 
processes distinguished by different theorists, which cannot be classified into two 
systems. Therefore, Evans (2008) proposed a need to classify dual-process theories, 
as fitting into a variety of categories. Testing the tenets of dual-process models has 
proved challenging, as the examination of many processes can only be inferred. For 
example, there currently exists no process-pure measures of attention, interpretation, 
or memory (McNally, 1995), with current measures  incorporating both strategic and 
automatic processing (see: Sherman et al., 2008). Because of this limitation, 
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Table 1.1: Label attached to dual-processes in the literature as compiled by Evans 
(2008) on the assumption of a generic dual-system theory. 
References System 1 System 2 
Fodor (1983, 2001) Input modules Higher cognition 
Schneider & Schiffrin (1977) Automatic Controlled 
Epstein (1994) Experiential Rational 
Chaiken (1980) Heuristic Systematic 
Reber (1993); Evans & Over (1996) Implicit/tacit Explicit 
Evans (1989, 2006) Heuristic Analytic 
Sloman (1996); Smith & DeCoster 
(2000) 
Associative Rule based 
Hammond (1996) Intuitive Analytic 
Stanovich (1999, 2004) System 1 (TASS) System 2 (analytic) 
Nisbett et al. (2001) Holistic Analytic 
Wilson (2002) Adaptive unconscious Conscious 
Lieberman (2003) Reflexive Reflective 
Toates (2006) Stimulus bound Higher order 
Strack & Deutsch (2004) Impulsive Reflective 
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Table 1.2: Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking (see: Evans, 
2008). 
System 1 System 2 
Cluster 1 (Consciousness)  
Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious 
Implicit Explicit 
Automatic Controlled 
Low effort High effort 
Rapid Slow 
High capacity Low capacity 
Default process Inhibitory 
Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reflective 
 
Cluster 2 (Evolution)  
Evolutionarily old  Evolutionary recent 
Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality 
Shared with animals Uniquely human 
Nonverbal Linked to language 
Modular cognition Fluid intelligence 
 
Cluster 3 (Functional characteristics)  
Associative Rule based 
Domain specific Domain general 
Contextualized Abstract 
Pragmatic Logical 
Parallel Sequential 
Stereotypical  Egalitarian 
 
Cluster 4 (Individual differences)  
Universal Heritable 
Independent of general intelligence Linked to general intelligence 
Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity 
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assumptions have relied on time-course responding (i.e., responses to stimuli 
presented at different durations; e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Vanvolsem, & De 
Houwer, 2007), or have utilized mathematical modeling (e.g., McNally, Otto, Hornig, 
& Deckersbach, 2001) to estimate contributions of automatic and strategic processes. 
Sherman et al. (2008) argue that attempts to separate automatic and strategic 
processes are questionable, as they may conflate important differences between 
qualitatively distinct aspects (i.e., in relation to attention; orientation, interpretation, 
engagement, disengagement and avoidance), when features of both automaticity and 
control are in fact present in behaviors and cognition (e.g., Bargh, 1992; Sherman et 
al., 2008). 
1.6.1 Applications of dual-process models 
Despite the limitations in measuring and testing dual-process models, there 
exists an extensive body of literature examining dual-process theory. However, much 
of the literature sits within one of two disconnected domains: cognitive psychology, 
including reasoning, judgment and decision-making (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1999) or social 
psychology (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, 
dual-process theories have been classified in the manner to which they are applied; 
offering insight into either (1) social cognition or (2) higher level cognition (e.g., 
reasoning, judgment and decision-making; Evans, 2008).  
Dual-process models of higher level cognition (i.e., human reasoning;  Evans, 
2006; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1999) posit that belief-based 
reasoning - whereby there is a tendency to evaluate the strength of an argument based 
on the plausibility rather than how strongly it supports the conclusion - is our natural 
response when required to make an evaluation of logical validity. However, this can 
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be overcome by the application of conscious effortful analytic reasoning (Evans, 
2008). Heuristic responses are presented as the default, which control behavior 
directly unless analytic reasoning intervenes (Evans, 1989; 2006). Evidence in 
support of dual-process accounts of reasoning include the observation of more logical 
and less belief-biased reasoning under strong deductive reasoning instructions, and an 
association between logical accuracy and intelligence when problems cannot also be 
solved by a logical route (see: Osman, 2004, for review). Additionally, support has 
been offered for dual-process accounts of reasoning in the finding that working-
memory load, or instructions to respond rapidly, increase levels of typical biases as 
well as reduce logical accuracy (see: Osman, 2004, for review). 
Within the judgment and decision making literature, there are three dominant 
research paradigms: (i) heuristics and biases research, which is focused particularly 
on judgments of probability (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982); (ii) the study of decision making under risk (Wu, Sause, & Zacker, 
2005); and (ii) social judgment theory (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). Of most interest to 
the current project is the research into heuristics and biases, as this domain 
incorporates erroneous information processing and beliefs, which have an impact on 
behaviour, factors that are also present and implicated in worry (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch, 
Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
Biases have been found to be associated with System 1, although analytic reasoning 
can intervene to override biases, thereby resulting in more rational behaviour being 
linked with System 2. However, although deliberate reasoning can be applied to 
inhibit the biased response, thus resulting in reflective reasoning, it should be noted 
that the activation of System 1 does not always result in erroneous responding, nor 
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does the activation of System 2 (and, therefore, overriding of System 1 responses) 
necessarily lead to more functional responses.  
Rather than a focus on cognitive architecture and evolution, as in the cognitive 
dual-process theories, dual-process models of social cognition particularly focus on 
issues concerning consciousness, free will, and the implications for moral and legal 
responsibilities of individuals. For example, automatic and unconscious processing of 
social information examining social perception, stereotyping, and attitudes, and their 
dissociation from explicit beliefs and conscious processing (Bargh, 2006; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson, 2002). As the social cognition dual-process 
theories focus on links between unconscious processing and implicit forms of 
knowledge representation they are, therefore, most translatable to our understanding 
of psychopathology. These models offer an explanation for to how it may be possible 
to change explicit attitudes even when implicit attitudes still take precedence in 
behavior (Bargh, 1999; Bargh & Williams, 2006; Devine, 1989), an occurrence that is 
prevalent in anxiety disorders (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
Recently, the application of dual-process theory to emotion has been 
generating increasing interest (Evans, 2008). Although largely overlooked in the dual-
process literature, emotions are classified as processes that relate to System 1 (see 
Table 1.1) and are argued to be automatic in nature (e.g., Epstein, 1990; Evans, 2008; 
Hassin, Uleman, et al., 2005). It is perhaps this omission of emotional processes - that 
dual-process research has tended to overlook emotional processes - which has resulted 
in little emphasis being put on dual-process models with regard to their application to 
psychopathology and clinical psychology. 
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1.6.2 The application of Dual-Process Models to psychopathology  
The core assumptions of dual-process theories have begun to be incorporated 
into cognitive theories of depression (Beevers, 2005), PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996), the development of addictive behaviors and addiction (Wiers et al., 
2007), and in anxiety and worry (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). For 
example, research has demonstrated that threat-related interpretive biases in social 
anxiety can be viewed through a dual-process framework, whereby interpretive biases 
result from an interplay between indicators of implicit and explicit social anxiety and 
working memory capacity (Salemink, Friese, Drake, Mackintosh, & Hoppitt, 2013). 
Researchers are also becoming aware of the presence of a conflict between System 1 
and System 2 in phobias and compulsive behaviors, such as gambling, overeating, and 
smoking (Evans, 2008). Behavior has been found to become irrational because an 
individual compulsively behaves in a manner that is at odds with explicitly stated 
goals, which can lead to the experience of ‘two minds in one brain’ (Evans, 2008) or a 
brain ‘at war’ with itself (Stanovich, 2004).  
Negative automatic thoughts are present in most psychological disorders, 
although they are particularly reflective of anxiety-biased schema, and are a blend of 
both implicit (System 1) and explicit (System 2) processing (Teachman & Woody, 
2004). For example, if a tendency to preferentially attend to threat cues combines with 
the interpretation of ambiguity as threatening, negative thoughts and anxiety arise 
(Teachman & Woody, 2004). In this way, parallels can be drawn between current 
conceptualizations of GAD and dual-process theory. For example, GAD is 
characterized by habitual, stuck patterns of responding across domains (Borkovec, 
1994; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002) relating to System 1, with a disjunction between 
mental content and experience thought to be present and to interrupt the informative 
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feedback and relationship an individual has to their environment (Mennin et al., 
2002). This is reflected in individuals with GAD and worry presenting with associated 
deficits in the ability to engage in goal-directed behaviors (System 2) when distressed, 
displaying deficits in impulse control, and limited ability to access effective 
regulation strategies (Emotion Dysregulation Model; Mennin et al., 2002). 
Pathological worry has also been found to result from being unable to inhibit 
maladaptive beliefs, appraisals and responses (processes implicated in System 1), as 
well as being a result of the failure to effectively resolve System 2 processes, such as 
problem-solving (Borkovec et al., 1998; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002; Wells & Carter, 
2001). One dual-process theory that is particularly appealing in the application to 
psychopathology, due to the explicit links and import placed on emotion, is Epstein’s 
Cognitive Experiential Self theory.  
1.6.3 Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential Self Theory 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is a cognitive based personality 
theory developed by Seymour Epstein (Epstein, 1983, 1990). Evans (2008) places 
CEST within the social cognition category, although it shares many common features 
with two-system theories of reasoning. CEST focuses on an implicit self-theory 
which, consistent with other dual-process models, assumes that there are at least two4 
partially independent conceptual systems (see Table 1.3), or modes of thought, which 
operate in parallel: the logical, analytical rational system (RS) that operates at the 
conscious level, and the preconscious, intuitive, emotional experiential system (ES; 
Epstein, 1991b, 1998b; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992). Epstein proposes that each system has access to distinct knowledge  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Note: Epstein also discusses a third system – the Associative System – however, this is largely 
overlooked and is not explored in experimental research studies. As such, it will not be further 
discussed in this thesis. 
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Table 1.3: Comparison of Epstein’s (1991b) Experiential and Rational Systems  
Experiential system  Rational system 
1.   Holistic 1. Analytic 
2.   Automatic, effortless 2. Intentional, effortful 
3.   Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented 
(what feels good) 
 
3. Logical: Reason oriented (what is 
rational) 
4.   Associationistic connections 4. Logical connections 
5.   Behaviour mediated by "vibes" from 
past events 
 
5. Behavioural mediated by 
conscious appraisal of events 
6.  Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives 
 
6. Encodes reality in abstract 
symbols, words, and numbers 
7.   More rapid processing: oriented 
toward immediate action 
 
7. Slower processing: oriented 
toward delayed action 
8.   
 
Slower and more resistant to change: 
Change with repetitive or intense 
experience 
8. Changes more rapidly and easily: 
changes with strength of argument 
and new evidence 
9.   
 
More crudely differentiated: Broad 
generalization gradient; stereotypical 
thinking 
9. More highly differentiated 
10.  
 
More crudely integrated: 
Dissociative, emotional complexes; 
context-specific processing 
10. More highly integrated: Context-
general principles 
11.  
 
Experienced passively and 
preconsciously: we are seized by our 
emotions 
11. Experienced actively and 
consciously: We are in control of 
our thoughts 
12.  
 
Self-evidently valid: "Experiencing 
is believing" 
12. Requires justification via logic 
and evidence 
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forms; his theory is distinct in the proposed linkage of the two systems (two 
competitive, yet interacting, processing styles), as well as offering an account for 
emotion, particularly in the context of psychopathology. 
The preconscious ES automatically assimilates reality, informs behavior and is 
claimed to be the source of heuristics. CEST states that via our ES we form an 
implicit theory about ourselves and the world (known as our self theory), which is 
created from experiences that involve significant others or those that are highly 
emotional. The ES is thought to generalise and relate information to activated 
schemas of our self-theories that results in the use of heuristics (Epstein, 1991a; 
Epstein et al., 1992). CEST perceives that although the experiential system is both 
highly efficient and adaptive it can, in some circumstances, be prone to errors and the 
source of maladaptive biases (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). It is because of the ES’s 
strong relationship to heuristic thinking, that it is believed to cause irrational 
inappropriate reactions, including cognitive biases and errors (Epstein, 1991b, 1998d; 
Epstein et al., 1992; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). These reactions are then 
maintained by a failure to control the ES, which is outside of conscious awareness 
(Epstein, 1991b, 1998c). CEST explains maladjustment (in general) as the dominance 
of one system over the other or conflicting responses from the two systems, which can 
result from the conflict between basic needs, and/or as problematic beliefs (Epstein, 
1998a). As such it is important to note that maladjustment can result from either 
system and, therefore, rational or strategic processing does not necessarily equate to 
adaptive or functional responses. 
Research findings support the tenets of CEST and offer evidence for multiple 
systems of learning and memory. For example, there exists an associative learning 
system that implicitly acquires knowledge of the world, which cannot be explicitly 
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called to mind but is directly influencing behavior (Carruthers, 2006; Sherry & 
Schacter, 1987). In addition, early life experiences are seen as pivotal in the 
development of individual processing styles (Epstein, 1983, 1990). Individual 
differences have been observed with regard to an individual’s reliance on the two 
processing modes, both in general and in specific situations (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; 
Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, & Heier, 1996), with implications for adaption, wellbeing 
and psychopathology being evident (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes, Witteman, & 
van den Bercken, 2009). Although the interplay between the two systems is 
important, a dominance or deficit in one system has the most significant and 
problematic implications (Epstein, 1983, 1990).  
Empirical support for CEST has also been demonstrated with reasoning tasks 
and two self-report measures - the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999), a general measure of processing style, and the Perceived Modes of 
Processing Inventory (PMPI; Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999), a situation specific measure 
of processing style. Through employing these measures CEST has been examined in 
relation measures of personality (Epstein et al., 1996), to identity formation 
(Berzonsky, 2008), coping ability (Epstein, 1992), the impact of emotions on 
rationality (Pham, 2007), and psychopathology (e.g., Kerns, 2006). In terms of 
psychopathology, processing styles have been found to be associated with a number 
of presentations, including depression (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998), schizotypy 
(Kerns, 2006), eating disorder related behaviours and coping styles (Claes et al., 
2009), and neuroticism (Marks, Hine, Blore, & Phillips, 2008; Pacini & Epstein, 
1999) - a personality trait closely linked to GAD (Mackintosh, Gatz, Wetherell, & 
Pedersen, 2006). Furthermore, these processing styles have been linked to beliefs 
about the world being predictable and controllable (Klaczynski, Fauth, & Swanger, 
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1998), and the susceptibility to heuristics and framing effects (Shiloh et al., 2002). 
Individuals with a less dominant rational processing style demonstrate reduced 
reasoning and problem-solving performance (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick 
& Epstein, 1992), factors which are also implicated in pathological worry (Dugas et 
al., 1995; Hayes et al., 2008).  
Reasoning tasks have been used to examine dual-process models as they 
deliberately place the rational and experiential systems in conflict by requiring 
analytic/rational processing to override heuristic experiential processing (Denes-Raj 
& Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Denes-Raj, & Pacini, 1995; Epstein et al., 1996; 
Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998). In 
comparison to verbal based paradigms less empirical research has employed 
behavioural measures of reasoning. However, behavioural reasoning tasks are 
appealing for several reasons. First, they engage the experiential mode whilst 
simultaneously bypassing implicit demand characteristics. For example, individuals 
who implicitly want others to see them as rational are less likely to engage in attempts 
to present themselves as rational (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Second, behavioural 
tasks are appealing as the outcomes of both processing modes are immediately and 
equally accessible (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Overall, CEST implicates lower 
reasoning scores to a low dispositional rational processing style and higher levels of a 
dispositional experiential processing style (Epstein, 1998c), with findings 
demonstrating that heuristic responses are significantly correlated with an experiential 
processing style (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Denes-Raj, Epstein, & Cole, 1995; 
Epstein et al., 1996; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Stanovich 
& West, 1998).  
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1.7 Conclusion  
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is the most understudied of all the 
anxiety disorders (Dugas, Anderson, Deschenes, & Donegan, 2010), which is 
concerning considering the negative impact and cost of chronic worry both at an 
individual (Stein & Heimberg, 2004; Turk & Mennin, 2011; Wittchen, 2002) and 
societal level (Ballenger et al., 2001; Wittchen, 2002). Furthermore, there is 
consensus that there is room for significant improvement in regards to treatment 
outcomes (see: Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013, for meta-analysis), with 
treatment found only to be effective for around 50% of patients (Borkovec et al., 
2002; Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Gould et al., 2004). However, although models of 
GAD and worry are numerous and encompass both cognitive and emotional aspects 
of the disorder, no one model stands out in providing a thorough account of the 
disorder. Theoretical advances and the realization of a cohesive theory of worry/GAD 
could potentially lead to much needed advances in therapeutic approaches. Foa and 
Kozak (1997) have called for a synthesis of already acquired knowledge across the 
disparate psychology literatures in order to progress efficacious treatments (i.e., 
CBT). For example, a larger-scale synthesis of existing GAD related knowledge and 
the explicit incorporation of theories of normative behaviour into clinical models 
might improve the current limitations with regard to theory and, therefore, the 
treatment of worry (Koerner, 2014). Epstein (1985) also argues that the development 
of a more cumulative science could be achieved through establishing integrative 
theory, whereby ‘mini-theories’ can be subsumed under boarder concepts. Therefore, 
it would seem that, in light of Ouimet et al.’s (2009) and Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) 
recent theoretical suggestions, the application of dual-process theory and the role of 
associative and rule-based processes in accounting for worry/GAD might offer an 
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overarching framework to conceptualize and understand worry and its associated 
processes (e.g., cognitive biases). Thus, the current project aimed to explore the 
applicability of current dual-process theories in accounting for the processes involved 
in chronic worry and, therefore, GAD. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
2.1 Aims and Methods  
2.1.1 Statement of Aims 
As indicated in the previous chapter, dual-process theories remain largely 
unexplored in relation to worry, despite theoretical contentions that suggest they 
would benefit our understanding of the etiology and maintenance of worry (Ouimet et 
al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Therefore, the overall aim of the studies 
included in this thesis is to explore the relationship between individual processing 
style and worry, and to determine whether the consideration of processing style and 
patterns of information processing (i.e., relationships between attentional control and 
attention and interpretation biases) improves our ability to understand heightened 
levels of worry over and above existing explanations. 
This thesis reports the findings from four studies. The first study examined 
participants’ self-reports of their processing style and worry symptoms (see below) in 
a large sample of undergraduate students. In addition to self-reported processing style, 
the remaining three studies included experimental tasks that assessed the implicit 
processing styles of participants. The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the 
relationship between all the variables in the current project, with the purpose of 
testing and providing evidence for current dual-process models of anxiety (e.g., 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), as well as developing a model which incorporated 
individual processing style. The four studies that were conducted related to the 
following aims: 
1) Questionnaire Study 1: The main aim of this study was to determine whether 
the processing styles of participants with high levels of worry differed from 
those with low levels of worry as predicted by Epstein’s (e.g., 1998a) dual-
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process theory, Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST). In this proof of 
concept study, questionnaire measures were employed to determine whether 
self-perceived processing style differed depending upon self-reported worry.  
 
2) Empirical Study 2: An experimental methodology was employed with the aim 
of corroborating the findings from the first questionnaire study, and further 
exploring the applicability of CEST in accounting for worry. To this end, we 
inquired whether participants with high levels of worry demonstrated poorer 
problem-solving or rational judgment skills (syllogistic reasoning task; 
inductive preferences task; probabilistic reasoning task) compared to those 
with low levels of worry. 
 
3) Experimental Study 3: Experimental Studies 3 and 4 aimed to examine the 
relationship of Epstein’s specified individual processing styles and 
components, such as attentional control, and cognitive biases of attention and 
interpretation, that are central to models of anxiety and worry (e.g., Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Therefore, Study 3 focused on the aspect 
of attention control (with the antisaccade task) and its relationship to 
processing style and worry and its related symptoms.  
 
4) Experimental Study 4: Experimental Study 4 aimed to investigate the 
relationship between the biases of attentional (dotprobe task) and 
interpretation (homophone semantic priming task) in individuals who worry, 
as well as the relationship of attentional control to these biases and, in turn, to 
Epstein’s processing styles.  
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2.2  General Methodological Issues 
2.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
Participants in the current studies were all first year psychology students 
recruited from the University of Sydney. A subset (N = 31) of the Sample 1, who 
were recruited to complete the online questionnaire in Study 1, were invited (based on 
DASS Stress scale scores, see below: Section 2.2.2 p. 69) to participate in studies 2-4 
(see Figure 2.1). In addition, the participants (N = 75) recruited for Sample 2 (Study 
2- 4), also contributed to the data in Study 1. Although the same sample was used 
across Studies 2-4, the testing protocol required individually running participants 
through the various tasks over two testing sessions; data was collected from one 
participant at a time and took a total of two and a half hours per participant (total of 
265 hours of testing was undertaken for Studies 2-4). The University of Sydney 
Human Research Ethics Committee approved all study protocols and all participants 
provided informed consent before participating (see Appendix A). All participants 
were offered course credit was for their participation and were informed that after the 
testing session all collected data would remain de-identified. Inclusion criteria across 
all the studies were identical. Inclusion criteria included being 18 years or older, 
having normal, or corrected to normal vision, and a high level of English proficiency.  
Worry is increasingly thought of as a transdiagnostic process, seen across the 
full range of anxiety disorders and in a number of other disorders (Borkovec et al., 
1991; Brown et al., 1992; Konstantellou et al., 2011; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Turk & 
Mennin, 2011).  Therefore, present research employed an analogue population of 
participants with high and low levels of worry, but who did not necessarily have a 
clinical diagnosis for GAD or any other psychological disorder. The justification for  
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Figure 2.1: Participant allocation by total project and individual study 
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using an analogue sample was that there is strong support for qualitatively similar 
experiences of worry in both clinical and non-clinical and analogue student 
populations (Borkovec et al., 1983; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010; Vasey & Borkovec, 
1992). Additionally, strong support has been found for the dimensional nature of 
pathological worry, whereby normal and pathological worry are not discrete 
constructs, rather comprising opposite ends of a continuum (Ruscio, Borkovec, & 
Ruscio, 2001). Such findings highlight the importance of a transdiagnostic 
perspective of the process of worry; understanding worry as a process that is common 
across disorders rather than a discrete diagnostic category. In light of this, research in 
non-clinical and analogue samples offers several opportunities; such as it allows us to 
further our understanding of the process of persistent worry without limiting it to a 
diagnosis of GAD. The decision to select a non-clinical student sample was also 
arrived at as the current studies are best seen as preliminary investigations of the 
application of CEST to worry. Nonetheless, because the research was interested in 
determining factors that differed between those with and without clinical levels of 
worry, when classifying participant’s levels of worry and symptom scores, only those 
who endorsed scores within the clinical range (representative of individuals with 
GAD) on valid and reliable measures of GAD were classified as having high levels of 
worry. In contrast, those with low levels of worry obtained scores that were well 
within the range of scores previously found in community normative samples. While 
the use of extreme samples increases the degree of confidence that the results reflect 
differences between those with clinical versus normal levels of worry, the degree to 
which they reflect findings with particular diagnostic groups, such as those with 
GAD, is unclear.  
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2.2.2 Prescreen Questionnaire 
In order to participate in studies 2-4, a prescreening procedure was used. First  
year psychology students (approximately 2000) who were studying undergraduate 
Introductory Psychology at the University of Sydney were asked to complete a battery 
of questionnaires in the first week of their semester. Although individual researchers 
cannot access the results of these screening questionnaires, they can nominate a 
particular range of scores on a questionnaire and only those students who scored in 
that range are able to access the experiment. In the present study, the Stress scale of 
the DASS-21 (DASS Stress; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a) was used as a screener. 
Therefore, only participants who either scored in or above the moderate range (19+) 
or within the normal range (<15) in that pre-screening questionnaire were able to 
volunteer for the study. These scores were selected based on previous research 
reflecting distress in clinical samples and community norms (Crawford & Henry, 
2003; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). A prescreen was 
used to ensure the examination of the impact of extreme groups. For uniformity, 
participants from Study 1 who scored within the stipulated high and low range on the 
DASS Stress scale were also invited to participate.  
As the screening battery required consensus across numerous groups of 
researchers for the inclusion of very brief questionnaires the DASS Stress scale was 
selected.  The DASS Stress scale held the advantage over the PSWQ or the GADQ-IV 
in that it was the fastest scale to administer. Furthermore, the DASS Stress scale has 
been demonstrated to measure the emotional symptoms associated with self-reported 
pathological worry (Brown et al., 1997; Szabo, 2011), and has also been found to 
have valid discriminate and convergent validity, as well as presenting high internal 
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consistency, in both clinical and non-clinical populations with worry/GAD (Brown et 
al., 1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Henry & Crawford, 2005).  
2.2.3 Determining extreme groups for analyses 
In order to create high/low worry groups for analyses the samples in studies 1-
4 were split into three groups (high worry/low worry/intermediate worry), once the 
data had been collected. The splits were undertaken on both PSWQ and GADQ-IV 
scores (see Table 2.1). The high worry group consisted of participants who endorsed 
scores, on one of the two scales that, based on previous findings, fell within the 
clinical range (e.g., PSWQ > 61; GADQ-IV > 15; Brown et al., 1992; Fresco, 
Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003; Newman et al., 2002). Where participants were in 
the high worry group on one scale but were in the low worry group on the other scale, 
they were not included in analyses. However, if participants reported within the high 
worry group on one scale and in the intermediate worry group on the other, they were 
included in the high worry group. In contrast, in order to meet criteria for the low 
worry group participants were required to score within the normal range on both 
scales (i.e., PSWQ < 45; GADQ < 5), as based on previous research (Brown et al., 
1992; Fresco et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2002). Inclusion criteria differed slightly 
between Study 1 and studies 2-4 (see Table 2.1), as an attempt was made to generate 
approximately equivalent participants in both high and low worry groups. Details of 
the process whereby participants were included and excluded in final analyses are 
specified in the empirical chapters. 
2.2.4 Demographic variables 
In order to clarify the generalizability of the sample, demographic variables 
were collected using a brief demographic questionnaire. The following aspects were 
assessed: 
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Table 2.1: Criteria scores and number of participants per group  
 Low worry  Moderate worry High worry 
Study1    
PWSQ 45 173 115 
Criteria score 16-35 36-57 58-80 
GADQ-IV 101 152 80 
Criteria score 0-4 5-18 19-33 
No. participants for analysis* 72 176 85 
Study 2    
PWSQ 27 42 37 
Criteria score 16-45  46-60 61-80 
GADQ-IV 35 35 36 
Criteria score 0-5 6-14 15-33 
No. participants for analysis 
39 25 42 
Study 3    
PWSQ 23 38 34 
Criteria score 16-45 46-60 61-80 
GADQ-IV 31 31 33 
Criteria score 0-5 6-14 15-33 
No. participants for analysis 
35 22 38 
Study 4    
PWSQ 25 38 31 
Criteria score 16-45 46-60 61-80 
GADQ-IV 32 30 32 
Criteria score 0-5 6-14 15-33 
No. participants for analysis 
32 28 34 
* see: Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, p.70, for further details of participants included in 
high and low worry group analyses 
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1) Participants were asked to state their age due to research demonstrating that 
both rational and experiential processing strengthen with age to adulthood, and  
then begin to decline again in elderly populations (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; 
Sladek, Bond, & Phillips, 2010).  
2) Gender was also assessed. Although men are more likely than women to 
endorse higher levels of engagement in rational processing, women are more 
likely to identify as experiential processors (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Higher 
prevalence rates of worry have been found in women, compared to men, 
although the relationship between gender and worry has been largely 
overlooked (Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003; Zlomke & Hahn, 2010). 
3) Lastly, ethnic group was assessed by asking participants to endorse their 
ethnicity from a list of common ethnic groups. There is evidence indicating 
that GAD is more prevalent in Australian populations (3.6%) than other 
ethnicities (see: Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3.1 pp. 10-11, for further details).  
Results 
Although a subset of the participants in Study 1 also completed studies 2-4 
(see Figure 2.1), analyses revealed little variation in terms of demographic variables. 
Across all the studies, participants ranged from 18 to 49 years of age, with the 302 
participants included in Study 1 having an average age of 19.29 (SD = 2.89), whilst 
the 106 participants in studies 2-4 had an average age of 19.79 (SD = 4.51). The 
sample was predominantly female in both Study 1 (72.7% women; 26.1% men; 1.2% 
other) and studies 2-4 (75.5% women; 24.5%men). With regard to ethnicity, in Study 
1, 49.5% stated their ethnicity as Australian, and 24.9% stated they were of either 
South-East Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Indonesian), North-East Asian (e.g., Chinese, 
Korean), or Southern and Central Asian descent. Similar to Study 1, the sample in 
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studies 2-4 were of a majority of Australian descent (43.4%), however, 22.6% stated 
their ethnicity as North-Western European (e.g., UK, Irish, German) or Southern and 
Eastern European (e.g., Italian, Macedonian, Polish, Russian), whilst only 20.7% of 
the participants were of Asian descent. Participants’ first language was predominantly 
stipulated as English for both Study 1 (55.9%) and studies 2-4 (79.2%).  
2.2.5 Questionnaires 
The following measures were given to all participants in the current studies (a 
copy of all the measures included in this project can be found in Appendix D). The 
Cronbach’s α for each measure used in the current project are available in Table 2.2. 
Evidence supporting the reliability and validity of the processing style and symptoms 
measures is discussed below. 
2.2.5.1 Processing Style Measures 
To determine an individual’s level of experiential and rational thinking two 
self-report measures were used: the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999), a general measure of trait processing style, and the Perceived Modes 
of Processing Inventory (PMPI; Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999), a situation specific 
measure of state processing style. Although the REI and PMPI both measure rational 
and experiential processing styles, they include different questions that assess state 
and trait processing style, respectively. The PMPI has been validated as a measure of 
situational or state (rational and experiential) processing style, which examines how 
individuals perceive themselves to respond when they are actively engaged in worry. 
In contrast, the REI has been validated as a trait or general measure of (rational and 
experiential) processing style that examines how individuals perceive themselves 
more generally (REI).  
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Table 2.2: Cronbach’s α scores for Processing Style and Symptom Measures 
described above. 
Measure Cronbach’s α 
Processing style   
REI-R .772 
REI-E .801 
PMPI-R .879 
PMPI-E .882 
Symptom measure  
DASS .943 
PSWQ .867 
GADQ  .871 
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Rational-Experiential Inventory (dispositional processing style) 
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) is a 40-item 
self-report questionnaire measuring two independent, orthogonal constructs 
(Bjorklund & Backstrom, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999); the 
rational scale and the experiential scale. It is a cross-culturally valid and reliable 
measure of trait processing style (Bjorklund & Backstrom, 2008; Epstein et al., 1996; 
Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & Godoy, 2009). The REI measures trait or 
dispositional processing style and asks participants to respond by indicating the 
number that best represents their feelings about each statement. The rational scale 
consists of two sub-scales: rational ability (10 items; e.g., “Using logic usually works 
well for me in figuring out problems in my life”) and rational engagement (10 items; 
e.g., “I enjoy thinking in abstract terms”). Similarly, the experiential scale consists of 
two 10-item subscales: experiential ability and experiential engagement. Participants 
are asked to respond on a five-point Likert scale, where “1” is completely false and 
“5” is completely true of themselves. Nineteen items are reverse coded before each 
subscale is summed and divided by 10 to give total scores.  
Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (situational processing style) 
The Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI; Burns & D'Zurilla, 
1999) is a 32-item self-report measure of situational (state) processing style; in the 
current studies it specifically asked participants to “consider yourself as you typically 
cope with situations which cause you worry in your life”. It assesses three perceived 
information-processing styles, two of which were examined in this study: the 12-item 
Rational Processing scale (e.g., “I usually stick to the “facts” and try to use a logical 
approach to cope”) and the 10-item Emotional Processing scale e.g., “My feelings 
usually determine how I will cope”. As this study’s focus was on worry, participants 
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were asked to self-report on their dominant mode of information processing in 
situations in which they worry specifically. Scores in each of the subscales are 
summed to give a total score. The PMPI has been found to have high internal 
consistency and to be a valid and reliable measure (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999).  
2.2.5.2 Symptom measures 
The following symptom measures were selected as they are the most 
commonly used screening tools for worry and generalised anxiety disorder that are 
employed both in research and clinical practice.  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) was developed as a 16-item self-report questionnaire to assess 
chronic pathological (or trait) worry. Participants are required to rate items such as 
“My worries overwhelm me” on a Likert scale of one to five, where one is not at all 
typical and five is very typical. Items one, three, eight, 10, and 11 are reverse scored 
then all 16 items are summed to give a possible score range of 16-80, where higher 
scores are suggestive of more worry.  The PSWQ is commonly used in both research 
and clinical practice with evaluation on both clinical and non-clinical populations 
demonstrating the PSWQ to have good convergent and discriminant validity, as well 
as good reliability and consistency (Brown et al., 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994).  
Generalised Anxiety Questionnaire – IV  
Measurement of symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) 
encompasses not only the act of worrying but the physiological symptoms that 
accompany it. Newman et al.’s (2002) self-report the Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
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Questionnaire – IV (GADQ-IV), is a measure of GAD symptomatology based on 
DSM-IV criteria (Newman et al., 2002).  The GADQ-IV consists of nine questions: 
five yes/no questions, one question asking individuals to rate their symptoms of 
worry, another asking participants to check from a list of physiological symptoms 
such as “Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge”, and two Likert scale questions 
where participants rate distress (i.e., “How much are you bothered by worry and 
physical symptoms (how much distress does it cause you)?”) and interference (i.e., 
“How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work, social 
activities, family, etc.?”) on a scale of zero to eight where “0” is none and “8” is very 
severe. 
Continuous scoring was used for the GADQ-IV whereby a sum total of the 
responses was calculated. Newman et al. (2002) devised this scoring system in an 
attempt to generate scores that best reflected DSM-IV diagnostic thresholds for the 
diagnosis of GAD. In order to determine a total score, all questions that are answered 
with “yes” are scored as “1” and all answers with a ‘no’ recorded are scored as “0”. 
The numbers circled for items eight and nine (distress and interference) were divided 
by four before being added to give a total score.  Total scores ranged from 0-33. 
Previous research has found the GADQ-IV to have good internal consistency, test-
retest reliability, strong convergent and discriminant validity, as well as having good 
specificity and sensitivity (Newman et al., 2002).  
 Depression Anxiety Stress Scale  
The DASS Stress scale is one of three subscales from the Depression Anxiety 
Scale 42 (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a) It is a 14-item scale that measures 
the emotional symptoms associated with self-reported pathological worry (Brown et 
al., 1997; Szabo, 2011) and evaluates symptoms of tension (“I was in a state of 
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nervous tension”), irritability (“I felt that I was rather touchy”), agitation (“I felt that I 
was using a lot of nervous energy”), impatience (“I found myself getting impatient 
when I was delayed in any way”), and an inability to relax (“I found it difficult to 
relax”). Respondents are asked to indicate which number best represents how much 
the statements (14 questions) applied to them over the past week, where “0” = did not 
apply to me at all and “3” = applied to me very much, or most of the time. Scores on 
each subscale are then summed to give a total score, with scores ranging from 0-42. 
Individuals who score in the 0-14 range are classed as being within the normal 
population, 15-18 in the mild range, 19-25 in the moderate range, 26-33 in the severe 
range and 37+ in the extremely severe range (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). 
Although the DASS was originally developed to assess levels of stress, it is 
often used as a measure to screen for GAD. Whilst the PSWQ and the GADQ-IV 
encapsulate the cognitive processes present in worry, previous research has 
demonstrated that the DASS Stress scale captures the specific emotional experience 
accompanying worry (Szabo, 2011). It demonstrates valid discriminate and 
convergent validity, as well as presenting high internal consistency, in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations (Brown et al., 1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Henry & 
Crawford, 2005).  
2.3. Experimental Task Selection   
Most dual-process theories have as their core assumption the fact that it is not 
just the content of people’s thoughts but the way in which they process information 
that is important to the development of psychopathology (e.g., Epstein, 1998c; 
Ouimet et al., 2009; Beck & Clark, 1997). Hence, there is a focus on implicit 
processes. By their nature, most theorists would agree that implicit processes are not 
always in the conscious realm and, as such, are better assessed through experimental 
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tasks that assess particular processes. Therefore, in the present thesis, an effort has 
been made to assess the implicit processes that are hypothesized to have a role in the 
development or maintenance of pathological worry. The tasks employed in the current 
study are described below. 
2.3.1 Study 2: Problem-solving and Reasoning Tasks 
In addition to dual-process theories, models of pathological worry highlight 
the importance of reasoning and problem-solving (Borkovec et al., 1998; Brown, 
1997; Szabo & Lovibond, 2002). Problem-solving and reasoning with regard to worry 
and GAD have predominantly been explored with self-report questionnaires that 
query perceived reasoning ability (e.g., Davey, 1994b; Gosselin, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 2002; Ladouceur et al., 1998). In order to improve upon self-report 
methodologies, as well as assessing the application of Epstein’s dual-process model to 
the process of worry, tasks were selected that have been previously, and most 
commonly, used to examine individuals’ reasoning abilities with regard to the 
relationship between the rational and experiential systems.  
The selected tasks were vignettes and behavioural measures of reasoning that 
have been demonstrated to place the two systems (rational and experiential) in 
conflict, which is integral to the dual-process literature (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6, 
pp. 48-61 for further discussion). Errors observed on reasoning and judgment tasks 
that relate to principles of heuristic responding represent the operation of the 
experiential system (Epstein et al., 1992). It has been found that when problem-
solving and reasoning, people often ignore statistical concepts such as base rates and 
rely on judgmental heuristics such as availability, anchoring effects, and salience 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). Therefore, 
examining participants’ performance on reasoning tasks allowed for the examination 
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as to whether these negative beliefs correspond to actual deficits in actual reasoning, 
problem-solving implementation and to a specific processing style.  
In measuring reasoning ability, traditionally there are three types of reasoning 
most commonly examined: (i) deductive reasoning, (ii) statistical inference or 
inductive reasoning and (iii) probabilistic reasoning. Based on previous research in 
the reasoning and dual-processing literatures, three tasks were selected for Study 2 to 
match each of these components of reasoning ability: a deductive reasoning task 
(Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999), an inductive reasoning 
task (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Jepson, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983; Stanovich & 
West, 1998), and probabilistic reasoning task (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; 
Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). See Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3 pp. 122-124 and Appendix 
E for further details of the tasks. Although these tasks have yet to be applied in 
research examining individuals who worry, they were selected as they are well 
established and frequently used paradigms in the wider reasoning literature and have 
been used to demonstrate evidence for dual-processing models (e.g., Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 2008; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Sa et 
al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013). A brief description 
of the reasoning tasks used in the current project follows: 
2.3.1.1 Deductive reasoning: Syllogistic reasoning task 
Deductive reasoning tasks are most commonly employed in research 
examining human reasoning, whereby the effect of prior knowledge, beliefs, and 
opinions in disrupting impartial rational responses to arguments can be examined. For 
the current project a task taken from Markovits and Nantel (1989) and adapted by 
Stanovich and West (1998) and Sa, West, and Stanovich (1999: see Appendix A for 
items) was employed.  
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The task involves participants being presented with two premises and a 
conclusion, which they are required to decide whether the conclusion follows 
logically from the premises (even if the premise is not in itself believable), assuming 
that the premises are true. For example, for Ben to graduate he needs a C average and 
Ben graduates, so we can logically conclude that he has a C average. The logical 
validity of the item is important and some of the items are logically valid despite the 
fact that the premises are known to be untrue (e.g., All things that are smoked are 
good for the health and cigarettes are smoked, so we can logically conclude that 
cigarettes are good for health). Participants are given one point for every logical 
deductive reasoning response these are summed to give a total deductive reasoning 
score.  
2.3.1.2 Statistical reasoning: Inductive preferences task 
Inductive reasoning tasks have been used to examine heuristics and biases and 
have largely been examined in research that is separate to deductive reasoning 
(Stanovich & West, 1998). Responses to inductive reasoning tasks offer the 
opportunity to examine the tendency for human judgment to be influenced by 
compelling but unrepresentative personal and case evidence at the cost of considering 
more representative, diagnostic, statistical evidence (Stanovich & West, 1998). In 
contrast to deductive reasoning, where conclusions are either valid or invalid, 
inductive reasoning problems present premises, which offer information that allows 
for a probable or credible conclusion to be drawn. The questions used in the current 
study were multi-choice questions similar to those used in Stanovich and West 
(1998), which were adapted from Fong et al. (1986) and Jepson et al. (1983). 
The items selected to examine inductive reasoning simulate real-life decisions, 
for example, a vignette is presented about Henry who is trying to make a decision 
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between two university classes he wants to take. The vignette states that “past student 
course evaluations indicate that Course A is better taught. However, Henry attended 
the first meeting of both classes and found that Course B seemed to be better”.  
Participants are then asked to choose between four alternatives with regard to what 
they think Henry should do. Each question provided different information that was in 
some instances conflicting. For example, participants were provided with statistical 
evidence as either probabilistic or aggregate base-rate which supported the 
information provided (i.e., past student evaluations in the case of Henry), as well as 
being given concrete case or personal experience that was counter to the information 
provided (i.e., Henry’s opinion after attending the first meeting of both classes). 
Participants employing statistical principles (rational processing) should avoid 
making inferences based on small samples or the personal case experience 
(experiential processing), and one point is awarded for every answer employing 
statistical principles. The sum of these is the total score. Previous research has 
published significant findings with a multiple choice question structure (Stanovich & 
West, 1998), this was, therefore, selected for the current study.  
2.3.1.3 Probabilistic reasoning task: Jellybean game 
Probabilistic reasoning tasks are also used to demonstrate conflict between the 
rational and experiential processing systems. People have been found to judge the 
probability of an unlikely event as lower when it is presented in the form of a ratio of 
smaller rather than larger numbers. The behavioural probabilistic reasoning task 
included in the current study followed the method described in Denes-Raj and Epstein 
(1994) and Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992), which was adapted from Miller, Turnbull, 
and McFarland (1989). For example, when participants are offered two containers, the 
first containing one red of 10 beans and the other 10 red of 100 beans, which both 
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contain 10% red beans. Studies have demonstrated that over two thirds of participants 
demonstrate the ratio-bias phenomenon and will select from the container with the 
larger number of beans, which reflects the non-optimal, subjective choice and 
engagement in heuristic experiential processing (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; 
Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). In order to make the rational choice, a dominance of 
rational processing is required in order to override experiential processing which 
would result in the subjective, heuristic choice. Therefore, the size (big or small) of 
the container that participants choose is recorded as the dependent variable. A 
subjective probability score between 0-4 is calculated from the responses; scores are 
calculated by the choice of container which is coded as  “0” or “1” depending on 
whether participants chose the subjective choice, which reflected engagement in 
heuristic experiential processing (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992). 
In the current study there were two win conditions and two lose conditions, 
whereby choosing a red bean meant either a win (win condition) or a loss (lose 
condition) of one point. Probabilities of winning or losing in the four conditions are 
presented in Table 2.3. Although the mathematical probabilities in the two bowls 
were identical, many people have a gut-level preference for one bowl or the other. In 
the ‘win’ conditions, the heuristic choice is the large container on the 10% win 
condition as individuals have a tendency to view the odds as more favorable when the 
ratio is expressed in larger (e.g., 10 white beans in 100 red beans) than smaller (e.g., 
one white bean in 10 beans) numbers, with the opposite being true for the 90% win 
condition. Conversely, on lose conditions, the odds are perceived as more favorable 
when the ration is expressed in smaller than larger numbers on the 10% lose 
condition, and more favorable when expressed in large numbers (10 in 90 rather than 
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Table 2.3: Probabilities of winning or losing in the four conditions of the probabilistic 
reasoning task 
 10% Probability  90% Probability 
Win Condition 1 Condition 2 
Lose Condition 3 Condition 4 
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one in nine) on the 90% lose condition (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). One point was 
given for every heuristic choice participants made, these were then summed to give a 
total subjective probabilistic reasoning score. 
2.3.2 Study 3: Attentional Control  
Individual differences in attentional control are argued to have implications 
for information processing biases and the development of chronic worry (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Salemink & Wiers, 2012), with attentional control being found to  
moderate the relationship between attentional bias and levels of worry (Bardeen et al., 
2014). See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3.2, p. 39 and Chapter 6 for a full discussion. To 
date, studies have predominantly measured attentional control using self-report, most 
commonly the attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). This has 
consistently been stipulated as a limitation to this area of enquiry, as it is argued that 
self-report measures examine beliefs about attentional control rather than providing 
an index of actual attentional control abilities (Fergus et al., 2012; Spada, Georgiou, 
& Wells, 2010).  
However, to demonstrate attentional control deficits in individuals with high 
levels of worry, Hayes and colleagues (2008) employed a non self-report random key-
pressing task, which was also used in conjunction with the N-back task by 
Stefanopoulou et al. (2014). The random key-pressing task required participants to 
press a random key (different from the last key pressed on the key board) whenever 
they heard a beep and to return to thinking about a presented thought (e.g., “what 
would be bad about that”), or in the case of Stefanopoulou et al.’s (2014) study it was 
given in conjunction with the N-Back Task. The N-Back task requires participants to 
watch a sequence of letters, and to press a key whenever an item is identical to the 
one presented “n” positions before.  
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Although these methodologies are an improvement on studies that have 
predominantly relied on self-report measures, they are not without their limitations. 
Namely, using differences in RTs to measure cognitive processes has been argued to 
be unreliable (Borkenau, Paelecke, & Yu, 2010). There has also been suggestion that 
RT measures access momentary personal or contextual factors that result in findings 
on RT tasks not consistently being replicated (Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 
2004; LeBel & Paunonen, 2011); results on RT measures vary considerably as a 
function of physiological, hormonal, emotional and other changes in the respondent 
(LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). For example, response execution is susceptible to 
disruption effects that are suggested to be particularly problematic in highly emotional 
participants or when using emotion provoking stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). 
Furthermore, manual RT data must not only infer the allocation of attention but also 
take into account that the distal relation between key presses may be open to 
confounding effects of emotional information and mediating processes (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012; Mogg & Bradley, 2006). Therefore, one task that appears promising 
and improves on the limitations of both self-report and reaction time tasks is the 
antisaccade/prosaccade task. It examines saccadic eye movements and has been 
frequently employed in the wider anxiety literature to examine attentional control 
(Camchong, Dyckman, Austin, Clementz, & McDowell, 2008; Clementz, McDowell, 
& Stewart, 2001; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; McDowell et al., 2002; McDowell, 
Dyckman, Austin, & Clementz, 2008; McDowell et al., 2005). This task will be 
discussed in the next section 
2.3.2.1 The Antisaccade and Prosaccade tasks 
The antisaccade task was first introduced by Hallet in 1978 (see: Hutton, 
2008, for reviews; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006), and involves participants being given a 
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cue, which requires them to look towards or away from an object/image presented on 
the screen whilst their eye movements are measured (Derakshan, Salt, & Koster, 
2009; Hallett, 1978; Hutton, 2008; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; Nummenmaa, Hyona, & 
Calvo, 2006; Taylor & Hutton, 2009; Wieser, Pauli, & Muehlberger, 2009).  The 
antisaccade task requires participants to enact control over their attention, specifically 
to inhibit the reflexive saccade responses. Participants unconsciously are drawn to 
look toward a visually presented stimuli on either the left or right of a central 
fixation, even though they have been instructed to direct attention/generate volitional 
saccades in the opposite direction (see Figure 5.1, Chapter 5 p. 139).  In contrast, the 
prosaccade task, which is presented with the antisaccade task (either in separate 
blocks of trials, or alternating with antisaccade trials), requires participants to make 
the natural response and enact a saccade (look) towards the presented stimuli. The 
most common variables of interest in the antisaccade/prosaccade task are latency and 
error rate. Antisaccade latencies have been typically found to be 100-150ms longer 
than in prosaccade (Munoz & Everling, 2004). Compared to their non-anxious 
counterparts, individuals with anxiety have been found to demonstrate increase 
latency on the antisaccade, but not prosaccade task, whereas error rates have been 
found to be unrelated to levels of anxiety (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011b; Ansari, 
Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Antoniades et al., 2013; Everling, Dorris, & Munoz, 
1998; Fischer et al., 1993; Hartnegg & Fischer, 2002). 
The simplicity of the antisaccade methodology has led to it being employed to 
examine various aspects of psychopathology (Gooding & Basso, 2008; Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006). Since its introduction it has since been a useful tool for examining 
various aspects of cognition including control of attention, working memory, and to 
simultaneously examine reflexive and volitional responses - processes which have all 
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be implicated in the development and maintenance of worry (e.g., Hayes et al., 2008; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Stefanopoulou et al., 2014) and in anxious individuals 
(Derakshan, Salt, et al., 2009; Hallett, 1978; Hutton, 2008; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; 
Nummenmaa et al., 2006; Taylor & Hutton, 2009; Wieser et al., 2009)  
The appeal of the antisaccade task for the current project lies both in previous 
research findings demonstrating an effect of anxiety on attentional control, as well as 
the tasks ability to simultaneously examine both volitional and reflexive responses 
(components of dual-process models) in individuals endorsing high and low levels of 
worry. The creation of a ‘process-pure’ measure of information processing has proved 
to be extremely difficult, as all measures comprise a mix of multiple distinct 
automatic and strategic processes (Sherman et al., 2008). Thus, in the absence of a 
‘process pure’ measure of the information processing systems (Sherman et al., 2008), 
the antisaccade task offers a more direct measure of rational processing and the 
relationship between the systems, as well as outcomes when the two systems are put 
into conflict.  
2.3.3 Study 4: Cognitive Biases Tasks  
Fear and anxiety are important, normal, and adaptive reactions to threat, as 
they enable one to determine potentially threatening stimuli so that cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral processes can be activated to ensure safety is maintained 
(LeDoux, 1996). However, these processes are over-activated in pathological anxiety, 
with individual differences in the processing of threat-relevant material argued to lead 
to the development and maintenance of anxiety (Beck & Clark, 1997). One popular 
approach that allows a more direct examination of the role of automatic and strategic 
processes concurrently is to employ methodologies that measure cognitive biases. The 
role of erroneous information processing, particularly threat-relevant cognitive biases 
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(e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), 
are well established as having a role in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). However, what remains in contention is 
whether biases are a result of automatic or strategic processes (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Matthews & Wells, 2000; McNally, 1995). McNally (1995) suggests that whilst 
biases may be involuntary and unconscious, they are not resource-free or effortless. 
Ouimet et al. (2009) argue that examining the basic mechanisms of these processes 
may at least provide an integrative dual-process framework that can guide and enable 
future research and intervention. Therefore, although it is important to acknowledge 
the limitations of distinctions between the systems, and methodologies to capture 
these automatic or unconscious processes have been extensively researched with 
findings clearly highlighting the presence of cognitive biases. 
2.3.3.1 Attentional Bias Tasks 
Models of pathological anxiety/worry suggest that individuals who are prone 
to worry are more likely to orient their attention towards threat and subsequently are 
unable to disengage from that threat (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
Cisler and Koster’s (2010) integrative review considers the three components of 
attentional bias and their role in anxiety. These components are facilitated attention 
for threat, delayed disengagement from threat, and attentional avoidance. Facilitated 
attention for threat refers to the speed with which attention is orientated to threatening 
stimuli has been the most consistently observed of the attentional processes in 
anxiety. Delayed disengagement from threat refers to the degree to which, once a 
stimulus has become the focus of attention, it holds attention and impacts the 
switching of attention away from threat. Aside from one study (Carlson & Reinke, 
2008), which employed masked stimuli, consistent evidence of difficulty disengaging 
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from threat has been observed in individuals with anxiety on the dot probe task 
(Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & 
De Houwer, 2004; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007c). However, the 
observation of delayed disengagement appears dependent upon presentation times, in 
addition to threat intensity (see: Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009, for review). 
Overall, there is mutual agreement that individual differences in attention to 
threat are central to our understanding of anxiety (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997) and GAD 
(e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), theories of attentional processing differ in the 
emphasis that they place on the various stages of processing (e.g., Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). Some authors argue that the key characteristic in anxiety 
disorders is the inhibition in disengagement from threat (Gole, Koechel, Schaefer, & 
Schienle, 2012), whilst others argue that it is the initial orientation and engagement 
with threat or avoidance which are central (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2011; Koster et al., 
2007; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Oathes, Squillante, Ray, & Nitschke, 2010; 
Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, Migliozzi, & D'Olimpio, 2014). Although attention to 
threat is a normal adaptive function for all humans, reduced ability to control or stop 
attending to threatening stimuli may result in a specific vulnerability to pathological 
anxiety (e.g., Ouimet et al., 2009). Attentional biases are relevant to the current 
research as they are implicated in the activation of internal representations of threat, 
which if not able to be inhibited by voluntary control or if the emotional experience 
cannot be processed, may lead to the development of worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
Therefore, due to attentional bias having important implications in 
understanding the process of worry we considered a range of potential paradigms 
thought to assess attentional bias for threat (see: Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for meta-
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analysis). Specifically, we also wished to examine attentional bias so as to further 
explore the suggested relationships between attention and interpretation biases, as 
well as attentional control. However, although visual search and spatial cuing tasks 
have been employed in the study of worry and GAD, the most common measures of 
attentional bias tasks in the anxiety literature are the modified dotprobe task and the 
emotional Stroop task (Cisler & Koster, 2010). The e-Stroop (see: Bar-Haim et al., 
2007, for review) task requires participants to label colors of emotionally valenced 
words, which are usually presented in categories (e.g., negative, neutral, positive). 
High-anxiety has been shown to slow the naming of colors in negatively-valence 
words and greater interference has been observed in anxious participants’ naming of 
the colours of threat-related words (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) 
Although the Stroop task has been widely employed in the study of 
anxiety/worry, significant limitations have been documented. For example, it is 
unclear whether results may be influenced by late stage processes, which are 
unrelated to attention (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In 
assuming the results do relate to attention, it cannot be determined whether findings in 
anxious participants on the Stroop task are a result of attention being drawn toward 
threatening stimuli, if delayed responding is related to enhanced attention and/or 
delayed responding to threat (Algom et al., 2004), or whether the observed automatic 
attentional bias is in fact related to deficits in maintaining attentional focus (Fox, 
1993). Additionally, emotional inference effects are also observed. This suggests that 
all words presented are automatically processed for meaning, but subsequently 
disregarded if irrelevant. However, when presented with a word that is highly related 
to one’s current concern, rejection is seen as irrelevant, and, therefore, responding is 
slower (Algom et al., 2004). Overall, the most commonly cited criticism of the Stroop 
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task is that response bias cannot be ruled out, whereby participants demonstrate 
inhibited responsiveness in the presence of threatening stimuli (Cloitre, Heimberg, 
Holt, & Liebowitz, 1992; McNally, 1996). In contrast, the modified dot probe 
paradigm - the primary measure used in the field - has over 100 published studies and 
is considered the gold standard for investigating attentional bias for threat (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Fox et al., 2001; Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & 
Proudfit, 2014; MacLeod et al., 1986). Widespread use of the dot probe paradigm has 
influenced the manner in which we conceptualize and understand attentional bias 
(Staugaard, 2009).  
The dotprobe paradigm was developed by MacLeod et al. (1986) to overcome 
the problems with the Stroop task in examining aspects of psychopathology (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). Typically it consists of the presentation of two different valenced 
stimuli (e.g., emotional faces; one neutral and one angry) to either side, or to the top 
and bottom, of a central fixation on a screen (see Figure 6.1, p. 177). This is then 
followed by the presentation of a dot in place of one of the stimuli, to which 
participants are required to indicate the location as quickly as possible. Trials are 
congruent - with the probe and threatening stimuli placed in the same location - or 
incongruent - whereby the probe and threatening stimuli are placed in opposite 
locations. Despite the aforementioned limitations with reaction time (RT) measures, 
as mentioned previously examining RTs on the dot probe task is the gold standard for 
investigating attentional bias for threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Fox et al., 2001; Kappenman et al., 2014; MacLeod et al., 1986); Reaction times (in 
milliseconds) are the dependent variable with shorter response times indicating that 
attention has been allocated to the area of the screen where the probe appeared. 
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Longer RTs indicate that attention was required to be shifted to an unattended area in 
order to detect the probe.  
The selection of the dot probe task over the Stroop task was also informed by 
the advantage of being able to simultaneously examine the processes of engagement 
and disengagement by differing not only the presentation stimuli (i.e., threatening vs 
neutral faces), but also the presentation duration (Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Fox, 
Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Koster et al., 2004; 
Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003; Mogg et al., 2000). Findings suggesting the 
influence of contextual factors (Fox, 1996) on automatic processing biases, led to the 
examination of both early (engagement i.e., latencies < 500ms) and late 
(disengagement - latencies between 500-1000ms) attentional processes, which are of 
particularly interest in the current project given its focus on a dual-process model of 
worry. Despite the variables of interest in the current study being able to be examined 
most efficiently by the use of a dot probe task, it must, however, be noted that 
examining manual reaction times (RTs) on the dot-probe task is only “snapshot”, 
restricted to a single time point within a trial (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006). This imposes limits on the ability to effectively and efficiently 
examine dynamic attentional processes. 
In order to explore early and late attentional processes in the context of dual-
process models, the current study examined responses to stimuli presented across a 
variety of presentation times. To date, dot probe studies examining attentional bias in 
individuals with worry/GAD have predominately employed unmasked word based 
stimuli presented at 500ms, 1000ms, or 1250ms (see: Mogg & Bradley, 2005 for 
review), with only two studies employing masked word-based stimuli presented at 
shorter durations times of 14ms - 50ms (Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; 
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Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). However, in the wider anxiety literature, there is 
also good evidence of attentional bias occurring at 100ms (e.g., Koster et al., 2007) 
and, although results are less clear, at very short durations (e.g., 28ms), and longer 
durations (e.g., 200msec and 500 msec) also (e.g., Koster et al., 2007; Mackintosh & 
Mathews, 2003; Sagliano et al., 2014).  
In light of previous research, 16ms, 33ms, and 100ms stimuli presentation 
duration times were selected to examine early attentional processes in the current 
project. The 33ms and 100ms timeframes have been used previously to demonstrate 
early stage attentional biases (e.g., Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Koster et al., 2007). Furthermore, as 
attentional orientation processes are suggested to occur earlier that 30ms (Ouimet et 
al., 2009), with some evidence suggesting that faces are processed subliminal even at 
presentation times of 16ms (Wronkaa, Walentowskaa, & Asanowiczb, 2010), a 16ms 
stimuli presentation time was also selected. In terms of later stage processing biases, 
200ms, 500ms and 1500ms stimuli presentation times were chosen as there is a body 
of evidence suggesting that when stimuli are presented at these timeframes attentional 
biases (namely avoidance and disengagement) are observed (e.g., Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2007; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, 
& Painter, 1997). 
Facial stimuli were selected for the current study as they have been argued to 
be more ecologically valid as they are more salient and threatening than words, due to 
the recognition of facial stimuli being an automatic processes that can occur without 
awareness (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998). The reliability of the dot probe tasks 
using photographic facial images has also been found to be more robust (Staugaard, 
2009). Valenced images may be more strongly related to affective information in 
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GAD than words, as images have privileged access to the systems in which affective 
information is stored (Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & 
Joormann, 2004). Additionally, we are biologically wired to analyze facial 
expressions of emotion, especially anger (Esteves, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994; Fox et 
al., 2001). Therefore, pictures of neutral and angry facial expressions - employed in 
previous dot probe tasks in anxious populations (Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Fox et al., 
2007; Mogg et al., 2000) - were selected as stimuli for the current project.  
2.3.3.2 Interpretation Bias Task 
Interpretation relates to the process by which meaning is determined from  
ambiguous information with the aim of constructing a mental representation. The 
resolution of ambiguous events and situations (which can occur with or without 
awareness) is fundamental to our everyday lives, as we are constantly presented with 
situations that we must decipher. For example, determining the meaning behind a 
comment or a loud noise in the night (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Of most interest 
to researchers is the impact of emotional states on the resulting interpretations of 
different situations. Specifically, the ability to accurately determine ambiguous signs, 
which could be related to danger or harm and are vital for our adaptive functioning 
and survival (Blanchette & Richards, 2010).  
Models, in particular dual-process models, of pathological worry suggest that 
individuals who are prone to worry are more likely interpret ambiguous information 
as threatening (Beck & Clark, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). In fact, as stipulated 
previously, individual differences in the processing of threat-relevant material are 
suggested to be causal in the development and maintenance of anxiety and worry 
(e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; 
Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007a, 
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2007b), with Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) studies confirming such 
suggestions (e.g., Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Salemink 
et al., 2007b; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009). Both Hirsch and Mathews 
(2012) and Ouimet et al. (2009) argue that individuals with high levels of worry 
should be able to be distinguished from those with low levels of worry based on 
biases of interpretation, which in turn can be expected to be related to low levels of 
rule based processes (e.g., reasoning and attentional control). Refer to Chapter 1, 
Section 1.5.3, pp. 31-44, for a more detailed account. Research supports the 
aforementioned theoretical suggestions with anxious individuals tending to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening (e.g., Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Dugas, 
Hedayati, et al., 2005; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Halberstadt 
et al., 1995; Mathews et al., 1989; Mogg et al., 1994). 
Homophone (e.g., “sleigh/slay”) spelling tasks have traditionally been 
employed to examine interpretation bias, despite this methodology producing 
inconsistent findings (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; 
Mathews et al., 1989). Such tasks aurally present a list of words for participants to 
spell. Some of the words are ambiguous in that they are homophones with two 
possible meanings. Ambiguous sentence tasks have also been employed to examine 
interpretation bias. For example, Eysenck et al. (1991) presented ambiguous sentences 
to participants with clinically diagnosed anxiety disorders and found that they 
provided threatening (rather than non-threatening) interpretations compared to non-
clinically anxious individuals. Interpretation bias for threat has also successfully been 
observed in anxious participants with memory recognition paradigms. This research 
involved participants being presented with a series of ambiguous sentences 
(threatening or neutral) and being requested to rate the unpleasantness before 
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completing an unexpected memory recognition test for disambiguated variants 
(threatening/ non-threatening) of the sentences. 
Overall, with regard to paradigms exploring interpretive bias in individuals 
with high levels of worry/GAD (i.e., see above), several methodological limitations 
are present. First, the predominance of self-report measures, second, the potential 
impact of memory biases and the lack of clarity as to whether response selection 
biases are in action. In addition, findings suggest that participants who are aware of 
the purpose of the research task show stronger interpretative biases (Hazlett-Stevens 
& Borkovec, 2004; Salemink et al., 2007a, 2007b).  
In light of such limitations, alternative paradigms in the wider anxiety 
literature have been developed to measure interpretive bias. One such task, which 
more directly assesses interpretation bias is the lexical-decision semantic-priming 
paradigm (e.g., Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Fox et al., 
2007; Fox et al., 2002; Mathews et al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000; Richards & French, 
1992; Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1993; Walsh, McDowall, & Grimshaw, 2010). 
The lexical-decision semantic-priming task involves participants being aurally 
presented with a homophone word (“sleigh/slay”) shortly before a visual word is 
presented on the screen (snow/die/table), to which they must respond whether the 
words are related/unrelated (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; 
Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mathews et al., 1989; Walsh et al., 2010).  
This technique has been used to examine semantic activation of different 
meanings of the same ambiguous prime, by presenting target words that are related to 
different meanings and comparing the time taken to respond to related/unrelated 
words (Richards & French, 1992). The task is most frequently presented as a reaction 
time task, whereby the processing of a target word is thought to be facilitated when a 
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related (compared to unrelated) word is processed shortly before its presentation 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; 
Mathews et al., 1989; Walsh et al., 2010). This finding reflects that dominant 
meanings of ambiguous primes are retrieved first, with the subordinate meaning 
activated more slowly (Simpson & Burgess, 1985). Overall, the lexical decision task 
has been argued to improve on other methodologies that examine interpretation bias 
by: (1) requiring shorter response latencies so that there is less time for interference 
by conscious or strategic processes to become involved; (2) examining response time, 
which is a more direct measure than written responses; (3) being able to compare 
response times to valenced and non-valenced stimuli. To date interpretation bias has 
predominantly been examined using word-based stimuli, and as interpretation bias is 
assumed to be a result of later stage, rule-based system processing, word-based 
stimuli are deemed most appropriate (Epstein, 1998a; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
2.4 Data Preparation  
For Study 1, a power analysis undertaken with G*power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that with 80% power at an alpha level of 0.05 and 
assuming a small to medium effect size (0.25) - as observed in other questionnaire 
studies with similar variables - 299  participants were needed. However, oversampling 
ensured we had sufficient participants once high and low worry groups had been 
formed.  
As the current project consisted of studies which were novel and some of the 
first research to examine processing style in worry, we also wanted to ensure the 
studies had sufficient power. Therefore, for Study 2, Study 3 and Study 4 we 
estimated effect sizes (Cohen’s d) from literature based on the experimental tasks. 
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The reasoning tasks (Study 2) employed have not been used in relation to worry, or 
GAD samples so it was not possible to calculate population relevant effect sizes. 
However, in studies examining similar populations, an effect size of d = 0.64 is 
observed for subjective probability tasks and d = 0.56 on deductive reasoning tasks 
(Klaczynski, 2001). Although there have been no studies examining antisaccade 
performance in adult populations endorsing GAD symptoms (Study 3), similar studies 
examining participants with high levels of anxiety demonstrate an effect size of d = 
0.66 (Ansari et al., 2008). The dot probe task (Study 4) was found to have an effect 
size of d = 0.45 across studies of participants with high and low levels of worry and 
GAD (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), and an effect size of d = 0.47 was observed on a 
semantic priming homograph task (Study 4) in a university student sample of 
participants screened for GAD (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004). Therefore, with 
91 participants, the between group comparisons would all have sufficient power to 
identify small effect sizes. 
Preliminary data screening was conducted on all variables to identify outliers 
as well as to determine whether the variables were normally distributed. Variables 
were assumed to be normally distributed if the skewness and kurtosis of the 
distribution were within the acceptable range. All variables in Study 1 were normally 
distributed. For the remaining studies several outliers were observed and not all 
variables were normally distributed. Because there were variables present that were 
not normally distributed, even after altering outlier scores, we ran analyses on 
transformed variables. However, a similar pattern of results emerged with no 
significant differences observed between transformed and untransformed variables. 
Therefore, we chose to report analyses undertaken on untransformed variables.  
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Substituted means were inserted in the homophone interpretation bias task when 
individual data points were missing. No means were substituted in the other tasks 
because no further data points were found to be missing. The procedure of 
substituting means assumes that data were missing from the results randomly and, as 
the presence of missing data often related to malfunctions with the equipment. Little’s 
missing completely at random (MCAR) test was undertaken in SPSS to ensure that 
the missing data were random. Little’s MCAR test for the homophone interpretation 
bias task resulted in a chi-square = 11.995 (df = 24; p = .981), which indicates that the 
data was missing at random and no identifiable pattern was observed within the 
missing data. Information about outliers and the distribution of variables will be 
reported in each experimental chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
Rational and Experiential Processing in Individuals Who Worry: A Dual-
Process Account 
As argued in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the distinction between 
automatic and strategic processes has led to significant theoretical developments in 
the conceptualization of psychopathology (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Yet, the majority of these developments have 
occurred outside the context of dual-process theories of cognition, where the 
distinction between automatic and strategic processes is central. The relative absence 
of dual-process theories from literature examining psychopathology is particularly 
notable given the literature on dual-process theories is both extensive and well 
established (see: Evans, 2008, for review).  
The dual-process theory that will be the focus of this Chapter is Epstein’s 
Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1983; 1990) as it is arguably 
particularly relevant to psychopathology, due to its strong focus on personality and 
individual processing style. As described earlier (Chapter 1, Section 1.6.3, pp. 57-61) 
CEST proposes two distinct, interactive conceptual systems that inform behaviour and 
conscious thought: a rational system, and an experiential system (e.g., Epstein et al., 
1996). Individuals who have an imbalance, such as the dominance of an 
automatic/experiential processing style in conjunction with weak control (rational) 
processes, have been found to be most at risk for psychopathology (e.g., depression, 
eating disorders; Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009; Epstein, 1998c; Kerns, 
2006). Although limited in number, self-report studies offer support for a relationship 
between processing style, wellbeing, and psychopathology (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; 
Claes et al., 2009; Epstein et al., 1996). However, individual differences in processing 
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style appear to depend largely on situational variables (Epstein, 1990, 1994), with 
more recent studies highlighting the differences between situational (how someone 
responds in a specific situation), and dispositional (how someone responds more 
generally) processing styles (Claes et al., 2009).  
To date, despite processing styles being linked with aspects of 
psychopathology (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.3, pp. 57-61 for further details), the 
applicability of CEST to anxiety and worry has yet to be explored. This is particularly 
surprising as recent models implicate dual-process theory in accounting for worry 
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Additionally, there are parallel 
findings in the separate literatures on dual-processing theory, and worry and anxiety. 
For example, in the case of anxiety, cognitive biases are known to characterize 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005), with biases in attention and interpretation claimed to be 
fundamental in the development and maintenance of pathological worry (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). With regard to processing style, the presence of cognitive biases and 
the acceptance of heuristic thinking as rational is linked to pattern of processing 
where an individual engages largely in dispositional experiential processing (see 
Chapter 2, pp. 73-76 for description and clarification between dispositional and 
situational processing styles) whilst underutilizing dispositional rational processing 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shiloh et al., 2002). Parallels also exist between 
characteristics of pathological worry and dispositional processing style in relation to 
deficits in both working memory capacity and problem-solving (Dugas et al., 1995; 
Hayes et al., 2008).  
Of note, individuals with high levels of worry are asked to offer self-appraisals 
they often report negative appraisals, which do not necessarily correspond to actual 
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deficits. This is most clearly observed in the case of problem-solving. Although a 
relationship between a low dispositional processing style and deficits in problem-
solving ability has been observed (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994), it is the negative 
appraisals and perceptions that individuals with high levels of worry have about their 
ability to problem solve, rather than problem-solving deficits per se, which are 
problematic  (Belzer, D'Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002; Dugas et al., 1995; Hayes 
et al., 2008; Ladouceur et al., 1998). For example, studies have found no difference in 
problem-solving ability between individuals with high and low levels of worry 
(Dugas et al., 1995; Ladouceur et al., 1998).  
During worry episodes, problem-solving attempts are argued to be impacted 
by negative beliefs and appraisals that act to maintain the worry cycle and prolong the 
problem-solving process (Ladouceur et al., 1998). Thus, it is important to consider 
possible differences between dispositional and situational processing style, as no 
difference has been observed in problem-solving ability between individuals with 
high and low levels of worry. Therefore, it is likely that no difference in dispositional 
rational processing would be observed, however, due to the impact of negative beliefs 
and appraisals related to problem-solving in the context of worry (Ladouceur et al., 
1998; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a, 2005b), higher levels of situational processing 
would be expected to be observed during active periods of worry.  
The similarities between characteristics associated with individual differences 
in processing style and pathological worry raises the question as to whether different 
styles of processing could be associated with pathological worry. For example, 
individuals who engage in excessive worry could exhibit a processing style 
characterized by an over reliance on dispositional experiential processing and an 
under reliance on dispositional rational processing. Therefore, integrating the 
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disparate literatures on dual-process theory and pathological worry may provide a 
useful framework to better understand the factors that contribute to the development 
of pathological worry (Ouimet et al., 2009). As the association between individual 
processing styles and worry has not been systematically studied, the aim of the 
present study is to determine the nature of individual differences in both situational 
and dispositional processing styles, in individuals with high and low levels of worry. 
In this way, the applicability of Epstein’s CEST will be examined. Specifically, using 
processing style questionnaires (PMPI and REI) we will test whether individual 
differences in processing styles can account for individual differences in worry.  
In light of previous research (e.g., Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Dugas et al., 
1995; Fletcher, Marks, & Hine, 2011; Ladouceur et al., 1998; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Shiloh et al., 2002), it is hypothesized that no difference will be observed between 
participants with high and low levels of worry with regard to dispositional rational 
processing. However, as active periods of worry are characterised by engagement in 
problem-solving attempts (Szabo & Lovibond, 2006), which rely heavily on rational 
processing (Fong et al., 1986), it is expected that higher levels of situational rational 
processing will be observed in the high, compared to the low worry group.  
In terms of dispositional experiential processing, research suggesting a link 
between cognitive biases and processing errors in individuals with higher levels of 
worry (Hayes et al., 2010). This leads to the expectation that dispositional experiential 
processing will be observed in individuals endorsing high but not low levels of worry. 
We hypothesized that when engaged in worry (situational processing), no difference 
would be observed in situational experiential processing between participants with 
high and low levels of worry, as worry is cognitive in nature, and the risk for 
psychopathology is increased by the presence of one dominant system (Burns & 
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D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009; Epstein, 1998c; Kerns, 2006).  Due to gender 
differences observed in research into both worry (e.g., Robichaud et al., 2003) and 
processing styles (Epstein et al., 1996), differences between male and female 
participants will be examined.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
A total of 344 first year undergraduate psychology students were recruited. 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 (pp. 66-68) and 2.2.3 (p. 70) provide full details of the 
procedure, participants, and constitution of the high and low worry groups. A total of 
17 participants were excluded from analyses after submitting incomplete surveys. In 
order to create the high/low worry groups a three-group split was undertaken, which 
left a total of 157 (72 low and 85 high worry) participants in the final analyses. The 
sample consisted of 74.5% women (25.5% men) with a mean age of 19.7 years. 
3.1.2 Measures 
Participants completed an online questionnaire battery, which was 
administered by LimeSurvey (version 1.87). The questionnaire battery included the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV), the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) and the 
Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI). See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 (pp. 
73-76) for further details and psychometric properties of the measures.  
3.1.3 Planned analyses 
Three outlying scores were observed in study one, two on the REI-R and one 
on the REI-E. These were replaced by substitution. The GADQ-IV’s distribution was 
also found to be negatively skewed (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4 p. 98 for rationale for 
using untransformed variables). In order to test the hypotheses with regard to 
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differences in processing style by gender and level of worry, two mixed model 
analyses of variance were conducted. The mean scores on processing style scales 
(PMPI and REI scores) acted as the within subject variables, whilst high or low worry 
group and gender acted as the between subjects variables. One 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
examined dispositional processing style (rational and experiential) by level of worry 
(high versus low) and gender (male versus female), whilst the other examined 
situational processing style (rational and experiential) by level of worry and gender. 
Follow-up t-tests were conducted to assess differences in between subject variables. 
3.2 Results  
Means and standard deviations of processing style and symptom scales are 
shown in Table 3.1.  
3.2.1 Situational processing style 
The ANOVA showed a main effect (see Figure 3.1) of situational processing 
style F(1, 153) = 124.25, p < .001, indicating that, overall, when engaged in worry 
participants endorsed higher levels of rational (M = 37.14, SD = 8.88) than 
experiential processing (M = 26.10, SD = 7.44). Participant responses on scales of 
situational rational and experiential processing differed depending on the levels of 
worry with a significant situational processing style x worry interaction observed: 
F(1, 153) = 4.36, p = .04. T-tests showed a difference between high (M = 38.77, SD = 
8.85) and low (M = 35.22, SD = 8.60) worry groups on rational processing (t(155) = -
2.53, p = .01), whereas experiential processing did not differ between the groups 
(t(155) = -1.23, p = .21). A significant situational processing style x gender 
interaction was also revealed F(1, 153) = 10.04, p < .01. T-tests indicated that this 
resulted from female participants reporting higher levels of situational experiential 
processing (M = 26.86, SD = 7.72) than male participants (M = 23.88, SD = 6.09;  
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Table 3.1: Means (standard deviations in parenthesis) for situational and 
dispositional processing style scales and symptom scores by level of worry and 
gender. 
  Level of worry and gender 
 High worry  Low worry 
 
Measures 
Men  
(N=11) 
Women 
(N=74) 
Total 
(N=85) 
Men  
(N=29) 
Women 
(N=43) 
Total  
(N=72) 
Symptom       
GADQ-IV 19.81 (6.54) 21.64 (6.55) 21.40 (6.54) 1.41 (1.43) 2.07 (1.67) 1.81 (1.60) 
PSWQ 65.0 (6.78) 67.20 (6.03) 66.92 (6.13) 34.21 (7.26) 35.53 (7.04) 35.00 (7.12) 
Dispositional       
REI-E 2.84 (0.31) 3.02 (0.27) 3.00 (0.28) 3.01 (0.28) 2.99 (0.21) 3.00 (0.24) 
REI-R 3.03 (0.18) 3.04 (0.20) 3.04 (0.20) 3.00 (0.15) 3.02 (0.17) 3.00 (0.16) 
Situational       
PMPI-E 23.64 (6.49) 27.26 (8.06) 26.78 (7.93) 23.97 (6.05) 26.19 (7.15) 25.29 (6.77) 
PMPI-R 43.46 (9.20) 38.07 (8.64) 38.77 (8.85) 37.28 (7.81) 33.84 (8.91) 35.22 (8.60) 
Note: N = 157. GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire – IV; PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; PMPI – E = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Emotional scale; PMPI – 
R = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Rational scale; REI – E = Rational Experiential 
Inventory, Experiential; REI – R = Rational Experiential Inventory, Rational scale. 
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Figure 3.1: Mean self-report Perceived Mode of Processing Inventory (PMPI) scores 
by situational processing style scales (Rational, Experiential) and gender in high and 
low worry groups  
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t(155) = -2.22, p = .03). Situational rational processing style scores were not found to 
differ significantly as a result of gender:  t(155) = 1.52, p = .13. Worry was also found 
to be unrelated to gender as the three-way interaction of processing style x worry x 
gender was not significant: F(1, 153) = .52, p = .47. 
3.2.2 Dispositional Processing Style 
The ANOVA examining mean dispositional processing style (see: Figure 3.2)  
showed no significant main effect of processing style F(1, 153) = 3.13, p = .08. The 
processing style x worry F(1, 153) = 2.07, p = .15, and processing style x gender 
interactions F(1, 153) = .86, p = .36 were also not significant. Neither was the three-
way interaction of processing style x worry x gender: F(1, 153) = 2.86, p = .09. 
3.3 Discussion 
It was hypothesized that higher levels of situational rational and dispositional 
experiential processing would be observed in individuals reporting high, compared to 
low, levels of worry. Additionally, due to documented differences between men and 
women in both worry (e.g., Robichaud et al., 2003) and processing style (Epstein et 
al., 1996), gender differences were assessed. Our hypotheses were only partially 
confirmed. Consistent with hypotheses, when faced engaged in worry (i.e., situational 
processing style) participants with high, compared to low, levels of worry 
demonstrated greater rational compared to experiential processing. Indeed, follow-up 
analyses confirmed that this was because those high in worry reported engaging in 
increased levels of rational processing compared to those low in worry. In contrast, 
when faced with a situation in which they worry, women were found to engage in 
more experiential processing than men. However, an increase in experiential 
processing amongst worriers is not better accounted for by gender effects as no 
relationship was observed between processing style, gender, and levels of worry.  
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Figure 3.2: Mean self-report Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) scores by 
dispositional processing style scales (Rational, Experiential) and gender in high and 
low worry groups 
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We also hypothesized that, for dispositional processing style, those high in worry 
would report more experiential compared to rational processing. However, this 
hypothesis was not supported. That is, participants with high levels of worry were not 
found to differ from participants with low levels of worry in regard to their reports of 
dispositional levels of experiential processing. As expected no worry related 
differences were observed between dispositional rational and situational experiential 
processing styles.  
Despite there being no previous studies that have investigated the role of 
dispositional versus situational processing in pathological worry, these results 
emphasise the importance of considering both situational and dispositional processing 
style, particularly when exploring the relationship of processing style to 
psychopathology (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes, Witteman, & van den Bercken, 
2009). Furthermore, the results suggest that when engaged in worry people with high 
worry are more likely to rely on rational processing, consistent with the idea that 
individuals high in worry rely on a particular form of rational processing to try and 
solve the problem that is at the source of their worry. Previous research has shown 
that during worry episodes the very nature of worry requires increased engagement in 
problem-solving attempts, which rely on rational processing (Fong et al., 1986; Szabo 
& Lovibond, 2006).  However, also consistent with previous findings - that no real 
difference in actual performance on reasoning or problem-solving tasks has been 
observed – this rational processing style does not reflect a difference in levels of 
general, trait, or dispositional self-perceptions of rationality between individuals with 
high and low levels of worry (Davey, 1994a; Dugas et al., 1995; Ladouceur et al., 
1998; Shewchuk, Johnson, & Elliott, 2000). In order to provide further clarification, 
there is a need for research exploring the relationship between perceived rationality 
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and measures of rational processing performance (e.g., problem-solving or reasoning 
tasks) in the context of worry.  
Although not previously examined in relation to worry, prior research led to 
the expectation that dispositional experiential processing would be associated with 
higher levels of worry. For example, there is an association between an over-reliance 
on dispositional experiential processing and the presence of cognitive biases and the 
acceptance of heuristic thinking as rational (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shiloh et al., 
2002). Furthermore, cognitive biases have been found to be associated with high 
levels of worry (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004; Hirsch et 
al., 2011; Mathews et al., 1989). As a dispositional experiential processing style has 
been found to be responsible for heuristic thinking and cognitive biases and, although 
not explicitly tested in this study, cognitive biases have previously been linked to high 
levels of worry, we expected to find individuals with high levels of worry to 
demonstrate high levels of a dispositional experiential processing style. However, the 
current study found no relationship between high levels of worry and a dominant 
dispositional experiential processing style. As previous research based on the 
priniciples of CEST has focused largely on personality aspects (i.e., neuroticism) or 
psychopathology - where the key characteristic symptoms are not so clearly cognitive 
(Claes et al., 2009) - the current finding, that those high in worry did not report 
dispositional experiential processing style but instead reported a dominant situational 
rational processing style, may well reflect the cognitive nature of worry.  
The finding of a dominant situational rational processing style is consistent 
with current of models of worry, which stipulate worry to be a cognitive strategy in 
which people attempt cope and solve the worrying situation (Borkovec & Roemer, 
1995; Davey, 1994a). Of particular relevance are Wells’ (1995), and Borkovec’s 
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(1994) models (see Chapter 1, pp. 19-21, and pp. 31-33 for detailed discussion of 
these models). Both Wells (1995) metacognitive model and Borkovec’s Cognitive 
Avoidance Model of Worry (AMW; Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 2004) highlight 
the cognitive nature of worry and stipulate that worry is a cognitive strategy that 
individuals engage in to cope with anticipated problems. Wells’ theory places 
emphasis on beliefs about worry maintaining the worry cycle. Worry is thought to be 
initially triggered by intrusive negative thoughts that activate beliefs about worry and 
lead to a range of ineffective strategies aimed at avoidance of worry via attempts at 
cognitive control (Wells, 2004; Wells & Carter, 1999). Similarly, Borkovec (1994) 
conceptualizes worry as a perseverative, cognitive activity that serves as avoidance - a 
cognitive attempt to problem solve and remove possible future threat, or avoid 
thinking about more distressing topics (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).  
Although gender differences in relation to worry have been reported, they 
remain largely unexplored (Robichaud et al., 2003). Despite the current study 
addressing gender, no worry related gender differences were found. However, 
consistent with previous research into processing style (Epstein et al., 1996), women 
demonstrated higher levels of experiential processing than men (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999).  The experiential system is argued to be the seat of emotions - with those either 
high or low in experiential processing reported to be less emotionally well adjusted 
(Epstein, 1992; Pacini et al., 1998). However, due to the lack of a relationship 
observed between gender, mode of processing, and worry, these findings did not offer 
insight into understanding how men and women may worry in different ways. 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to compare individuals with 
high and low levels of worry with regard to self-reported individual processing style 
as characterised by CEST. The findings provide preliminary evidence that 
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participants’ level of worry has significant implications for individual differences in 
processing style, particularly when confronted with periods of active worry (e.g., 
Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009). Ouimet et al. (2009) have argued that the 
application of dual-process theory to anxiety disorders might lead to important 
theoretical developments (Ouimet et al., 2009). These results confirm that further 
investigations of the nature of processing styles in anxiety disorders are warranted.  
Additionally, if the present findings are replicated in a clinical sample there could be 
implications for treatment. Currently, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is the 
most empirically supported, and evidence based treatment for generalised anxiety and 
anxiety disorders more generally (Arch & Craske, 2008). The cognitive challenging 
components incorporated in CBT focus and rely on engaging the rational system to 
determine the validity of beliefs. However, if the current findings are shown to be 
robust, the efficacy of these strategies might be enhanced through increasing the focus 
on the experiential components of CBT (e.g., use of imagery), in order to engage 
experiential processing.  
Several limitations require noting with regard to this study. Firstly, although 
participants in the high worry group lay within the clinical range with regard to self-
reported levels of worry and GAD symptoms, the study relied on an analogue worry 
sample (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1,  pp. 64-66 for further details). However, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the processes that are characteristic of worry differ 
between clinical and non-clinical populations. Indeed, the qualitative experience of 
worry has been found to be similar between clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Borkovec et al., 1983). Further, the approach was to get distinct groups of high and 
low worry by using an extreme groups approach (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, p. 70) 
instead of a median split. Nonetheless, these results need to be replicated in a sample 
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of individuals who meet criteria for generalised anxiety disorder before there can be 
full confidence in their wider applicability. A second limitation relates to the current 
sample consisting of predominantly young adults. As both rational and experiential 
processing decrease with age (Sladek et al., 2010), further research using participants 
across a broader age range is required. Lastly, the employment of self-report measures 
is a limitation that must be considered. Responses provided on self-report measures 
by individuals high in worry can be influenced by an individual’s perceptions, which 
are open to distortion (Eng & Heimberg, 2006). Therefore, employing experimental 
measures in a clinical sample to replicate and corroborate these preliminary findings 
would be beneficial, particularly to clarify whether individuals with higher levels of 
worry are reporting their perceived, rather than preferred, processing style.  
In summary, although erroneous information processing is implicated in the 
development and maintenance of chronic worry (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hirsch et 
al., 2011; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Mathews et al., 1989), individual differences in 
processing style between individuals with high and low levels of worry  have not been 
previously examined (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). The 
current questionnaire-based study takes the first step to address this gap in the 
literature. The hypotheses were partially supported, with individuals endorsing high 
levels of worry also endorsing higher levels of situational rational compared to 
experiential processing than individuals with low levels of worry. However, there 
were no indications of differences between those who reported high and low levels of 
worry reporting differences in dispositional processing styles. The preliminary 
findings in this study emphasise not only the significance of considering individual 
processing style in relation to chronic worry, they also emphasise  the importance of a 
dual-process perspective in research considering both dispositional and situational 
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aspects of processing style. The pattern of individual processing style observed in 
individuals with high levels of worry appears to reflect the future orientated cognitive 
nature of worry, rather than the emotional symptoms which accompany worry. 
Further research employing experimental paradigms would be helpful to extend and 
corroborate these preliminary findings; this will be the focus of the next chapter. 
Overall, despite the preliminary nature of the current study, it provides evidence of 
the potential applicability of dual-process theory in extending our understanding of 
information processing in the development and maintenance of worry. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Study 2 
Reasoning in Individuals Who Worry: A Dual-Process Account 
As outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis, most theories of 
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) consider chronic worry to be an attempt to 
problem-solve future orientated concerns (Borkovec et al., 1983; Dugas et al., 1998; 
Mennin et al., 2005; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006).  Although these theories differ as 
to why some people are unable to resolve this cycle of futile problem-solving, there is 
general agreement and empirical support for poorer reasoning and problem-solving 
performance contributing to chronic worry (Davey, 1994a; Dugas et al., 1995; 
Robichaud & Dugas, 2005b).  
The emphasis on problem-solving in chronic worry has led researchers to 
investigate differences in both problem-solving ability and actual performance 
between people with and without high levels of worry and GAD. Evidence suggests 
that the problem-solving of those with chronic worry is affected by factors that can 
occur at any of the various steps in the problem-solving process, which can effect 
performance, rather than there being deficit in problem-solving ability per se (Belzer 
et al., 2002; Davey, 1994b; Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas et al., 1995; Hayes et al., 2008; 
Ladouceur et al., 1998; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005b). Both Anderson, Goddard, and 
Powell (2009) and Davey (1994b) found that when individuals who worry are faced 
with real-life problem-solving situations no deficits are observed, in fact, during 
worry episodes, individuals with chronic worry are found to be actively engaged in 
problem-solving attempts (Szabo & Lovibond, 2006), which rely heavily on rational 
processing (Fong et al., 1986). Thus, high levels of worry have only been found to be 
associated with negative appraisals and perceptions toward problem-solving, low 
problem-solving confidence and poor perceived control over the problem-solving 
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process, which act to maintain the worry cycle and prolong the problem-solving 
process (Anderson et al., 2009; Davey, 1994b; Ladouceur et al., 1998). Therefore, any 
observed worry related problem-solving deficits appear to occur as a result of the 
solution implementation not solution generation phase of the process (Davey, 1994b). 
Despite this recent focus on the role of reasoning and problem-solving, as it 
contributes to worry, current research paradigms are largely based on self-report 
measures which are vulnerable to bias and distortion and may not accurately reflect 
the processes underlying poor problem-solving performance (Eng & Heimberg, 
2006). Additionally, current research has yet to employ methodologies from the wider 
reasoning literature, which have a strong evidence base with regard to human 
reasoning processes.  
Traditionally within the general reasoning and problem-solving literatures, 
two types of experimental tasks have been employed to assess problem-solving skills: 
verbal based problems using vignettes or written questions, and experimental 
behavioural tasks. The verbal-based problem tasks relate specifically to the use of 
deductive or inductive reasoning, which underlie problem-solving, reasoning and 
human rationality (Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo, & Cherubini, 2012; Stanovich & 
West, 1998). Therefore, if individuals with higher levels of worry have poorer 
reasoning and problem-solving skills than those with low levels of worry, one would 
expect them to be less proficient at deductive and inductive reasoning. However, 
these paradigms have not as yet been applied to worry. 
As discussed previously, Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 
1983; 1990; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), specifically addresses individual differences in 
the two processing style (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6.3, pp. 57-61): the rational style, 
based on logic, numerical analysis and rational thought processes and the experiential 
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style, which is based on learned experience and intuitive thought processes (e.g., 
Epstein et al., 1996). Individuals with a less dominant rational processing style 
demonstrate reduced reasoning and problem-solving performance, as well as 
decreased working memory capacity (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Fletcher et al., 
2011; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992), factors which are also implicated in pathological 
worry (Dugas et al., 1995; Hayes et al., 2008). As mentioned previously, during worry 
episodes, individuals demonstrate restricted working memory capacity and reduced 
problem-solving performance (Belzer et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 2008).  
In terms of measuring both reasoning and processing style, employing 
reasoning measures that place the two systems (rational and experiential) in conflict 
are integral to the dual-process literature. Their usefulness lies in that research into 
problem-solving and reasoning depicts solutions as either resulting from individuals 
analytically deconstructing the components and optimally solving problems or, 
alternatively, engaging less optimal, superficial, methods (Reber, Ruch-Monachon, & 
Perrig, 2007). Therefore, the outcomes of both processing modes are immediately and 
equally accessible (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). One such paradigm is the ratio-bias 
probabilistic reasoning task (developed from Miller et al. (1989) and employed by 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992)). The ratio-bias phenomenon is the subjective 
judgment of a low probability event as being more likely when the probability is 
presented in the context of a ratio of larger numbers (e.g., 10 in 100 rather than 1 in 
10). Participants are influenced by the presence of large numbers (Denes-Raj & 
Epstein, 1994; Pacini et al., 1998) and tend to respond automatically to frequency 
information rather than taking rational considerations (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The 
ratio-bias can relate to either strong experiential processing, weak rational processing, 
or both, due to the rational system being associated with control of experiential 
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response tendencies (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). However, incentives such as enforced 
conditions where participants win or lose a point appear to also impact results. 
Although economic models would assume that incentives make people behave more 
rationally (Mukherjee & Srinivasan, 2013), previous findings demonstrate that 
context (the presence of large numbers) and incentives act to exacerbate individual 
processing styles and engagement in heuristic responding (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).  
Overall, although it has been established that, during worry episodes, 
individuals with chronic worry demonstrate restricted working memory capacity and 
reduced problem-solving performance (Belzer et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 2008; Leigh 
& Hirsch, 2011), few studies have progressed past theoretical assertion to consider the 
relevance of dual-process models and the complex interplay between the rational and 
experiential systems in the processes that underlie chronic worry. In Study 1 (see 
previous chapter), we found preliminary evidence for an association between worry 
and perceived situational rational processing. Specifically, when individuals reporting 
high levels of worry were faced with a situation that caused them to worry, they 
reported engaging in increased levels of rational processing compared to individuals 
with low levels of worry. However, these findings were based on self-report measures 
that are open to distortion (Eng & Heimberg, 2006). Therefore, using experimental 
reasoning paradigms, this study aimed to assess the possible application of a dual-
process framework, specifically individual processing styles, to pathological worry 
and reasoning performance. Thus, the findings will further examine the applicability 
of Epstein’s processing styles (CEST) in accounting for worry (psychopathology), 
using more direct experimental measures. Additionally, it offers the opportunity to 
further investigate whether individuals with high levels of worry actually have poorer 
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reasoning skills; or whether the reasoning and, therefore, problem-solving 
performance is related to negative self-perceptions and beliefs.  
If worry is associated with actual deficits in reasoning and problem-solving 
implementation, we would expect that people high in worry would perform more 
poorly on all reasoning tasks particularly on behavioural reasoning tasks. CEST 
suggests lower reasoning scores to be related to low dispositional rational processing 
and higher levels of dispositional experiential processing, neither of which is expected 
to be related to levels of worry based on findings from Study 1. Although Study 1 
showed that, when faced with a situation in which they worried, participants with 
higher levels of worry demonstrated increased levels of situational rational 
processing, this is thought to relate to challenges at the solution implementation not 
solution generation phase of the problem-solving process (Davey, 1994b). Thus, we 
expected that any observed relationship between situational processing style and 
actual reasoning performance would not be moderated by participants’ level of worry. 
The relationship between processing style, worry/GAD symptoms and reasoning have 
not yet been examined, therefore, the analyses will also assess the relationships 
between these variables. Since there were no interactions between gender and worry 
in Study 1 (see Chapter 3, p. 101), gender was not further explored.  
4.1 Method  
4.1.1 Participants 
As described in Chapter 2, the current study consisted of 112 participants 
selected through a prescreen procedure (high and low Stress scores on the DASS). 
See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, pp. 66-69 for further details. Participants completed the 
study components in the same 1.5 hour session as some of the tasks described in 
experimental Study 4 (Chapter 6). Six participants did not complete the study 
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components due to arriving late to the session, therefore, a total of 106 participants 
were included in final analyses.  
4.1.2 Measures 
Symptom and processing style measures 
The Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire –IV (GADQ-IV), the Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) and 
the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI) were presented in one of two 
counterbalanced orders and were completed by participants via LimeSurvey (version 
1.87). For further details about the measures and their psychometric properties see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5, p. 73.  
4.1.3 Problem-solving and reasoning tasks 
4.1.2.1 Deductive reasoning: Syllogistic reasoning task 
Deductive reasoning involves syllogisms whereby two premises are offered 
from which a definite conclusion is then logically drawn, which follows even if the 
premises are not in themselves believable (Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sa et al., 1999: 
see Appendix A for items). Further details and examples of the task have been 
described in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1.1, p. 80 and Appendix E. Prior to completing the 
survey participants were informed that they would be presented with two premises 
and a conclusion, which they would then need to decided whether it followed 
logically from the premises assuming that the premises were true. It was highlighted 
that answers should evaluate the items logical validity and not the believability of the 
conclusion. The 24 problems were presented to participants via LimeSurvey (version 
1.87). Participants were given one point for each answer that correctly stated whether 
the conclusion followed/did not follow logically from the premise. These were then 
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summed to give a total deductive reasoning score with higher scores representing 
more rational choices. 
4.1.3.2 Statistical reasoning: Inductive preferences task 
Via LimeSurvey (version 1.87), participants were presented with six multi-
choice inductive reasoning problems that simulated real-life decisions (Fong et al., 
1986; Jepson et al., 1983; Stanovich & West, 1998). Inductive reasoning problems 
present premises, from which a probable or credible conclusion can be drawn. 
Participants were informed that the problems did not have strictly right or wrong 
answers and that the study was interested in how people explain and predict events 
when limited information is provided. Further details on the task can be found in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1.2, p. 81) and examples are presented in Appendix E. 
Participants employing statistical principles (rational processing) should avoid 
making inferences based on small samples or the personal case experience 
(experiential processing). Items were scored from 1 – 4 (see: Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 
1980), with higher scores given to answers that included the aggregate information 
and, therefore, represented the statistical or rational choice. Lower scores were given 
to answers based on evidence from the single case, personal experience information, 
which is representative of a choice related to experiential processing.  
4.1.3.3 Probabilistic reasoning task: Jellybean game 
This task followed the method described in Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) and 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992). Participants were told that they would be presented 
with a choice of two containers from which they would select one container from 
which to attempt to pick a red bean to win one point, on ‘win trials’, and avoid 
choosing a bean so as not to lose a point on ‘lose trials’. They were told that the task 
was an attempt to try and understand how people play a game of chance and it was 
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emphasized that although the mathematical probabilities in the two bowls were 
identical, many people had a gut-level preference for one bowl or the other. A Latin 
Square randomization determined the order in which the conditions (i.e., 90% win, 
10% win, 90% lose, 10% lose) were presented. The size (big or small) of the 
container was recorded and participants were asked to state their thoughts, which had 
led to their decision to choose either a large or small container. Further details on the 
task can be found in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.1.3, p. 82).  
Answers were coded as  “0” or “1” depending on the whether participants 
chose the subjective choice of container - which reflected engagement in heuristic 
experiential processing (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) - 
with a total possible score of four. For example, with regard to 10% win conditions, 
the ratio-bias effect can be observed whereby the heuristic choice is the large 
container as individuals have a tendency to view the odds as more favorable when the 
ratio is expressed in larger (e.g., 10 white beans in 100 red beans; 10% condition) 
than smaller (e.g., 1 white bean in 10 beans; 10% condition) numbers, with the 
opposite being true for 90% win conditions; the odds are perceived as more favorable 
when the ration is expressed in smaller than larger numbers (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992). This phenomena is more readily observed on “win” than “lose” trials (Denes-
Raj & Epstein, 1994), however, with regard to “lose” conditions CEST predicts the 
opposite to win conditions; participants will favor the small bowl in the 10% lose 
condition (Condition 3) as the l-in-10 odds of drawing a losing bean from the small 
container seem more remote in comparison to the odds of drawing a losing bean from 
the large container. In contrast, participants should favor the large container in the 
90% lose condition (Condition 4) as the likelihood of odds of selecting a red bean 
from the small container (9 red beans in 10 losing) seems convincingly large 
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(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
4.2 Planned Analyses 
SPSS version 21.0 was used to conduct the analyses. All variables in Study 2, 
were normally distributed, with only one outlier detected. An outlier on the total 
reasoning score was observed and this score was altered to sit one unit lower than the 
next most extreme score before analyses were undertaken. Z-scores for inductive and 
deductive reasoning questionnaires were calculated. These were then summed to form 
a composite score for statistical reasoning (see: Stanovich & West, 1998). This was 
labelled total reasoning score and was used in the analyses. An extreme groups 
approach based on PSWQ and GADQ-IV scores was also undertaken on the 106 
participants who completed all components of the study, 81 participants remained, 
with 42 in the high worry group and 39 in the low worry group (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.3, p.70, for further details). 
First, analyses were undertaken to examine heuristic responses on the 
subjective probability task as a function of worry. To this end, a mixed ANOVA was 
performed examining the within subjects factors of trial valence (10% versus 90% 
probability) and trial type  (win versus lose trials) by level of worry (high versus low; 
between subject factor). Where differences emerged, t-tests were performed to further 
examine differences between the groups.  
In order to examine the relationship between processing style scales and 
reasoning tasks scores, as well as the relationship of these variables symptom scales, 
correlations were undertaken, as were moderation analyses. The correlation analyses 
were undertaken on the complete data set (no split: N = 106), whilst moderation 
analyses were examined for extreme groups only; high (N = 27) and low (N = 36) 
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worriers (total N = 63) to assess the impact of worry (high/low) on the relationship 
between situational processing style and reasoning scores/heuristic scores. 
4.3 Results  
Descriptive statistics for processing style, symptom measures, and reasoning 
task can be found in Table 4.1.  
4.3.1 Analyses of variance: Subjective probability task and worry 
In relation to the subjective probability task, the number of heuristic responses 
across the trials was analysed in a mixed model 2 (valence: 10% versus 90% 
probability) x 2 (trial type: win versus lose) x 2 (group: high versus low worry) 
ANOVA, with group as the between-subjects variable. A significant main effect of 
valence was observed F(1, 79) = 8.12, p = 0.01 with more heuristic responses made 
on 10% trials (M = 0.71, SD = 0.46) than on 90% trials (M= 0.39, SD = 0.49). The 
valence x trial type interaction was significant: F(1, 79) = 31.35, p < 0.001. More 
heuristic responses were made on 10% win than lose trials (t(105) = 3.50, p < 0.01), 
whilst the reverse was found for lose trials - more heuristic responses were made on 
90% lose than win trials (t(105) = 3.17, p < 0.01).   No other main effects or 
interactions were found to be significant, responses did not differ between high and 
low worry groups (F < 1). 
4.3.2 Correlational analyses 
Correlations, between the reasoning tasks and symptom and processing style 
measures are presented in Table 4.2. In terms of the reasoning variables, the total 
reasoning score (comprised of results from inductive and deductive reasoning tasks) 
was found to be negatively correlated with situational experiential processing scores 
(r = -.25, p = .011), and positively correlated with dispositional rational processing 
scores (r = .24, p = .013). No relationship was observed between subjective  
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Table 4.1: Symptom Measure Means and Standard Deviations and comparison of 
group Means on processing style questionnaires  
 Low worry  High worry  Total Sample 
Scale M SD M SD M SD 
Symptom       
GADQ-IV 3.33 2.30 21.52 7.25 11.65 9.67 
PSWQ 40.39 8.17 67.19 8.24 54.19 14.03 
Dispositional       
REI_E 6.28 1.27 6.08 1.27 6.28 1.23 
REI_R 7.44 1.23 6.61 1.34 7.06 1.27 
Situational       
PMPI_E 24.33 6.91 24.88 7.29 25.24 7.03 
PMPI_R 36.51 7.40 40.33 9.29 38.05 8.41 
Reasoning       
Sub. Probability 2.08 .96 2.21 .98 2.18 1.00 
Total Reasoning .05 1.78 -.05 1.43 -0.22 1.59 
Note: Total Sample N = 106; low worry group N = 39; high worry group N = 42(total n = 81); PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire – IV; PMPI – E = Perceived 
Modes of Processing Inventory, Emotional scale; PMPI – R = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Rational 
scale; REI – E = Rational Experiential Inventory, Experiential; REI – R = Rational Experiential Inventory, 
Rational scale; M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
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probability scores (results from the probabilistic reasoning task), total reasoning 
scores, and processing style and symptom scores.  
4.3.3 Moderation Analyses 
Four moderation analyses were undertaken to confirm that worry did not 
moderate a relationship between situational processing style (both rational and 
experiential) and reasoning (total reasoning score and subjective probability scores). 
None of the moderation analyses were significant, as can be observed in Table 4.3 
and Table 4.4. 
4.4 Discussion  
This study aimed to further assess the possible application of a dual-process 
framework in accounting for worry through the use of experimental reasoning tasks. It 
was expected that if worry was associated with negative beliefs about problem-
solving that correspond to actual deficits in reasoning and problem-solving 
implementation, individuals with high levels of worry would perform more poorly on 
all reasoning tasks. Additionally, in keeping with CEST, a dominant dispositional 
experiential system and/or low level of dispositional rational processing were 
expected to correspond to lower reasoning scores and more non-normative 
responding. No differences were expected between participants with high and low 
levels of worry with regard to relationships between situational processing style and 
actual reasoning performance. The analyses offered partial support for the hypotheses. 
Worry was found to be unrelated to actual deficits in reasoning, and heuristic 
responding on the probabilistic reasoning task was unrelated to both processing style 
and level of worry. Although the current results do not offer support for Borkovec’s 
Avoidance Model of Worry, which argues that ineffective/effective problem-solving 
are related increased/reduced perceptions of threat, they corroborate and expand  
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Table 4.2: Correlations of Situational and Dispositional Processing Style Scales with 
Symptom Measures and Reasoning 
Measures PSWQ GADQIV PMPI-E PMPI-R REI-E    REI-R Reasoning 
Reasoning -.030 -.038 -.247* .006 -.097 .240* - 
Sub. Prob.  .088 .066 .026 .010 -.020 -.057 -.188 
Note: N = 106. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire.; GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; PMPI – E = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Emotional scale; PMPI – R = 
Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Rational scale; REI – E = Rational Experiential Inventory, Experiential; 
REI – R = Rational Experiential Inventory, Rational scale. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Moderation Regression Analyses of Situational Rational Processing Style, 
High and Low Worry/GAD symptoms and Reasoning Scores as the Outcome 
Variables 
Predictor Subjective Probability  Total Reasoning Score 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
PMPI-R -.021 -.163  .068 .516 
Worry high_low .145 1.109  -.122 -.931 
ΔR2 .020  .016 
F .618  .484 
Step 2       
PMPI-R -.121 -.282  .079 -1.075 
Worry high_low .145 1.097  .423 -.951 
PMPI_R x worry .105 .244  .049 1.297 
ΔR2 .001  .027 
F .426  .887 
Note: N = 63. PMPI – R = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Rational scale 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
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Table 4.4: Moderation Regression Analyses of Experiential Situational Processing 
Style, High and Low Worry/GAD symptoms and Reasoning Scores as the Outcome 
Variables 
Predictor Subjective Probability  Total Reasoning Score 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
PMPI-E -.090 -.703  -.080 -.624 
Worry high_low .147 1.154  -.101 -.789 
ΔR2 .028  .018 
F .857  .546 
Step 2       
PMPI-E .387 .979  -.165 .336 
Worry high_low .194 1.467  -.101 .625 
PMPI_R x worry -.509 -1.273  .090 .690 
ΔR2 .026  .001 
F 1.118  .375 
Note: N = 63. Worry = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GAD symptoms = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; PMPI – E = Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory, Experiential scale  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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previous findings by demonstrating that worry is unrelated to problem-solving and 
reasoning skills per se (Davey, 1994b; Ladouceur et al., 1998). Current research into 
pathological worry highlights the importance of beliefs and self-perceptions with 
regard to performance on tasks of higher-level cognitive functions. For example, 
Dugas et al.’s (1998) Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (IUM) of worry highlights a 
negative problem orientation, rather than a deficit in problem-solving skills, as 
characteristic of worry, and indeed no differences have been observed in problem-
solving performance on experimental tasks between individuals with and without 
worry (e.g., Robichaud & Dugas, 2005b). Furthermore, Wells’ (1995) Metacognitive 
Model argues for the central role of beliefs in the development and maintenance of 
chronic worry (these models are described in full in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, pp. 16-
43). Thus, the current study highlights the discrepancy between self-perceptions and 
performance in individuals with high levels of worry and supports the importance of 
beliefs and self-perceptions, which are central to cognitive models of worry/GAD, in 
understanding the development, maintenance, and treatment of worry (Davey, 1994a; 
Dugas et al., 1995; Shewchuk et al., 2000).  
There was some evidence of a relationship between self-reported processing 
style and actual reasoning abilities; participants with low dispositional rational and a 
high situational experiential processing style were found to perform lower on 
statistical reasoning. However, no relationship was found between increased 
worry/GAD symptoms, processing style and reasoning scores. The findings in Study 
1 (Chapter 3, pp. 101 - 116) demonstrated that when faced with periods of active 
worry (i.e., situational processing style) participants with high, compared to low, 
levels of worry reported increased levels of rational processing. However, no 
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significant relationships were observed between reports of preferred situational 
processing styles, actual reasoning skills and levels of worry. Therefore, although 
individuals with high levels of worry perceive themselves to use rational processing 
more than those with low levels of worry, the current findings suggest that this is 
purely their perception as neither strengths nor actual deficits were observed in 
rational thinking or reasoning skills per se. 
Effective problem-solving relies heavily on rational processing and 
metacognitive processes (e.g., monitoring and evaluation), which are required to 
override experiential processing (Fong et al., 1986; Ricco & Overton, 2011). Data in 
the current study is consistent with previous findings; higher reasoning scores were 
associated with higher levels of dispositional rational processing and less engagement 
in a situational experiential processing (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Klaczynski & 
Daniel, 2005; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich 
& West, 2008; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011).  These relationships 
indicate that, when faced with situations in which they worry, individuals who 
perceive themselves to be less rational respond in a more emotional, intuitive manner 
and are more likely to use a heuristic style of processing. Cognitive Experiential Self 
Theory (CEST) would argue that it is these individuals, who both perceive themselves 
to have a less rational disposition and to engage in more experiential processing when 
faced with periods of active worry, who are most at risk for pathological levels of 
worry. CEST assumes that the dominance of one system over the other is predictive 
of reasoning, problem-solving performance, and non-normative responding, as well as 
being associated with psychopathology (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009). 
However, the results of this study do not support this contention. That is, there was no 
relationship observed between worry, processing style, and reasoning scores. 
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One possible explanation for the lack of association is that the current study 
did not contain a worry induction component. The results from Study 1 demonstrate 
that participants report different results when asked to think about situations in which 
they worry, compared to how they respond more generally. It is possible the current 
findings reflect the absence of worry with regard to its impact on reasoning task 
performance. This supports the findings from Study 1 (Chapter 3, pp. 101-116), 
which highlight the importance of taking into account the impact of both internal and 
external context in relation to both perception and behaviour is an important 
consideration in future research examining worry.  
The discrepancy observed in this study between self-reported rationality and 
performance on reasoning tasks has significant implications for research into worry. It 
highlights the fact that self-report is a person’s assessment of their abilities, which is 
influenced by the perceptions and biases that they hold. Therefore, the biases common 
to those who worry (e.g., increased self-doubt, lack of self-efficacy in problem-
solving) are likely to influence their judgments in reporting on their cognitive abilities 
and deficits. Hence, the current results strongly argue for the importance of using 
experimental paradigms to directly assess cognitive processes, rather than simply 
asking participants to characterize their own cognitive processes.  There are also 
wider applications with regard to clinical treatments. The current findings are in line 
with recent meta-analyses and randomised control trials that support the efficacy of 
cognitive based therapies, which target errenous self-perceptions and cognitive biases 
that may be contributing to the maintenance of anxiety (e.g., cognitive threapy, meta-
cognitive therapy; Cuijpers et al., 2014; van der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 
2012; Wells & King, 2006).  
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The current study has several limitations. First, the sample was comprised of a 
non-clinical analogue sample. However, as stated earlier, clinical and non-clinical 
populations have a qualitatively similar experience of worry, thereby offering 
justification for the adequacy of non-clinical samples for research into worry 
(Borkovec et al., 1983; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). Second, the current study tested the 
null hypothesis that worry would not moderate the relationship between processing 
style and reasoning and that there would be no worry related group differences 
observed in actual reasoning performance. However, testing for the presence of no 
observed difference can be very difficult to interpret, as there can be multiple reasons 
for the observation of non-significant findings, such as methodological limitations or 
low power. Third, although we carefully selected the experimental tasks in order to 
investigate levels of both statistical and heuristic reasoning it is possible that the 
hypothetical nature of these problems and the lack of a worry induction component 
meant that they may have failed to elicit a disruption to the problem-solving process, 
which may occur in real-life situations. Future research would be beneficial that 
employs a problem-solving paradigm, such as the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Test 
(MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975), which examines a more direct measure of problem-
solving that may be more reflective of the problem-solving challenges observed in 
individuals with chronic worry/GAD. Nonetheless, the current findings certainly 
accentuate that major reasoning and problem-solving deficits are not inherent in 
individuals with high levels of worry. However, research that aims to further 
differentiate problem-solving performance deficits from problem-solving ability 
deficits so that one can examine worry related performance deficits would be 
beneficial.     
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In conclusion, this study extended previous research by integrating dual-
process theory and findings from the problem-solving and reasoning literatures more 
generally, as this applies to pathological worry. These results confirm and extend the 
findings in Study 1 (Chapter 3, pp. 101-116) that self-reported processing style, 
particularly high situational and low dispositional rationality, is associated with worry 
and GAD symptomatology. A strength of this study was the use of both self-report 
and experimental paradigms, which offered the opportunity to overcome the possible 
distortions of self-perceptions (Eng & Heimberg, 2006). The findings have 
implications more broadly in that they are consistent with cognitive models of worry 
and GAD (e.g., the Metacognitive Model and Intolerance of Uncertainty Model), 
which highlight the role of beliefs and biases in self-perceptions (e.g., a negative 
problem orientation) as common to those who worry. In light of the reasoning tasks in 
the current study being found to be unrelated to levels of worry, we were unable to 
gain further insight - via experiemental rather than self-report measures - of the 
possible applicability of dual-process models (i.e., CEST) in accounting for worry. 
Therefore, the following study will turn to focus on attentional control, as 
demonstrated by performance on the antisaccade task, to further examine the 
applicability of alternative dual-process/integrated models of worry - specifically the 
relationship between reflexive (bottom-up, experiential) and volitional (rule-based, 
rational) processes and their association to chronic worry. 
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Chapter 5: Experimental Study 3 
The Impact of Worry on Attentional Control: A Dual-Process Account  
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, a common theme in theories of 
anxiety disorders is the suggestion that individuals who are vulnerable to anxiety have 
certain information processing biases, which lead them to become vigilant to threat-
related stimuli (Barlow, 2002; Sheppes, Luria, Fukuda, & Gross, 2013), as well as 
having difficulty disengaging from those stimuli (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 
Przeworski, 2003; Fox et al., 2001; Koster et al., 2004; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
Meta-analyses confirm that on common measures of attention bias, such as the dot-
probe and Stroop tasks, individuals with clinical levels of anxiety are characterized by 
selective attention to threatening cues (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, more recent 
psychological models of anxiety (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012) have shifted focus from emphasizing attentional biases in anxiety to also focus 
on deficits in attentional control, an aspect of executive function (Visu-Petra, Miclea, 
& Visu-Petra, 2013). 
Attentional control, as conceptualised by attentional control theory (ACT; 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), involves processes underlying the 
ability to intentionally ignore distracting information, as well as shifting attention 
from one aspect to another via the use of deliberate conscious processes. Attentional 
control is the ability to concurrently suppress automatic stimulus driven reactions 
whilst simultaneously engaging one’s goal-directed attentional system to control 
one’s focus (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Richards, Benson, & Hadwin, 2012). 
Therefore, the distinction between controlled and automatic processes is central to 
research into attentional control. This is also reflected in current theoretical 
developments in chronic worry, which account for attentional control deficits within a 
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dual-process framework (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Dual-
process models and attentional control are particularly relevant to anxiety and worry, 
essentially due to the impact of threat; once an individual is exposed to threat both 
habitual (automatic) and intentional (controlled) aspects of processing are engaged.  
Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) recently proposed model of worry (see Chapter 
1, Section 1.5.3, pp. 31-43 for a more detailed discussion) highlights both voluntary 
top down attentional control processes, in addition to emotional processing biases, as 
being central to the development and maintenance of worry. The basic premise of the 
model is that processing biases of attention and interpretation occur outside of 
awareness and lead to a strong and stable representation of threat-related information, 
which in turn contributes to the likelihood that they will reach awareness as thoughts. 
As these threatening thoughts take a verbal form, they are inevitably harder to ignore 
due to their detrimental impact on working memory capacity and executive function 
(Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). Hirsch and Mathews (2012) propose that the form worry 
takes (“quasi-verbal”), in addition to deficits in attentional control, allows for the 
perpetuation of further biases and a repeated cycle of worry, which is often perceived 
as uncontrollable.  
Research evidence is building to support the role that deficits in voluntary top-
down attentional control processes are argued to play in anxiety (Bishop, 2009; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007; Osinsky, Gebhardt, Alexander, & 
Hennig, 2012), with methodologies favoring the use of tasks based on saccadic eye 
movements. For example, the antisaccade task (Hallett, 1978) is becoming 
increasingly popular as it is a simple methodology, that produces quality data, which 
can be subjected to rigorous mathematical and computational analyses (Antoniades et 
al., 2013). The antisaccade task (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.1, pp. 86-88 for a more 
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detailed discussion of this paradigm) requires participants to focus on a white circle 
that is replaced by a cue, which acts to direct participants to move their eyes either 
toward or away from a stimulus presented to one side of the central fixation. 
Attentional control is measured by the time (saccade latency) it takes an individual to 
inhibit the reflexive (bottom up) response and to control (top down) their gaze so as to 
generate an eye-movement (an antisaccade) in the opposite direction to stimuli 
presented (see Figure 5.1). The antisaccade task is most commonly presented in 
combination with the prosaccade task, which requires one to move their gaze from a 
central fixation to look toward the presented stimuli. 
Initially, research exploring the association between anxiety and anti- and pro-
saccade task performance focused primarily on examining these tasks in separate 
blocks. Ansari et al. (2008) were the first to employ a task-switching (between anti- 
and pro-saccade trials) paradigm, whereby they examined participants’ responses 
when presented with mixed blocks of anti- and pro-saccade trials. Adding a task-
switching component offers the opportunity to examine the impact of shifting, and, 
therefore, also the impact of task complexity and flexibility on performance (Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2010; Everling & Fischer, 1998).  
The majority of antisaccade studies in anxiety have compared individuals with 
high versus low trait anxiety, with levels of worry and/or the impact of GAD on 
attentional control remaining largely unexplored. With regard to comparisons of those 
with high versus low trait-anxiety, no differences have been observed with regard to 
errors on either the antisaccade task or prosaccade tasks (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 
2011a; Ansari et al., 2008; Brassen, Gamer, Rose, & Buechel, 2010; Garner, 
Attwood, Baldwin, James, & Munafò, 2011). Therefore, anxiety does not impair 
performance effectiveness, as participants with high levels of anxiety are as accurate  
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Figure 5.1. (A) Switch and repeat trials. (B) Anti- and prosaccade tasks.  
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as those with low levels of anxiety in generating antisaccades/prosaccades (Ansari et 
al., 2008; Derkshan et al., 2009; Ansari & Derakshan, 2010). In contrast, findings 
consistently show that trait anxiety impacts performance efficiency and impairs 
attentional control. Specifically, inhibition of reflexive eye movements in anxious, 
compared to non-anxious individuals, have been found to have to take significantly 
longer with regard to controlling the direction of their saccades on antisaccade, 
compared to prosaccade, trials (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 2011a; Ansari et al., 2008; 
Brassen et al., 2010; Garner et al., 2011).  
Although findings consistently demonstrate that high trait anxious participants 
are less efficient than low anxious participants at enacting control over their attention 
on the antisaccade task, whether the addition of threatening stimuli adds further to 
poor attentional control by demonstrating a greater antisaccade effect is less clear 
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; see: Garner, Ainsworth, Gould, Gardner, & Baldwin, 
2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012). Four out of a total of five studies have 
demonstrated an effect of stimuli valence, whereby, in comparison to individuals with 
low trait anxiety, individuals with high levels of trait anxiety had an additional 
increase in antisaccade latencies in the present of threatening compared to neutral 
stimuli (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). High compared to low-anxious 
individuals were slower to initiate saccades towards stimuli of threatening scenes 
(antisaccades; Cornwell, Mueller, Kaplan, Grillon, & Ernst, 2012; Garner et al., 
2011), and showed greater antisaccade cost (participants are slower to look away from 
presented stimuli) for angry than neutral faces (Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012).  
In addition to the use of threatening stimuli, another methodological 
characteristic that appears to increase the antisaccade task is adding a task-switching 
component. As previously described, adding a task switching component to the 
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antisaccade task increases the complexity and has been found to result in slower 
latencies in high trait anxious (see: Berggren & Derakshan, 2013, for review). 
Paradoxically, as a result of pre-cuing enabling attentional resources to be allocated to 
the task at hand low-anxious individuals have been observed to demonstrate switch 
benefits, whereby in comparison with non-mixed trials shorter latencies were 
recorded when switching between anti- and pro-saccade trials (Ansari et al., 2008; 
Barton et al., 2002; Cherkasova, Manoach, Intriligator, & Barton, 2002). The lack of 
switch-benefit observed in individuals with high levels of anxiety is thought to result 
from reduced working memory resources, a decreased ability to utilize cues to enable 
task set reconfiguration, and a decreased ability to exercise efficient top-down 
attentional control to distribute attentional resources according to task demands 
(Ansari et al., 2008).  
The aim of this study is to extend the results of the antisaccade task to adult 
individuals high and low in worry. To date, this has not been specifically investigated. 
The hypotheses were based on three factors. First, theoretical assertions emphasize 
the role of reduced attentional control in individuals with pathological worry (Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012). Therefore, worry is thought to be specifically responsible for 
consuming control capacity (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and reducing the ability to 
enact attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007). The persistent and inflexible negative 
cognitive activity observed in pathological worry suggests that greater impairment 
should be observed on the antisaccade task (attentional control) compared to disorders 
such as specific phobias and panic, as these later disorders are characterized by acute 
episodes of fear/panic (Hayes et al., 2008). As such, the current study aims to test the 
central tenet in both Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) and Ouimet et al’s (2009) models 
that deficits in top down attentional control/impairment of the central executive 
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function are associated with the development and maintenance of anxiety/worry. 
Second, as worry is present across the range of anxiety disorders (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2, p.4 for further discussion; Borkovec et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992; 
Konstantellou et al., 2011; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Turk & Mennin, 2011), many of 
those high in anxiety are likely to be high in worry; therefore, it seems likely that 
those high in worry would demonstrate similar patterns of performance on the anti-
saccade/pro-saccade task to participants with high levels of anxiety. Thirdly, two 
studies that have adapted the random key-pressing task and N-Back task (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.3.2, pp. 85-86 for further details) to assess attentional control in relation 
to worry, have found preliminary evidence for individuals with high levels of worry 
demonstrating less ability to control their attention, as both with and without the 
presence of threat worry depletes attentional control resources (Hayes et al., 2008; 
Stefanopoulou et al., 2014). Hayes, Hirsch, and Mathews (2008) found that in 
individuals with high levels of worry, worry depletes resources resulting in 
participants being less able to shift their attention away from worry to focus on the 
task at hand.  In contrast, Stefanopoulou et al. (2014) examined the impact of active 
worry versus thinking about a possible future event on reaction time performance and 
found that, when worrying, participants with GAD compared to control participants 
were less proficient in performing the random key-press task. Participants with GAD 
were also found to perform poorly on the N-Back task under high load conditions. 
Taken together these findings were suggested to reflect that worry consumed 
attentional control resources and, therefore, for individuals with high levels of worry, 
fewer available attentional resources are present to manage the theme of their 
thoughts (Hayes et al., 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011).  
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As such, we make the following hypotheses: First, individuals with high, 
compared to low levels of worry, will have more difficulty with attentional control 
and task switching, which will be observed as slower antisaccade latencies 
particularly when switching between anti- and pro-saccade tasks. Second, these 
effects are also expected to be greater in the presence of threatening cues. Last, it is 
also hypothesized that no difference in error rates will be observed between 
individuals with high and low levels of worry.  
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
The participants in this study were 106 first-year psychology students. Data 
for five participants could not be used, as they did not complete all components of the 
study. A further seven were excluded from analyses due to poor tracking or technical 
failures whilst administering the task. This left a total of 94 participants. After 
extreme group splits were performed the sample consisted of 73 participants included 
in the final data set examining high (n=38) and low (n=35) worry groups. Multiple 
linear regression analyses were planned to be undertaken on the complete data set (N 
= 94); an extreme groups approach was not used for these analyses in order to 
increase power. For further details about the sample see: Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, 
p.66. The task took approximately 25 minutes and participants completed the 
antisaccade task study components individually during a one-hour session during 
which the reasoning tasks (Study 2) and interpretation bias task (Study 4) were also 
administered. 
5.1.2 Measures 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV), and two processing style measures - the Rational-
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Experiential Inventory (REI) and the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory 
(PMPI) - were administered in one of two counterbalanced orders via LimeSurvey 
(version 1.87). A full description of the measures and their psychometric properties 
can be found in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5, pp. 73-78. 
5.1.3 The Antisaccade and Prosaccade tasks 
Cue and Target Stimuli 
A small white circle 7mm in diameter (0.7° visual angle) presented on a grey 
scale background served as the central fixation prior to each trial. Once fixation was 
achieved, the white circle then acted as the cue to indicate whether an anti- or pro-
saccade was required. Participants were instructed that the cue would change colour 
to indicate the required saccade direction; red required participants to look away from 
the image (antisaccade), whilst green required participants to look toward the image 
(prosaccade). The fixation and cue stimuli were created using the Microsoft Paint 
graphics application. The “target” stimuli were a selection of images obtained from 
the International Affective Picture System (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; 
Ansari et al., 2008; Garner et al., 2011; Jazbec, McClure, Hardin, Pine, & Ernst, 
2005). The selected images were comprised of neutral and threatening (50% moderate 
and 50% high valence and arousal) 2-D colour images, which have previously been 
employed in attentional research in anxiety (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). 
The images were cropped using Adobe Flash CS3 software, they subtended 8.5° x 
11.5° (height = 8.5cm; width = 11.5 cm) and were presented on a grey background. 
The center of the picture was located at 9.5° visual angle to the left or right of the 
center of the fixation circle. An 18-inch, 32-bit colour LCD monitor with a resolution 
of 1,024 x 768 pixels acted as the host PC, which ran the experiment. 
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Experimental Task 
Threatening and neutral anti- and pro-saccade tasks were presented at random 
in the same block of trials (see Figure 1). This led to the proliferation of ‘switch’ and 
‘repeat’ trial types which were used to examine participants task-switching ability; a 
repeat trial consisted of two similar trial types in sequence (e.g., an antisaccade trial 
followed by an additional antisaccade trial), whilst a switch trial consisted of a change 
in trial type from the preceding one (e.g., a prosaccade following an antisaccade trial). 
There were equal ‘switch’ and ‘repeat’ trials, which were also randomly presented. 
Eye-Tracking Device and Software       
Participants’ eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink1000 eye tracker 
("Eyelink 1000 [Apparatus and software]," 2010). The eyetracker had a sampling rate 
of 1000Hz, which means that during trials participants’ eye movements were recorded 
continuously at 1000 Hz. The measures generated are based on the corneal reflection 
(caused by infrared light source) in relation to one of the participant’s pupils; only the 
saccades of the right eye were recorded. A chin and forehead rest were used to 
minimise head movements and to ensure that the sitting and viewing distance were 
uniform (57cm) between participants and across trials. The eye-tracking system and 
software were automatically synchronised at the beginning of each trial.  
5.1.3.1 Experimental Procedure 
Eye-movements were recorded on a Mackintosh computer, running Windows 
XP version 2002, and the task was administered using the Experiment Builder 
software ("Eyelink 1000 [Apparatus and software]," 2010), which ensured 
millisecond timing accuracy. Instructions were presented as text for participants to 
read, however, verbal confirmation that they had understood the instructions was also 
sought. The importance of speed and accuracy were highlighted. 
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Participants completed the task in a small, dimly lit cubical at a viewing 
distance of 57cm from the computer monitor. A total of eight practice trials, with 
feedback, were presented at the start of the experiment. The importance of focusing 
on the white dot was emphasised, as well as minimising blinking during trials. The 
eye-tracker was calibrated for each participant at the beginning of the testing session 
and then repeated again between each of the four blocks of trials. Calibration 
consisted of the participant fixating on a series of points appearing at various 
locations on a nine-point grid, which the software uses to indicate whether or not 
valid gaze points can be calculated.  
Presentation order was random for each participant and the trials were 
completed in four blocks of 56 trials (total of 224 trials; see Figure 5.2 for 
breakdown), with a few minutes pause between each block. In order to avoid the 
potential impact of anticipatory saccades, the simultaneous cue (central fixation 
turning to red/green) and target (threatening/neutral picture) onset were activated only 
after participants had focused on the central fixation point at a varied fixation time 
between 750 – 1500msec. Specifically, the time between the fixation and 
simultaneous cue/target onset time was randomised to either 750ms, 1,000ms, 
1250ms, or 1500ms. The central fixation was used to control the initial retina position 
across all participants. This was made possible by defining a circular diameter area of 
3° visual angle around the central fixation point. If participants gaze fell outside of 
this fixation zone an ‘error’ sign was presented requesting participants to focus on the 
white circle until it changed colour. Once fixation had been established the white 
fixation circle was randomized to change to either green or red before the target 
stimuli were presented. Participants were required to respond by making a saccade 
either “away” (antisaccade) in the opposite direction to the target when the circle was  
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Figure 5.2: Antisaccade task methodology: Breakdown of trials presented 
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red or by looking “toward” (prosaccade) the target when presented with a green dot. 
The target was presented for 200msec and presentation to the right or left peripheral 
field of vision was randomised.  
5.1.4 Eye Movements Data Preparation 
The variables examined in this study were directional accuracy (the 
percentage of errors made by participants) and latency of first correct saccade, (the 
time lapsed between onset of either the red or green cue and the saccade toward the 
correct area of interest). Saccades were defined as latencies with velocities exceeding 
30°/sec and amplitudes > 3° that were made after cue onset. Trials were excluded if 
eye-tracking was interrupted due to lost pupil (including blinks), or if no eye 
movements were made. If the eye was not within approximately 1.5° visual angle of 
the central fixation at the time of target appearance the trial was rendered invalid. 
Exclusion criteria also included trials with recorded latencies shorter than 55msec, as 
these are deemed anticipatory, as well as latencies greater than 600msec after target 
onset (Antoniades et al., 2013). This led to the loss of 9.82% of antisaccade trials and 
7.81% of prosaccade trials. Lastly, in order to examine the impact of task switching, 
the first experimental trial in each block was excluded from analyses as it was not 
preceded by a trial and thus was neither a switch nor repeat trial. This methodology is 
common practice in the task switching literature (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010). 
5.2 Planned Analyses 
The following eight variables were found to contain outliers and, even after 
these were corrected, to not satisfy standard criteria for a normal distribution: one 
outlier each on both the antisaccade and prosaccade switch trial error percentage 
variable, as well as the prosaccade and antisaccade repeat trial error percentages. 
Two outliers were observed on prosaccade neutral stimuli trial error percentages but 
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only one data point was an outlier with regard to antisaccade neutral stimuli trial 
error percentages. Additionally, on prosaccade threatening stimuli trial error 
percentages, two outlying variables were detected, and one outlier was detected on 
antisaccade trials.  
All analyses were undertaken with SPSS version 21.0. Initial analyses  
consisted of a series of mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Two mixed 
ANOVAs were performed to examine saccade latencies (within subjects factor) by 
level of worry (between subject factor). Firstly, a 2 (task: anti-, pro-saccade) x 2 
(stimuli: threat, neutral) x 2 (high, low worry) ANOVA was employed to examine 
latencies of correct saccades, whilst the second 2 (task: anti-, pro-saccade) x 2 (trial 
type: switch, repeat) x 2 (worry: high, low) ANOVA examined the impact of switch 
and repeat trials on correct saccade latencies. Additionally, two mixed ANOVAs were 
also employed to examine saccade error rates. A 2 (task: anti-, pro-saccade) x 2 
(stimuli: threat and neutral) x 2 (high and low worry) ANOVA were employed to 
examine saccade error rates, whilst a second ANOVA examined the impact of switch 
and repeat trials on error rates: 2 (task: anti-, pro-saccade) x 2 (trial type: switch, 
repeat) x 2 (worry: high, low) ANOVA. Where differences emerged, univariate and t-
tests were performed to further examine differences between the groups.  
The next set of analyses aimed to assess the relationship between scores on the 
symptom scales, processing style scales, and attentional control. To this end, multiple 
linear regression analyses were planned to be undertaken on the complete data set and 
to focus on any variables that were found to demonstrate significance in the 
preliminary correlational analyses. Prior to these analyses attentional control scores 
were calculated, whereby saccade latencies on prosaccade trials were subtracted from 
saccade latencies on antisaccade trials. The attentional control scores represent the 
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degree to which participants are able to enact control over their attention, with lower 
scores representing more attentional control than higher scores. 
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Latencies of correct saccades 
A mixed design ANOVA examined the mean latencies for correct trials as a  
function of Task (anti- and prosaccade), Stimuli (threatening and neutral), and Group 
(high and low worry; see: Figure 5.3). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.1. 
Main effects of Trial F(1, 71) = 84.71, p < .001, and Stimuli F(1, 71) = 8.26, p < .01 
were revealed; participants were faster to respond on pro- (M = 334.78, SD = 57.21) 
than antisaccade (M = 370.22, SD = 61.92; t(72) = -8.97, p < .001) trials, and, overall, 
responded with faster latencies in the presence of threatening (M = 364.16, SD = 
60.45) than neutral (M = 357.08, SD = 53.82; t(72) = 2.72, p < .01) stimuli. Although 
the Task x Stimuli interaction (F(1, 71) = 2.45, p = .12), and the Task x Stimuli x 
Group interaction (F(1, 71) = .83, p = .37) failed to reach significance, a significant 
interaction of Stimuli x Group was observed: F(1, 71) = 4.68, p = .03.  
To clarify these findings, the interaction of stimuli and level of worry (group) 
was explored. Analyses confirmed that Stimuli (threat, neutral) had no impact on 
performance latency for participants with high levels of worry: threatening stimuli (M 
= 351.56, SD = 57.83) and neutral stimuli (M = 350.19, SD = 52.82; t(37) = .57, p = 
.571). In contrast, participants with low levels of worry initiated faster saccades on 
trials containing threatening  (M = 361.22, SD = 60.25) than neutral stimuli (M = 
351.45, SD = 49.27; t(35) = 3.17, p < 0.01).  
5.3.2 Switch and repeat saccade latencies 
A Task (anti-, pro-saccade) x Trial type (switch, repeat) x Group  
(high-, low- worry) mixed design ANOVA (Figure 5.4) revealed a main effect of  
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Table 5.1: Mean saccade latencies (milliseconds) and percentage error rates within 
trial, stimuli, and task factors (standard deviation of mean in parenthesis). 
  Level of worry and task type 
  High worry (n=38)  Low worry (n=35) 
 Antisaccade Prosaccade Antisaccade Prosaccade 
Stimuli     
Threat 367.83 (66.09) 335.30 (55.75) 377.70 (61.57) 344.74 (63.92) 
 5.96 (5.17) 3.85 (3.49) 4.44 (4.17) 3.43 (2.83) 
Neutral 370.89 (54.87) 329.48 (57.12) 369.87 (47.76) 333.04 (57.43) 
 6.71 (5.74) 2.59 (2.52) 5.95 (4.55) 1.79 (1.68) 
Trial     
Switch 378.06 (64.14) 338.91 (54.19) 381.85 (59.20) 345.06 (59.72) 
 7.17 (6.08) 4.99 (4.28) 6.01 (4.78) 3.90 (3.12) 
Repeat 360.66 (56.85) 325.87 (58.80) 365.72 (50.71) 332.72 (61.16) 
 5.50 (4.94) 1.50 (1.80) 4.38 (3.75) 1.32 (1.52) 
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Figure 5.3. Mean correct saccade latencies (msec) by Task (anti-, pro-saccade) and 
Stimuli type (threatening, neutral) in high and low worry groups  
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Figure 5.4. Mean correct saccade latencies (msec) by Task (anti-, pro-saccade) and 
Trial type (switch, repeat) as a function of worry (high, low groups) 
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Trial: F(1, 71) = 55.58, p < .001, with participants responding more quickly on repeat 
(M = 346.12, SD = 53.01), than switch (M = 360.87, SD = 56.77) trials. No further 
main effects or interactions were found to be significant (Fs < 1). 
5.3.3 Incorrect Saccades 
Overall, the percentage of errors recorded was higher on antisaccade (M = 
10.81%, SD = 8.69) than on prosaccade trials (M = 5.55%, SD = 4.84; t(72) = 5.74, p 
< .001: see Table 5.1).  A mixed design ANOVA was performed with Group (high-, 
low-worry) as the between-subject factor, and Task Errors (anti-, pro-saccade) and 
Stimuli Errors (threat, neutral) as within-subject factors (see Figure 5.5). A main 
effect of Task F(1, 71) = 32.09, p < .001, but not Stimuli F(1, 71) = .56, p =.46 was 
found. An interaction was also observed between Task and Stimuli F(1, 71) = 35.44, 
p < .001. Specifically, on antisaccade trials participants made more errors in the 
presence of neutral (M = 6.35, SD = 5.18) compared to threatening stimuli (M = 5.23, 
SD = 4.75; t(72) = 3.22, p < .01). Whereas, on prosaccade trials more errors were 
observed in presence of threatening (M = 3.65, SD = 3.18) compared to neutral 
stimuli (M = 2.21, SD = 2.18; t(72) = 5.48, p < .001). These findings were unrelated 
to levels of worry; Group X Task and Group X Stimuli interactions were not found to 
be significant, F < 1.  
Lastly, the impact of switch and repeat trials on error rates were assessed. A 
main effect was found for both Task (anti-, pro-saccade) and Trial (switch, repeat) 
errors, F(1, 71) = 31.95, p < .001 and F(1, 71) = 84.65, p < .001 respectively. The 
Task x Trial interaction also reached significance: F(1, 71) = 8.01, p < .01. Overall, 
more errors were observed on repeat (M = 11.43%, SD = 9.33) than switch trials (M = 
5.89%, SD = 5.16; t(72) = 5.72, p < .001). Participants made more errors on 
antisaccade switch (M = 6.62%, SD = 5.49) than repeat trials (M = 4.96, SD = 4.42; 
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t(72) = 4.67, p < .001), as well as prosaccade switch (M = 4.47%, SD = 3.79) than 
repeat trials (M = 1.41, SD = 1.66; t(72) = 8.72, p < .001). No significant findings 
were observed in relation to levels of worry with all Group interactions showing F >1 
(see Figure 5.5). 
5.3.4 Preliminary Analyses: Correlational Analyses 
Bivariate correlations between attentional control scores and symptom scales 
and processing style scales are presented in Table 5.2. The attentional control scores 
represent the degree to which participants are able to enact control over their attention 
with lower scores representing more attentional control than higher scores. No 
significant correlations were observed between attentional control scores and either 
processing style or symptom scores. As the correlational results (see: Table 5.2) 
indicated no significant relationships between symptom scores, processing style and 
attentional control, no multiple regression analyses were undertaken. 
5.4 Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to explore the association between worry and 
attentional control with the antisaccade task, both in the presence of neutral and 
threatening stimuli, as well as with a task-switching component. It was predicted that 
individuals with high, compared to low levels of worry, would demonstrate less 
attentional control and more difficulty (slower latencies) task switching between anti- 
and pro-saccade tasks. The presence of threat was also expected to produce greater 
effects, whereby it was anticipated that participants with high levels of worry would 
demonstrate slower latencies on task switching trials that contained threatening 
stimuli. Additionally, no difference in error rates was expected as a result of 
participants’ level of worry. 
The hypotheses were largely unsupported. Overall, participants were faster to  
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Table 5.2: Correlations of symptom measures and processing style measures and 
attentional control scores 
 PSWQ GADQ-IV PMPI-E PMPI-R REI-E REI-R 
Att.Control .028 .052 -.023 -.136 -.013 0.10 
 
Note: N = 94. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire – IV; 
PMPI-E = Perceived Modes of Processing – Experiential scale; PMPI-R = Perceived Modes of Processing – Rational scale; REI-
E = Rational Experiential Inventory – Experiential scale; REI-R = Rational Experiential Inventory – Rational scale **p < 0.01; 
*p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Percentage of errors in directional accuracy by Task (anti-, pro-saccade) 
and Stimuli type (threat, neutral) as a function of worry (high, low) 
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Figure 5.6. Percentage of errors in directional accuracy by Task (anti-, pro-saccade) 
and Trial type (switch, repeat) as a function of worry (high, low) 
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respond on pro- than anti-saccade trials, as well as repeat than switch trials, as 
expected. However, unexpectedly, no worry related attentional control deficits were 
observed. Unexpectedly, the only difference between the groups was that those with 
low levels of worry were faster to respond to threatening than neutral stimuli. As 
expected error rates reflected previous findings in that they were unrelated to 
symptom scores (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 2011a; Ansari et al., 2008; Hayes et al., 
2008; Kristjansson, Chen, & Nakayama, 2001; Sheremata & Sakagami, 2006).  
The lack of worry related attentional control deficits observed in the current 
study are not consistent with the proposed role of attentional control in the 
development and maintenance of worry and anxiety more generally (Eysenck et al., 
2007; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Jazbec et al., 2005). A major assumption of 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007) is that anxious individuals 
are characterised by deficits in attentional control (i.e., goal directed attention). Worry 
is particularly thought to deplete the resources required for the effective use of the 
top-down attentional system (required in attentional control), thereby contributing to a 
shift toward bottom-up processing (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). 
This is thought to contribute to reduced performance efficiency (slower latencies); 
effectiveness (comparative error rates) is not impacted due to the engagement of 
compensatory cognitive mechanisms and increased effort (Derakshan, Salt, et al., 
2009; Eysenck et al., 2007).  
Hirsch and Mathews (2012)  cognitive model of worry also focuses on 
attentional control deficits as central to generalised anxiety disorder. Their model 
takes into account the duality of attention, in that both the goal-driven attentional 
system (top down control) and the stimulus-driven attentional system (bottom-up 
control) are implicated in worry. Specifically, the combination of emotional 
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processing biases (i.e., attention and interpretation biases) in conjunction with 
attentional control deficits is assumed to be responsible for the development and 
maintenance of pathological worry. Hirsch and Mathews (2012) suggest that the 
management of worry can be achieved by increasing controlled attention whilst 
simultaneously inhibiting competing threat representations. However, the current 
findings do not offer support for attentional control deficits in individuals with high 
levels of worry, although this could relate to a number of internal and external factors 
that may have been influencing performance. 
Recent studies in the wider anxiety literature have highlighted that the 
presence of a combination of internal and external factors are required in order for 
expected antisaccade performance to be observed (Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & 
Derakshan, 2013). Notably, deficits in cognitive control are a direct result of an 
individual’s particular dispositional level of attentional control, which may then 
interact with the parameters of the experiment (Pilar Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, 
Lupianez, Roman, & Derakshan, 2012). Task parameters include, for example, 
demanding, high perceptual load tasks that fully occupy an individual's attentional 
resources, yet are not so demanding that they deplete attentional control, appear to 
reduce differences observed between high and low trait-anxious individuals (Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011b; Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2011; Bishop, 2009; Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007; Osinsky et al., 2012; Pilar Pacheco-Unguetti et 
al., 2012). Moderate to high task demands have been suggested to allow individuals 
with high trait-anxiety to engage increased effort and additional cognitive resources in 
order to compensate for any potential deficits in inhibitory control (Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011a; Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Osinsky et al., 2012). Due to the 
diversity of variables in the current study, - including threat/neutral stimuli and the 
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presence of a task-switching component - it is likely that the task demands were 
moderate to high compared to standard antisaccade tasks. Additionally, motivation 
also contributes to the likelihood that anxious individuals will employ compensatory 
strategies (Hayes, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2009). Research examining executive 
functioning in relation to worry have demonstrated that although worry creates 
cognitive interference it also has a specific motivational function, whereby increased 
effort maintains or improves performance (on tasks examining updating, inhibition, 
and shifting) through the employment of compensatory strategies (Visu-Petra et al., 
2013). Therefore, it is possible that the conditions of the current study allowed 
individuals with high levels worry to match the performance of (and in the case of 
prosaccade neutral trials, to outperform) their less anxious counterparts.  
In terms of accounting for the lack of worry related differences observed 
between threatening and neutral stimuli on antisaccade trials, evidence suggests that 
task demands also affect the impact of emotional stimuli (King & Schaefer, 2011; 
MacNamara, Ferri, & Hajcak, 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). Although emotional 
stimuli are preferentially and automatically processed due to their potential 
implications for wellbeing (Clarke & Johnstone, 2013), high task load can act to 
reduce the salience of threat stimuli and eliminate response differences between 
emotional and neutral stimuli (King & Schaefer, 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). 
Specifically, in tasks that are more complicated although threatening information is 
processed, it is prevented from interfering with performance as the task complexity 
engages top-down regulatory mechanisms (e.g., increased cognitive effort;  Clarke & 
Johnstone, 2013; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). This notion that increased task 
complexity engages compensatory top-down mechanisms is supported by 
experimental (King & Schaefer, 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009) and neuroimaging 
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(MacNamara et al., 2011) studies, as well as a recent antisaccade study (Berggren et 
al., 2013). Taken together, in the current study, findings suggest that participants with 
high levels of worry were able to match the antisaccade performance and, in the case 
of prosaccade trials containing neutral stimuli, surpass the performance of their non-
anxious peers. 
Another aim of the present study was to investigate the impact of worry on 
task switching performance. Difficulties in shifting of attention are related to worry 
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and have been found to be prevalent in GAD (Dorahy, 
McCusker, Loewenstein, Colbert, & Mulholland, 2006). In terms of antisaccade 
performance, although not previously explored in adults who worry, a paradoxical 
reduction in saccade latencies on ‘switch’ compared to ‘repeat’ trials when switching 
from pro-to anti-saccade trials has consistently been found in low, but not high, 
anxious individuals (e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; Barton et al., 2002; Cherkasova et al., 
2002). However, despite the current study recording faster latencies on repeat 
compared to switch trials, no differences in response latencies for switch and repeat 
trials were found to be associated with symptom measure scores. Thus, the 
hypothesized switch benefit was not observed in participants with low levels of 
worry.  The application of a strategy that reduced inhibitory demands but established 
an ‘automatic mode’ of responding may have contributed to the non-anxious 
participants’ results. Taking a bottom-up processing approach has been found to 
reduce participants’ inability to utilize the cue to improve performance, particularly 
on switch trials (Diamond, 2009). Although not measured in the current study, 
individual differences in motivation could again offer an explanation for the 
unexpected findings. Motivation has a large impact on tasks examining cognitive 
control and it maybe possible that the nature of the task simultaneously increased 
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motivation in participants with high levels of worry (due to its level of complexity), 
whilst decreasing motivation for participants reporting low levels of worry (possibly 
due to the effort to engage in the task leading to boredom and reversion to an 
automatic mode of responding) (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Kouneiher, Charron, 
& Koechlin, 2009).  
There are a number of limitations that need to be taken into account. First, as 
noted in earlier chapters, this study used a non-clinical student sample, which may 
limit the generalizability of the findings but is arguably valid for the study of 
pathological worry. However, it will be beneficial for future research to examine the 
impact of worry on attentional control in a clinical sample with a diagnosis of 
generalised anxiety disorder. Additionally, although the antisaccade task has many 
benefits, it has been argued that both the sample recruited as well as the methodology 
employed can impact findings (Bishop, 2009; Chiau et al., 2011; Osinsky et al., 
2012). In the current study, participants were requested to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible on the task. Recently, Antoniades et al. (2013) undertook a 
review of the literature and queried the impact of instructions on performance. The 
review highlighted the impact of instructions on task performance; studies that 
highlighted the importance of accurate responses presented different results to those 
that requested participants respond as quickly as possible (Antoniades et al., 2013). 
Responding as quickly as possible was argued to not capture the typical performance 
of subjects (Antoniades et al., 2013). Recent proposals have been presented to 
develop a standardized antisaccade protocol to strengthen the methodology and help 
make comparisons between the studies more meaningful. However, even taking into 
account the antisaccade methodology used in the current study, it failed to replicate 
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consistently reported effects with the antisaccade task in other studies (e.g., Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2010, 2011a; Ansari et al., 2008; Brassen et al., 2010; Garner et al., 2011).!
In trait anxious individuals, individual differences in automatic and strategic 
processes impact their capacity to voluntary control attention in the effort to cope 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). However, the current findings highlight previous 
suggestions (e.g., Visu-Petra et al., 2013) of the importance of accounting for the 
impact of both external situational (e.g., task demands) and internal personality 
factors (e.g., motivation and individual differences in attentional control) and their 
impact on cognitive control (dys)functions in understanding the interplay between 
involuntary and voluntary processes. To this end, future research that clarifies the 
impact of these factors (e.g., internal personality factors, and external situational 
factors) on individuals with clinical levels of worry would be valuable in order to 
better understand the relationship between worry and inhibitory control (Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2013; Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009; Fox, 1994; Wieser et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the relationship between attentional bias and attentional control 
is gaining increasing interest with preliminary findings demonstrating the role of 
attentional control as a moderator of attentional bias and worry (Bardeen et al., 2014). 
Further research that clarifies this relationship would be beneficial. To date, studies 
have focused upon trait anxiety at the cost of examining state anxiety. Therefore, 
future research should also include methodologies that actively induce worry in order 
to determine the impact of active periods of worry on attentional control.  
In summary, this study used an antisaccade methodology to examine the 
association between worry and attentional control, in the presence and absence of 
threat. Although the current findings require replication, they offer preliminary 
evidence that, like trait anxiety, high levels of worry are not associated with increased 
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error rates, and, therefore, worry does not appear to impair performance effectiveness. 
No evidence of attentional control deficits were observed in relation to worry. 
Therefore, the current study has not contributed to the literature that supports the 
important role of attentional control in worry/GAD. Further research in individuals 
with clinical levels of GAD is required, as well as exploring the possible moderating 
role of attentional control in the relationship between attentional bias and worry. This 
will be examined in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Experimental Study 4 
Biases of Attention and Interpretation in Individuals Who Worry: A Dual-
Process Account  
The role of erroneous information processing is highlighted as being central to 
many of the current models of worry and GAD (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012), with biases in the content and process of thoughts and beliefs being 
of central importance (Dugas, Marchand, et al., 2005; Hirsch, Mathews, Lequertier, 
Perman, & Hayes, 2013; Wells, 1995, 2004). So far, this thesis has demonstrated a 
relationship between processing style and worry/GAD symptoms, yet participants’ 
self-reported processing style was not found to reflect actual strengths or deficits in 
rational thinking or reasoning skills, per se. Furthermore, despite employing a 
rigorous experimental methodology, no evidence was observed of a direct relationship 
between attentional control deficits and levels of worry. However, there is preliminary 
evidence (e.g., Bardeen et al., 2014; Schoorl et al., 2014) for an indirect relationship 
between attentional control and worry - such that attentional control impacts the 
relationship between attentional bias and worry - which would, therefore, be 
beneficial to further examine.  
Attentional bias can be defined as the systematic inclination to attend to 
particular aspects in one’s environment, such as specific events or information (Hayes 
& Hirsch, 2007). Biases towards threat have been established as a risk factor for 
worry and GAD (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Evidence suggests that attentional biases 
contribute to the etiology and maintenance of excessive worry, as patients are more 
likely to identify minor threat cues in the environment, which reinforce dysfunctional 
beliefs that the world is unsafe (Olatunji, Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zhao, & Zald, 2011).  
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Bar-Haim et al.’s meta-analysis (2007) discussed in detail in Chapter 1 
(Section 1.5.3.2, p. 39) found clear evidence of highly anxious participants 
prioritizing the processing of threatening information significantly more than non-
anxious participants. However, there are still aspects that warrant further exploration 
with interest turning to attempts to better understand the nature of these attentional 
biases. Although research to date has predominately focused on facilitated attention 
and delayed disengagement (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.1, pp. 89-95 for further 
details), there have been a number of findings in the literature that suggest, under 
some conditions, avoidance may also occur in response to threat. Some studies show 
that avoidance, rather than difficulty disengaging, are characteristic of populations 
where the threat is real (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Livermore, Sharpe, & McKenzie, 
2007; Shechner et al., 2012; Wald et al., 2011). Therefore, the relationship between 
threat and attention may be non-linear, that is, at moderate levels of threat, attentional 
bias may increase, whereas when the threat is high (e.g. life-threatening), avoidance 
may ensue. However, the evidence for avoidance being fundamental to worry is both 
limited and inconsistent (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Gole et al., 2012; 
Hirsch et al., 2011; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Koster, 
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). 
Although attentional bias has not been widely examined in worry per se, there is 
evidence of delayed disengagement (Gole et al., 2012) and facilitated attention 
implicated in the process of worry (Hirsch et al., 2011; Oathes et al., 2010; Weinberg 
& Hajcak, 2011). On the basis of the research it is more likely that facilitated attention 
and difficulty disengaging would be associated with high levels of worry, rather than 
avoidance. 
Overall, the aforementioned findings highlight the importance of assessing 
!-167- !
 attentional bias as a multi-stage process consisting of overlapping stages (e.g., 
Posner, 1980) that may have a differential influence on the development and 
maintenance of anxiety (Ouimet et al., 2009). Therefore, methodologically rigorous 
studies that consider the stage of information processing (i.e., early vs late processing 
examined via time course analyses) when exploring attentional bias in individuals 
with high levels of worry will help to better elucidate the specific attentional biases 
that characterize worry. Examining various stimulus duration presentations (e.g., 
16ms, 200ms, 500ms; Mogg et al., 2004; Oathes et al., 2010) - that reflect different 
stages of information processing - at which attentional biases are observed has been 
an ongoing focus in the wider anxiety literature, as differential patterns of attentional 
anxiety-related biases of threat have been found as a result of presentation time (i.e., 
biases related to early versus later stage of information processing; e.g., Koster et al., 
2007; Sagliano et al., 2014). Of the studies that compare people with high versus low 
anxiety across time course, the findings are somewhat mixed. There is good evidence 
for biases occurring at shorter times (e.g. 100 msec, although not 28msec), which are 
representative of facilitated attentional engagement (e.g., Koster et al., 2007). 
However, results are less clear at longer durations (e.g., 200msec and 500 msec), 
which have been used to provide evidence of difficulty disengaging and attentional 
avoidance (e.g., Koster et al., 2007; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Sagliano et al., 
2014). 
One of the most commonly used measures of attentional bias is the dot probe 
task (see: Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for review; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; MacLeod 
et al., 1986). See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.1, pp. 89-95 for a more detailed rationale 
for the dot probe task selection. Of the 11 studies exploring adult samples with 
worry/GAD in Bar-Haim et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis, six employed the dot probe 
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task (see: Mogg & Bradley, 2005 for review). Except in one instance, individuals with 
worry/GAD, compared to non-anxious controls, have, overall, been found to respond 
(both with manual reaction times and eye movement studies) faster to dot probes in 
the place of threatening stimuli (see: Mogg & Bradley, 2005 for review; Oathes et al., 
2010). To date, dot probe studies examining attentional bias in individuals with 
worry/GAD have predominately employed unmasked word based stimuli presented at 
500ms, 1000ms, or 1250ms (see: Mogg & Bradley, 2005 for review); two studies 
have examined responses to facial expression stimuli presented at 500ms, 1000ms and 
1250ms and observed attentional bias (Bradley et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 2000). In 
addition, only two studies of participants with worry/GAD have used very short 
presentation times of masked word-based stimuli - at 14ms or 50ms - and only one of 
those found evidence of attentional bias (Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Williams, 1995). This calls into question whether the very early biases found in other 
anxiety disorders (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007, for meta-analysis), generalize to 
individuals with high levels of worry. These data highlight the need to understand the 
temporal dynamics of attentional bias specifically associated with worry. Further, 
attentional bias to facial expression stimuli across various time frames (e.g., masked 
and unmasked stimuli presented at 16ms, 100ms, 200ms, 500ms, 1500ms) has yet to 
be explored with the dot-probe task in relation to individuals with chronic worry 
(Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014b). Therefore, although it is generally agreed that 
people with worry show attentional biases the time course remains unclear.  
Furthermore, despite previous research demonstrating that individuals with 
high levels of worry are less able to control their attention (see Chapter 5, pp. 136-
164, for further discussion) than those with low levels of worry (Hayes et al., 2008; 
Stefanopoulou et al., 2014), this was not observed in the previous study (Chapter 5, 
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pp. 136-164). However, attentional control has also been argued to be of considerable 
importance in the expression of attentional bias in anxious psychopathology (Schoorl 
et al., 2014). Notably, recent evidence suggests that attentional control moderates the 
relationship between attentional bias and worry (Bardeen et al., 2014).  
In contrast to the large attention bias literature (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), there 
are only 13 studies of interpretation biases in trait anxiety or worry/GAD; only two 
specifically focus on worry/GAD. Overall, interpretation bias has been observed in 
individuals with anxiety, and worry, and presents as a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening (e.g., Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1993; Eysenck et al., 1991; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod, 
Campbell, Rutherford, & Wilson, 2004; Mathews et al., 1989; Mogg et al., 1994). 
Interpretation bias is of increasing interest to researchers, due to its role in dual-
process models of anxiety (e.g., Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). For 
example, a recent study of social anxiety has provided preliminary evidence for 
threat-related interpretive biases resulting from an interplay between implicit and 
explicit processes and working memory capacity (Salemink et al., 2013). Thereby, 
offering support for dual-process theory, which argues that both implicit and explicit 
processes determine information processing biases and behavior, and that aspects of 
cognitive control influence the impact of those processes on self-regulation (e.g., 
Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012, Salemink et al., 2013). 
Studies examining interpretation bias have differed significantly in terms of 
the research paradigms employed; three methodologies are predominantly used: 
homophone spelling tasks, ambiguous sentence completion tasks, and semantic-
priming lexical decision tasks (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.2, pp. 95-98 for further 
details). However, they all confirm the presence of interpretation bias. Of the 
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paradigms used to examine interpretation bias, the lexical decision task 
methodologies have the most robust findings, which may in part be due to it being a 
reaction time task methodology, rather than a self-report measure. Overall, research 
has demonstrated good evidence for interpretation bias in anxious individuals, using 
both word-based and non-verbal (i.e., facial expressions) stimuli (In-Albon, Klein, 
Rinck, Becker, & Schneider, 2008).  
One of the principal studies of interpretive bias was undertaken by Mathews et 
al. (1989). They employed a homophone (sleigh/slay) spelling task (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.3.2, p. 95, for a more detailed discussion of this task) to investigate 
interpretation bias in participants with clinical levels of GAD, those recovered from 
GAD, and control participants. Relative to controls and recovered participants, 
participants with GAD more frequently used the threatening spellings of the 
homophones. Mathews et al. (1989) concluded that although different meanings of 
ambiguous stimuli may be processed in parallel by all participants, the presence of an 
interpretive bias results in anxiety-prone individuals becoming preferentially aware of 
the more threatening meaning.  
The second study to explore interpretative bias in a population with worry/ 
GAD examined the role of context by employing a lexical decision task with 
homophone primes. Hazlett-Stevens and Borkovec (2004) investigated whether 
individuals with GAD rely on antecedent information to interpret ambiguity, and 
whether such an effect can be observed in the absence of threat. Their results suggest 
that, compared to non-anxious participants, individuals with GAD utilize antecedent 
words to interpret threat-related homophone primes. However, although both studies 
demonstrated the presence of interpretation bias in participants with worry/GAD, the 
relationship between interpretation bias and attentional bias - which is implicated in 
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both Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) and Ouimet et al.’s (2209) models - has not yet 
been explored. 
Although Epstein’s (1983; 1990) CEST makes no specific predictions about 
information processing biases of attention and interpretation, it highlights the role of 
two distinct but interactive systems in psycholpathology: the rational system (similar 
to the rule based system describe in Ouiment et al., 2009) and the experiential system 
(similar to the associative system describe in Ouiment et al., 2009). According to 
CEST, psychological distress (i.e., worry) results from a conflict between the systems 
and a failure of the rational system to enact control over the experiential system 
(Epstein, 1991b, 1998d; Epstein et al., 1992; Shiloh et al., 2002). Parallels can be 
drawn between such suggestions and Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model, which 
highlights deficits in attentional control as central to pathological worry, as well as 
Ouimet et al.’s (2009) prediction that it is a failure of the rule-based system to 
dampen the associative system, and it is this that is central to having a vulnerability 
for anxiety.  
With this in mind the current study aimed to compare attentional bias for 
threat at different presentation times (early versus late processes) and their 
relationship to interpretation of ambiguous homophones, in a group of participants 
who were either high or low in worry. The, current study also aimed to examine 
whether attentional control (as measured in Study 3, Chapter 5, pp. 136-164) 
moderated the relationship between attentional bias and worry. Hirsch and Mathews’ 
(2012) propose that emotional processing biases and impaired attentional control 
combine to maintain worry, however, this has yet to be directly tested with 
experimental measures. In addition, Ouimet et al (2009) suggest that interpretation 
biases relate to the rule based system, whilst attentional bias to threat is the 
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behavioural response to the activation of threat associations in the associative system. 
Therefore, the aim was to test this aspect of their model by examining the relationship 
between biases of attention and interpretation. Furthermore, the relationship between 
self-reported processing style to biases at different stages of attention (early and late 
stages of processing) and interpretation in individual with high, compared to low, 
levels of worry was also examined.  
Information processing bias measures were expected to distinguish 
participants with high and low levels of worry. Specifically, we expected that 
individuals who endorsed high levels of worry would show both attentional and 
interpretation biases, characterized by early processing attentional bias toward threat, 
as well as late processing bias of difficulty disengaging from threat (Carlson & 
Reinke, 2008; Fox et al., 2007; e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; 
Mathews et al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000; Ouimet et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
attentional control was also expected to moderate the observed relationships between 
attentional biases and worry (Bardeen et al., 2014). It was also hypothesized that an 
overall effect of context would be observed on the interpretation bias task, whereby 
participants with high levels of worry would likely be faster to interpret ambiguous 
homophones related to presented context than unrelated target words, and this effect 
was expected to be more pronounced when presented with emotional threat related 
context words (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 
2009; Richards & French, 1992; Richards et al., 1993; Walsh et al., 2010).  
Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model leads to the expectation that early stage 
attentional processes (< 200 msec) are driven by bottom up processes and, therefore, 
should not be related to interpretation biases. Instead, interpretation biases are thought 
to affect those attentional processes affected by top-down control, or in other words, 
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later attentional processes.  In terms of measures of processing style, Hirsch and 
Mathews’ (2012) models predicts that where early biases of attention to threat are 
present these will relate to a dominant self-reported experiential processing style 
(bottom up processes), whereas later stage attentional and interpretation biases for 
threat will relate to self-reported dysfunction or dominance of the rational processing 
system (top-down processes) in individuals with high levels of worry.  
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
As described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2, pp. 66-68), this study is based on 106 
first year undergraduate psychology students who occupied either a high or low worry 
group. Participants individually completed the study components during a 1.5 hour 
session. One participant did not complete the crossmodal homophone priming task 
(interpretation bias measure), eight participants did not complete the dot-probe and 
antisaccade tasks, whilst a further three were excluded due to technical failures that 
occurred in administering the tasks. This left a total of 94 participants included in the 
final modified dot-probe task and the combined dot-probe, crossmodal priming task, 
and attentional control analyses.  
6.1.2 Measures 
LimeSurvey (version 1.87) was used to administer the PSWQ, the GADQ-IV, 
and the two processing style questionnaires - the Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(REI) and the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI). The questionnaires 
were presented in one of two counterbalanced orders and were completed by 
participants via LimeSurvey (version 1.87). For further details about the measures and 
their psychometric properties see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5, pp. 73-78.  
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6.1.3 Dot-probe task 
6.1.3.1 Materials and Apparatus 
Dot-probe task stimuli 
Twelve black and white 2-D facial identities (five men and seven women), 
from the Pictures of Facial Affect developed by Ekman and Friesen (1976), were 
selected for stimuli (see Appendix G). An additional eight 2-D faces (four women, 
four men), from a standardized facial collection (Gur et al., 2002), were used to create 
the ‘mask’ stimuli and two practice trial face pairs (one man and one woman). The 
facial identities were selected based on those used in previous research that could be 
edited to create stimuli that were uniform (Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Fox et al., 2007; 
Mogg et al., 2000; see Appendix G for Ekman codes). 
Once selected, the images were matched for brightness and converted by 
FastStone Capture into JPGs before being cropped into ovals using Adobe Flash CS3 
Professional software.  It was ensured that the faces selected had a central gaze and all 
hair and all non-facial areas were removed; this resulted in an additional two women 
than men included in the final stimuli. The ovals subtended 8.5 x 11° (height = 8.5cm; 
width = 11cm) and the center of the oval was presented on a grey background, 9.2° 
visual angle from the center of a white fixation cross (1 x 1° visual angle). The face 
pairs always consisted of the same individual in order to minimize the facial identity 
differences, other than emotional expression. The combinations of neutral /angry face 
pairs were presented in one of four possible combinations (see Figure 6.1 for an 
example of congruent trials): the angry face on the left hand side of the screen and 
both congruent (combination 1) and incongruent (combination 2) with the location of 
the target dot, and the angry face on the right hand side of the screen and congruent 
(combination 3) and incongruent (combination 4) with the target dot stimulus. The 
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mask faces were made up of neutral facial pairs only, with the dimensions identical to 
the non-masked stimuli. However, although the face stimuli were presented to the left 
or right of the central fixation, the masks were offset vertically above the cue face by 
1° visual angle in order to minimise the impact of possible motion of facial features 
(Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Liddell et al., 2005). Masked stimuli were offset vertically, 
rather than horizontally, so that the masks were above the central line so as to avoid 
potential biasing of attention with participants being drawn to look to the side of the 
screen where the dot probe was presented (Carlson & Reinke, 2008). The target 
stimulus was a white dot (created in Microsoft paint) measuring 5mm in diameter 
(0.5° visual angle). The dot was presented to the left or right of the white fixation 
cross, the center of the dot was separated by 9° visual angle from the center of the 
fixation cross.  
Collection of Manual Response  
A Microsoft sidewinder plug and play game pad was used to collect the 
manual reaction time responses. For the dot-probe task, manual reaction time (RT) 
was defined as the time it took participants to identify the position (left or right) of the 
target dot by pressing the corresponding button on the response pad.  
Experimental Task Specifications 
A chin and headrest were used to ensure uniformity in the visual angle 
(participants were positioned at 57cm from the screen). The modified dot probe 
detection task (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995) was 
presented on a 32-bit colour, 18in LCD monitor with a resolution of 1,024 x 768 
pixels that was connected to a Mackintosh computer running Windows XP version 
2002. The experiment was created and presented by experiment builder software (SR 
Research Ltd., Mississauga, Canada, 2010).  
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6.1.3.2 Experimental Procedure 
Participants were seated in a small dimly lit cubical and presented with task 
instructions to read. They were instructed to look at the fixation cross at the start of 
every trial. It was then stated that two faces would appear, one to the left of the 
fixation and one to the right. After the faces were presented participants were 
informed that they would disappear and a small white dot would appear in the 
position of one of the faces. They were asked to respond by pressing the button on the 
Microsoft button pad that corresponded (left or right) with the location of the dot. The 
instructions highlighted the importance of speed and accuracy, in pressing the button 
that corresponded to the dots location. It was verbally confirmed that participants 
understood the nature and requirement of the experimental task before experimental 
trials began.   
A block of practice trials (total of 16 trials), with feedback, preceded the 264 
experimental trials (120 of which used masked stimuli: see Figure 6.1 for further 
details). Participants completed the experiment in four blocks, with each block 
containing 66 trials (total of 264 trials). A short break was offered between each of 
the four blocks. Of the total trials, 96 were congruent with the dot appearing in the 
same location as the angry face, 96 were incongruent, and the remaining 72 were 
baseline trials containing (either neutral-neutral or angry-angry face pairs, see: 
Carlson & Reinke, 2008). The probability of the cue appearing on left or right was 
equal, as was the presentation of angry and neutral faces. Experiment Builder 
randomised presentation, and, therefore, the position of the angry face and probe were 
presented in all of the possible four combinations (see above in Stimuli section pp. 
174-175 for further details) across trials. 
In order to avoid anticipatory responses, each trial was preceded by a white  
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Figure 6.1. Congruent trials of masked and non-masked modified Dot-probe task  
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fixation-cross presented for 500-1500ms (specifically, 500ms, 700ms, 1000ms or 
1500ms; see: e.g., Mogg et al., 2004). The fixation-cross remained on the screen 
throughout the trial. The facial stimuli presentation times consisted of two groups; one 
to capture early processing (16msec, 33msec, 100msec) and one to capture later 
processing of threat (200msec, 500msec, 1500msec). Masked trials consisted of facial 
stimuli that were presented for either 16msec or 33msec proceeded by the 
presentation of a mask for 100ms, before the target dot appeared. The dot remained 
on the screen until participants had made a manual reaction time response or until 
2500msec had lapsed. The task took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
6.1.4 Antisaccade task 
The antisaccade task, as described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2.1, pp. 86-88), 
and Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.3, pp. 144-148) was used to measure attentional control. 
Please refer to the previous Chapter for full details of the task and experimental 
procedure. 
6.1.5 Crossmodal homophone task 
6.1.5.1 Experimental Procedure 
Participants were instructed that the task involved listening to a word and 
responding as to whether it was related or unrelated to another word presented 
visually on the computer screen. They were informed that the aim of the experiment 
was to identify as quickly as possible whether the two presented words were related 
or unrelated. If participants judged the words to be related (e.g., you hear "pink" and 
see the word "colour") they were requested to press the button on the right hand side 
of the response pad, or if they deemed them to be unrelated (e.g., you hear "pink" and 
see the word "banana") to then press the button on the left hand side. The instructions 
were presented as text for participants to read, however, verbal confirmation that they 
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had understood the instructions was also sought and the importance of speed and 
accuracy were highlighted.  
The aim of the experiment was to assess whether high and low anxious 
participants differed in the speed and accuracy (dependent variables) of their response 
times to threatening words. A total of 16 practice trials (each of the eight cue words 
were presented with two visual target words), with feedback, were presented prior to 
one block of 260 experimental trials. Participants completed the task in one of two 
orders, the second of which was a counterbalanced version of the first order. Prior to 
the start of each trial a white fixation cross (1 x 1° visual angle) was presented in the 
centre of the screen. Participants were requested to focus on this cross, and, in order 
to avoid the potential impact of anticipatory responses, the simultaneous cue (central 
fixation) and target (word) onset were activated only after participants had focused on 
the central fixation point for a variable randomised period of time (750msec; 
1000msec; 1200msec; 1500msec). If participants responded prior to the appearance of 
the written word an ‘error’ sign was presented requesting participants to wait for the 
presentation of the word visually before responding. After the fixation timer lapsed 
the auditory presentation of a cue word was presented, followed by the visual 
presentation of a word (for either 400msec or 1200msec), which replaced the fixation 
cross. The task took approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
6.1.5.2 Materials and Apparatus 
Stimuli 
A total of 130 cue/priming words, which can be found in Appendix H, were 
collated for this task. Of the 130 priming words, 80 words were unambiguous filler 
words of neutral content which acted as a baseline, and the remaining 50 were 
homophones – words that have two or more different meanings, although pronounced 
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in the same manner (e.g., here and hear). Of the 50 homophones 21 had both a 
threatening and a neutral interpretation (e.g. die, dye), whilst 29 homophones had a 
neutral/neutral (e.g. cent, sent) interpretation.  The homophone priming words were 
presented followed by either a related target word with a neutral or emotional context 
word, or a target word that was unrelated to the prime. Participants were requested to 
respond as to whether the target word was related or unrelated to the homophone 
prime. An additional eight words (and 16 matched related/unrelated words) were used 
for practice trials prior to the commencement of experimental trials. The words were 
selected from previous research into interpretation bias in anxious populations 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Mathews et al., 1989). Audacity (version 1.2.6) was 
used to record, and later edit, a native Australian speaker reciting the 130 priming cue 
words. The visual target words were presented in Times New Roman, were white in 
colour, had a font size of 50, and were presented on a grey background. 
Collection of Manual Response  
Similar to the aforementioned dot-probe task, a Microsoft sidewinder plug and 
play game pad collected the manual reaction time responses. The manual reaction 
time (RT) was recorded as the time between the visual presentation of a word and the 
manual press of the correct button. 
Specifications and Experimental Task 
The same set up and equipment as described for the dot-probe task, including 
Experiment builder software (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Canada, 2010), was 
employed. Additionally, participants wore headphones to complete the task. Each 
word of the 130 prime/cue words were presented verbally prior to the visual 
presentation of a target word. The time between the initiation of the spoken word and 
the presentation of the visual target word was 2500msec. Participants were required to 
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respond whether the words were related or unrelated after the presentation of the 
visual target by pressing the corresponding button on the button box. A response was 
required within 2500msec in order for the trial to be classified as valid (Walsh et al., 
2010). 
6.2 Data Preparation 
Reliability analyses were undertaken on all three experimental tasks, see Table 
6.1. Cronbach’s alphas suggested all three tasks had good internal consistency. Nine 
variables in Study 4 were observed to have outliers, six of which failed to meet 
criteria for a normal distribution. See Chapter 2, Section 2.4, pp. 98-100, for further 
details and rationale for undertaking analyses on the variables without conducting 
transformations. 
Dotprobe task outliers  
RT button bias at 100ms had one outlier, whilst two outlying scores were also 
observed for RT button bias at 200ms; these were replaced by a value that was one 
unit lower than the next most extreme response. Lastly, an outlier was observed for 
the RT button bias 1500ms variable. Although the outliers were altered using standard 
methods, the RT button bias reaction times at 1500ms were still not found to be 
normally distributed with a positive kurtosis score above the standard acceptable 
range. 
Homophone task outliers  
Three reaction time variables on the homophone cross-modal priming task 
(Mean RT for: neutral words; neutral homophones; threat homophones) were found to 
have one outlier. Neutral percentage errors and homophone threat percentage errors 
were also found to have outlier each in their distributions. Three variables had a 
distribution that was positively skewed, with mean RT for neutral words and mean  
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Table 6.1 Cronbach’s α scores for Experimental Tasks. 
Measure Cronbach’s α 
Homophone task .812 
Dotprobe task .997 
Prosaccade task .984 
Antisaccade task .871 
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RT for threat homophones demonstrating skew and percentage of errors on neutral 
word trials having demonstrating both a positive skew and Kurtosis outside of 
acceptable parameters. 
Dot-probe task: Response Data (Reaction Times) 
Reaction times (button presses) under 100ms (0%) or above 2000ms (.01% 
see: Fox, 2002) were excluded from analyses. In addition, incorrect button presses 
(errors) were also excluded. Given that less than 1.8% of the data was discarded as 
either outliers or errors, the discarded data was not subject to further investigation.  
Homophone task: Response Data (Reaction Times) 
Homophone trials which elicited reaction times of less than 200msec (0%) or 
more than 2500ms (0.1%) were not included in the final analyses (Walsh et al., 2010). 
A further 0.3% of the trials were removed, as they were invalid, due to participants 
responding prior to the presentation of the visual context word.  
6.3 Planned Analyses 
As with Study 3 (Chapter 5, pp. 136-164) an extreme group split was 
performed on the participants who were recruited for this program of research (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, p. 70). High and low worry groups based on combined 
scores from the GADQ-IV and PSWQ were generated (see: Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics). Combined analyses consisted of a total sample size of N = 94. Following 
the group splits on the 105 participants who completed the homophone task, 80 
participants (high N = 41 and low N = 39) remained for the homophone analyses, 
whilst 66 (high N = 34 and low N = 32) of the original 94 participants were included 
in the dot-probe and combined task analyses.  
SPSS version 21.0 was used to conduct all analyses. Initial analyses consisted 
of four mixed model analyses of variance. Two mixed ANOVAs were performed to 
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examine homophone task performance (within subjects factor) by level of worry 
(between subject factor). First, a 3 (context condition: emotional context, neutral 
context, and unrelated) by 2 (stimuli: threat, neutral) by 2 (high and low worry) 
ANOVA was employed to examine RT speed, whilst the second 2 (worry: high, low) 
x 3 (condition: neutral words, neutral homophones, and threat homophones) ANOVA 
explored response accuracy. Additionally, two MANOVAs, both employing level of 
worry (high, low) as the independent variable, separately examined the dependent 
variables of dot-probe manual RTs of early (16msec, 33msec, and 100msec; first 
MANOVA) and late (200msec, 500msec, and1500msec; second MANOVA) 
processing. Where differences emerged, univariate and t-tests were performed to 
further examine differences between the groups.  
In order to test the relationship between scores on the symptom scales, 
processing style scales, and interpretation and attentional bias concurrently, it was 
anticipated that multiple linear regression analyses were planned. These analyses were 
to be undertaken on the complete data set (N = 94) and focused on any variables that 
might be found to demonstrate significance in the preliminary correlational analyses. 
Prior to analyses, attentional bias scores were calculated with the following formula, 
which takes into consideration the possible advantage of the target and probe 
appearing in the same location: 
Bias index = ((CL_PR – CR_PR) + (CR_PL – CL_PL)) / 2 
where C is the cue, P is the probe, L is the left location, and R is the right location. 
Therefore, ‘CL_ PR’ represents a trial where the cue appears to the left of the screen 
prior to the presentation of the probe to the opposite (right) side of the screen. The 
bias index scores represent the degree to which attention is directed either toward 
(i.e., positive score that represents vigilance) or away from (i.e., negative score which 
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represents avoidance) the cue (threatening face). Interpretation bias scores were also 
calculated prior to computing bivariate correlations. Separate scores for the three 
context conditions (emotional, neutral, unrelated) were calculated, whereby the RTs 
to target neutral words in the three context conditions presented following neutral 
valenced homophones were subtracted from RTs to emotional target words in the 
various context conditions following threat homophones. 
As we anticipated undertaking moderation analyses to explore for a possible 
moderation of the relationship between attentional bias and worry/GAD symptoms by 
attentional control, as suggested in Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) model a high and low 
attentional control group was calculated. These groups were determined by 
undertaking a tertile split on attentional control scores. The high attentional control 
group consisted of 29 participants (M = -7.55, SD = 25.94) and the low attentional 
control group included 29 participants (M = 71.41, SD =15.88), therefore, a total of 
N= 58 participants were included in the moderation analyses. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics for symptom measures are reported in Table 6.2 and 
mean reaction times (RTs) for correct responses and accuracies for each presented 
valence conditions on the homophone task are in Table 6.3. The mean response 
latencies and manual reaction times for the modified probe detection task are shown 
in Table 6.4.  
6.4.2 Preliminary Analyses: Homophone crossmodal-priming task  
Two mixed model ANOVAs were undertaken to examine differences in both 
RTs (Figure 6.2) and accuracy (Figure 6.3) for high and low worriers. The mixed 
model ANOVA examining accuracy, condition (neutral words, neutral homophones,  
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Table 6.2: Symptom Measure, and Processing Style Means and Standard Deviations  
 Low worry  High worry  Total Sample 
Scale M SD M SD M SD 
Symptom       
GADQ-IV 3.53 (2.26) 21.81 (7.04) 11.46 (9.59) 
PSWQ 41.12 (7.93) 67.50 (8.75) 53.85 (13.67) 
Note: Total Sample N = 94; low worry group N = 34; high worry group N = 32 (total n = 66); PSWQ = Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire – IV; M = Mean; SD = Standard 
deviation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: Homophone crossmodal priming task Means and Standard Deviations by 
Stimuli Valence Condition 
Stimuli Valence Condition Low worry  High worry  Total sample 
 M SD  M SD  M  SD 
Neutral       
 RT 708.94  (144.58) 691.68  (131.27) 700.09  (137.31) 
 %error 12.29% (8.28) 10.84% (7.85) 11.55% (8.04) 
Homophone neutral       
 Emotional RT 755.01 (210.98) 740.49  (166.93) 747.57  (188.61) 
 Neutral RT 742.10 (236.49) 703.68 (176.75) 7.22.41 (207.59) 
 Unrelated RT 797.73 (224.24) 817.88 (240.80) 808.06 (231.62) 
 %error 30.84% (14.51) 22.77% (17.12) 26.71% (16.32) 
Homophone threat       
 Emotional RT 703.40  (265.47) 664.03 (152.20) 683.22 (214.52) 
 Neutral RT 742.10 (236.49) 703.68 (176.75) 722.41 (207.59) 
 Unrelated RT 729.15 (231.97) 751.15 (151.02) 740.42 (193.79) 
  %error 26.40% (12.89) 24.94% (13.55) 25.65% (13.17) 
Note: Total Sample N = 94; low worry group N = 41; high worry group N = 39 (total n = 80). RT – reaction time; 
Emotional – homophone with emotional context word; Neutral – homophone with neutral context word; Unrelated 
– homophone with unrelated context word. 
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Figure 6.2: Mean correct reaction time (msec) by context (emotional, neutral, 
unrelated) and Stimuli type (neutral homophones, threat homophones). 
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Figure 6.3: Mean percentage errors by Stimuli type (neutral words, neutral homophones, 
threat homophones) in high and low worry groups 
 
 
Table 6.4: Modified probe detection task manual reaction time (RT) bias mean scores and 
standard deviations  
Manual RT Data 
 Low worry  High worry  Total sample 
Trial M SD  M SD  M SD 
16 msec 
33 msec 
100 msec 
200 msec 
500 msec 
1500 msec 
Total 
1.87 (30.73)  9.01 (36.21)  5.33 (33.43) 
8.31 (22.66)  -1.97 (39.66)  3.33 (32.21) 
9.48 (36.66)  11.43 (33.13)  10.43 (34.74) 
2.16 (39.89)  -8.39 (31.47)  -2.95 (36.17) 
9.83 (36.36)  -1.42 (33.63)  4.37 (35.25) 
-6.34 (53.18)  -5.26 (41.81)  -5.81 (47.64) 
3.38 (14.40)  2.52 (21.96)  2.96 (18.32) 
Note: Total Sample N = 94; low worry group N = 31; high worry group N = 33 (total n = 66) 
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threat homophones) by group (high, low worry), presented a significant main effect of 
condition F(2, 77) = 83.42, p < .001. However, this was not found to differ between 
participants with high and low levels of worry, as the interaction did not reach 
significance: F(2, 77) = 2.03, p = .14.  Therefore, although participants accuracy did 
not differ as a result of their level of worry, or between threatening (M = 25.65%) and 
neutral (M = 26.71%, t = -.55, p = .59) homophones, significantly fewer errors were 
made on neutral word trials (M = 11.55%) than trials containing either neutral (t = -
8.96, p < .001) or threat homophones (t = -10.86, p < .001).  
The reaction time, context condition (emotional, neutral, unrelated) by stimuli 
valence (threat, neutral) by group (high, low worry), mixed model ANOVA found a 
significant main effect of condition, F(2, 77) = 7.91, p < .01. The presence of 
emotional or semantically related context words led to faster reaction times. A main 
effect of stimuli was also observed: F(2, 77) = 16.50, p < .001; participants responded 
more quickly in the presence of threatening than neutral homophones. However, these 
main effects were again found to be unrelated to participants’ level of worry as both 
two-way and the three-way interactions were not significant (F<1). Therefore, 
although RTs differed as a result of the context and valence of the presented words, 
the observed differences were unrelated to participants’ level of worry.  
6.4.3 Preliminary Analyses: Modified probe detection task 
Two MANOVAs were conducted to examine early and late processing manual 
reaction times. The early processing manual RT MANOVA had group (high, low 
worry) as the independent variables (IV) and reaction times to early presentation time 
trials (16ms, 33ms, 100ms) as the dependent variables (DV). The multivariate result 
for the dependent variables in relation to group was not found to be significant Wilks’ 
Lambda F(3, 62) = .99, p = 0.40. The late processing multivariate result - late 
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processing manual RT of group (high, low worry) as the IV and presentation time 
(200ms, 500ms, 1500ms) as the DV - was also not significant Wilks’ Lambda F(3, 
62) = .1.01, p = 0.39. Therefore, no evidence was found for attentional biases either in 
early or late processing, regardless of participants’ level of worry. 
6.4.4 Preliminary Analyses: Correlational Analyses 
Correlations between the homophone task, modified probe detection task, 
attentional control scores and symptom and processing style measures are presented 
in Table 6.5. For a table of correlations for all variables in the project see Appendix J 
(p. 378). No significant correlations were observed between processing style or 
symptom scores with regard to attentional or interpretation bias scores.  
Participants who were more likely to demonstrate attentional bias at 1500msec 
were also found to be more likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening when 
presented in a neutral context (r = .22, p = .040). Additionally, participants who were 
observed to have an attentional bias at 100msec were less likely to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening when they were presented in an emotional context (r 
= -.21, p = .049). Lower attentional control scores were associated with increased 
levels of late stage attentional bias at 1500msec: r= -.23, p = .030. Despite this 
finding, and the findings that attentional bias at 1500msec was related to participants 
demonstrating higher levels of interpretation bias as well as attentional bias at 
100msec being observed in participants with lower levels of interpretation bias, these 
correlations were unrelated to worry and GAD symptom scores. Therefore, as the 
correlational results (Table 6.5) indicated no significant relationships between 
symptom scores, processing style and interpretation bias (homophone task), or 
attentional bias as measured by manual RTs, no multiple regression analyses were 
undertaken. Moderation analyses were undertaken to further explore the possibility of 
!-191- !
 
 
Table 6.5: Correlations of symptom measures, processing style measures, attentional 
control scores, homophone crossmodal priming task conditions and dotprobe 
attentional bias calculations 
 InterpN InterpU InterpE Att.B16 Att.B33 A.B100 A.B200 A.B500 A.B1500 
PSWQ .090 -.073 .005 .063 -.145 .044 -.056 -.104 .074 
GADQ-IV .027 -.100 .033 .080 -.130 .050 .033 -.132 .011 
PMPI-E .094 .021 .072 .081 .003 -.016 .153 -.168 -.068 
PMPI-R .138 .123 -.044 .020 -.014 .154 -.125 -.151 -.027 
REI-E .070 .007 .125 -.083 -.007 -.072 -.042 -.129 .032 
REI-R -.121 .028 .005 -.089 .072 -.085 -.039 .061 -.022 
Att.Cont. .068 .022 -.003 .079 .094 .073 -.145 .040 -.233* 
InterpretN - -.032 -.115 -.113 -.019 .019 .021 -.112 .217* 
InterpretU  - -.068 -.032 .021 .024 .062 .056 .019 
InterpretE   - -.145 .033 -.204* .130 .021 -.038 
Att.bias16    - .147 .039 .211* .119 -.180 
Att.bias33     - .083 .233* .015 .062 
Att.B100      - .015 -.044 -.148 
Att.B200       - -.051 .099 
Att.B500        - -.237
*
 
 
Note: N = 94. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ – IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire – IV; 
PMPI-E = Perceived Modes of Processing – Experiential scale; PMPI-R = Perceived Modes of Processing – Rational scale; REI-
E = Rational Experiential Inventory – Experiential scale; REI-R = Rational Experiential Inventory – Rational scale; Att.Cont = 
Attentional control score; InterpretN = interpretation bias neutral context; InterpretU = interpretation bias unrelated context; 
InterpretE = interpretation bias emotional context; Att.B = attentional bias. 
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 
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attentional control moderating the relationship between attentional biases (multiple 
presentation times 16ms-1500ms) and worry and GAD symptomatology.  However, 
none of the moderation analyses were found to be significant (see: Appendix I for 
results).  
6.5 Discussion 
The current study aimed to examine self-reported worry/GAD symptoms and 
individual processing style and their relationship to the cognitive biases of attention 
and interpretation. It was expected that information processing bias measures would 
distinguish participants with high and low levels of worry. Specifically, in terms of 
interpretation bias, an overall effect of context was expected, whereby those 
endorsing high levels of worry were expected to respond faster when presented 
targets that offered a context cue, particularly targets with a threat related emotional 
context. Participants with high compared to low levels of worry were also expected to 
demonstrate early and late stage attentional biases, and a significant relationship was 
anticipated between late stage attentional processing biases and interpretation bias. It 
was hypothesized that, for individuals with high (compared to low) levels of worry, 
the presence of attentional bias would be observed for those with a dominant 
experiential processing style, whereas interpretation biases were expected to be 
related to dysfunction or dominance of the rational processing system. 
The hypotheses were not supported. Although an effect of context was 
observed with participants demonstrating threat-related interpretation bias to 
ambiguous stimuli, particularly in the presence of threat related context words, this 
was unrelated to participants’ levels of worry. There was also no evidence for 
differential levels of attentional biases – in either early or late attentional processing – 
in individuals with high and low levels of worry.  In terms of the relationship between 
!-193- !
the biases, no worry related differences were observed. Furthermore, attentional 
control was not found to moderate relationships between attentional biases and 
worry/GAD symptom scores. Finally, symptom scores and self-reported processing 
style were also found to be unrelated to interpretation and attentional biases as 
measured by manual RTs. 
Thus, unexpectedly, the current study did not observe specificity for worry of 
the cognitive biases of attention and interpretation. The current pattern of results 
failed to replicate the robust findings in the literature that individuals with high and 
low levels of worry can be distinguished by both early (Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 
1995; Mogg et al., 1993) and late (Bradley et al., 1999; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg 
et al., 1992; Mogg et al., 2000) threat-related attentional biases (see: Bar-Haim et al., 
2007 for meta-analysis; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995). 
Previous studies employing the dot probe task - with methodologies replicated in the 
current study - have consistently found that both early and late processing stage 
attentional biases for threat are characteristic of individuals with high levels of worry 
(Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Fox et al., 2007; e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012; Mathews et al., 2003; Mogg et al., 2000; Ouimet et al., 2009).  
Although lower levels of attentional control and higher levels of later stage 
processing attentional bias (at 1500ms) were observed, these variables were unrelated 
to symptom scores. Thus, whilst this association supports findings and theoretical 
suggestions of a relationship between attentional control and attentional bias (Bardeen 
et al., 2014; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Schoorl et al., 2014), based on theoretical 
suggestions (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and previous findings 
(Bardeen et al., 2014), we expected to see attentional control moderating the 
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relationship between attentional bias and symptom scores. However, none of the 
moderation analyses were found to be significant.  
The current study did not reflect the commonly reported findings that 
individuals who present with high levels of worry/GAD demonstrate interpretive bias, 
whereby participants with high levels of worry are faster to interpret ambiguous 
homophones as threatening, particularly when presented in an emotional context (e.g., 
Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Byrne & Eysenck, 1993; Dugas, Hedayati, et al., 2005; 
Eysenck et al., 1991; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod et al., 2004; Mathews et 
al., 1989; Mogg et al., 1994). In individuals both with (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; 
Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004) and without (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b) high 
levels of worry lexical decisions have also been consistently obeserved to be 
significantly quicker when primes are emotionally or semantically related to targets. 
Therefore, in the case of immediate threat interpretations, the observed pattern of 
semantic activation found for threatening meanings should be the same as that found 
for dominant meanings (Blanchette & Richards, 2003); RTs should be short unless 
two or more competing meanings are activated that substantially differ in their 
affective valence, whereby the individual should have more difficulty and, therefore, 
RTs should be increased (Hock & Krohne, 2004). In previous research participants 
with high compared to low levels of worry demonstrate faster reaction times to 
ambiguous stimuli with threat related meanings (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; 
Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004), a finding not replicated here. Furthermore, the 
current findings demonstrated no relationship between interpretation bias and worry, 
despite using methodology that has been robustly associated with significant findings.  
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1997) propose that it is important 
to make a distinction between early (automatic i.e., attention) and later (where 
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meaning is constructed i.e., interpretation) cognitive processing, as they both have 
differential, albeit crucial, impacts to the development of pathological anxiety. 
Therefore, the temporal relationship between attention (early and later stage 
processing) and interpretation (later stage processing) biases are important to 
understand (White et al., 2011; Williams et al., 1997). However, as no relationships 
were observed between biases of attention, interpretation and levels of worry/GAD 
symptoms, the current findings cannot offer insight into these relationships (White et 
al., 2011).  
Theoretically, interpretation biases should be associated with attentional biases 
at longer, but not shorter presentation times (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012). While the current data offered some support for these predictions, that is, 
interpretation bias was associated with attention bias at 1500 msec, they were 
unexpectedly not related to attentional biases at other late stages of processing (200 
and 500 msec). Additionally, the negative relationship between interpretation bias and 
early stage attentional processing biases at 100msec was unexpected. Thus, the 
current results should be interpreted cautiously. Multiple correlations were assessed 
with no correction for multiple comparisons, which, if conducted, would have 
rendered the found associations no longer significant. Further, we would have 
expected significant relationships at 200 msec and 500msec as well. Finally, the size 
of the correlations were small and, therefore, the clinical relevance of these is unclear.  
The only study which has, to date, simultaneously examined attention and 
interpretation biases and their relationship to worry/GAD employed a sample of 
children and adolescents. Rozenman et al. (2014) found a relationship between the 
biases of both attention and interpretation with participant levels of interpretation bias 
predicting worry. As no relationship between worry/GAD symptoms and biases of 
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attention or interpretation was observed in the current sample it neither supported nor 
extended Rozenman’s data. Thus, although the basic tenets of dual-systems models 
may offer the benefit of elucidating the nature of cognitive biases in individuals with 
high levels of worry this could not be examined in the current study due to the lack of 
significant findings.  
Making sense of the current data, particularly the lack of worry related 
findings, is challenging. However, although there are several plausible reasons, the 
inconsistency of the current data with previous literature should be considered in light 
of the limitations of the current study. It is more likely that the current findings reflect 
aspects of the methodology employed and the population sampled, rather than calling 
into question the well-established role of cognitive biases in the etiology and 
maintenance of excessive worry.  
The failure to replicate previous findings with the dot probe task (Bradley et 
al., 1999; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mogg et al., 2004; Mogg, 
Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Mogg et al., 2000; Oathes et al., 2010) may relate to the 
complexity and a lack of stability of the task under different conditions. This is the 
first study of participants with high and low levels of worry that has presented such a 
varied time course for stimuli presentation. The fact that the tasks were also given in 
the context of a series of different tasks examined in this thesis may also have affected 
the results. Low motivation and participant fatigue may have led to participants not 
engaging in the task but rather responding in an automated way. Some authors use 
“catch trials”, where participants’ are presented with blank trials (where no dot probe 
is presented or no cue in the antisaccade/prosaccade task) in order to deter automated 
responding, but this was not used in the present study. Using a dot-probe task that 
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contained a forced judgment component would have also been beneficial. For 
example, requesting participants to indicate whether an arrow (the probe) is pointing 
left or right, or whether the probe is the letter E or the letter F, rather than just 
indicating the location of the probe. Adding a judgement component would have 
ensured that the participants had to actually look at the probe in order to respond 
correctly. Without this judgement component it is unclear that the latency to respond 
indicates the actual time taken to detect the probe. Additionally, aside from the 
antisaccade task, the current study collected behavioural reaction time data, rather 
than employing an eye-tracking methodology; eye-tracking methodology has 
demonstrated more robust findings than manual RTs and offers the opportunity to 
examine multiple timeframes in one trial. Furthermore, data based on manual reaction 
time responses (button presses) has been suggested to be problematic as an index of 
attentional bias. Specifically, individuals’ response times have been found to be 
poorly correlated with attentional processes (Algom, Chajut, Lev, 2004). Eye-tracking 
and neurophysiological methodologies are more rigorous due to their ability to more 
directly examine attentional responses to threat. Thus, undertaking further research of 
the relationship between attention and interpretation bias with an eye-tracking 
methodology would be beneficial.  
The failure to replicate interpretation bias as a result of participants’ level of 
worry may reflect the well-documented challenges in examining interpretation bias. 
Difficulties can arise due to both internal and external cues being subject to 
interpretative bias (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; 
MacLeod et al., 2004; Mathews et al., 1989), the impact of emotional state (Richards 
et al., 1993), context (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Nygaard & Lunders, 2002), and 
task parameters (Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Mogg et al., 1994; Richards & French, 
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1992), which have all been suggested to affect findings. Although worry is associated 
with threat-related inference, this does not necessarily translate to threat-related 
inferences being arrived at more quickly (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). However, 
previous studies using similar paradigms to the one employed in the current study 
have demonstrated reduced lexical decision times for threat-related targets 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989a, 1989b; Kemp-Wheeler 
& Hill, 1992; Richards & French, 1992).  
A further limitation with regard to all the tasks in the current study may relate 
to the diffuse and idiosyncratic nature of individuals’ worry concerns (Craske et al., 
1989; Roemer et al., 1997). The stimuli employed in the current study may not have 
sufficiently reflected individual participants’ worry themes. In light of this, future 
research that employs threatening stimuli generated to be specifically relevant for 
each individual participant would be optimal. For further discussion of the specific 
limitations of the antisaccade task refer to the previous chapter’s discussion section 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.4, pp. 155-164). 
Despite these methodological issues, this study had a number of strengths. It 
was the first to present stimuli across a range of presentation times (rather than the 
predominant presentation times of 500ms or 1250ms) within a dot probe methodology 
so to examine the time course of attentional bias in relation to worry. As the current 
study evaluated attentional bias over a variety of presentation times (covering early 
and late stages of processing) it offered the opportunity to explore the aspects of 
attention most related to interpretation bias, as well as the variety of possible effects 
of attention on the etiology and maintenance of worry more generally (Ouimet, 
Radomsky, & Barber, 2012; Zvielli et al., 2014b). The use of an interpretation bias 
task that examined the impact of context was another strength of the study; context 
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may offer a more accurate understanding of how people might respond when threat 
representations are activated. Overall, individually examining information processing 
biases neglects the exploration of theoretical proposals (Teachman et al., 2007). 
However, despite this, surprisingly few studies have simultaneously examined biases 
of attention and interpretation in relation to worry (or anxiety more generally). 
Although no significant findings were demonstrated in the current data with relation 
to individual processing style, processing biases, and worry this was the first time 
these factors have been explored simultaneously. 
Currently, there is no “process pure” measure of information processing, with 
all measures comprising of a mix of multiple distinct automatic and strategic 
processes (Eysenck, 1992; Sherman et al., 2008). Therefore, research that continues to 
untangle the stages of basic cognition within the chain of information processing has 
important implications and offers the opportunity to better understand the 
mechanisms underlying worry so that clinical interventions can continue to be 
developed and refined (Rozenman et al., 2014). Although the current study suggests 
Epstein’s individual processing styles may have little to offer in extending our 
understanding of worry, the conclusions that can be drawn are limited, and the current 
results require replication. 
In summary, the impact of worry on information processing, even when 
stimuli are presented outside awareness, has been well documented with individuals 
with high levels of worry demonstrating an enhanced ability to detect threatening 
stimuli. Yet, despite the convincing evidence supporting theoretical suggestions of the 
role of attention and interpretation in the development and maintenance of worry, 
these variables have rarely been examined simultaneously, particularly in an adult 
population (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Rozenman et al., 2014). Attention and 
!-200- !
interpretation biases were examined, as well as self-reported individual differences in 
processing style and worry/GAD symptoms. Although a relationship was observed 
between attention and interpretation biases at early and late stages of processing, these 
were found to be unrelated to levels of worry and individual processing style. As the 
results are not consistent with previous worry-related findings, it is likely they reflect 
methodological limitations. Future research should continue to focus on examining 
the distinction between automatic and strategic processes within the same sample in 
order to explore the applicability of dual-process theory in worry (Beck & Clark, 
1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; McNally, 1995; Ouimet et al., 2009).  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
7.1 Overview of the Project  
7.1.1 Summary and Major Findings 
Worry is the central feature of GAD and has also been found to be present in 
most anxiety disorders (Borkovec et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1992; Craske et al., 1989; 
Konstantellou et al., 2011; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Roemer et al., 1997; Turk & 
Mennin, 2011). Yet, despite its prevalence and the significant costs associated with 
chronic worry/GAD (Ballenger et al., 2001; Kessler et al., 1999; Ormel et al., 1994; 
Wittchen, 2002), it is recognized as the most understudied of all the anxiety disorders, 
which has led to the recent proliferation of models (Boschen, 2008). As empirical 
support for the majority of these models is only in its preliminary stages, the existence 
of one overarching theory that appears able to sufficiently account for the processes 
involved in worry remains elusive.  
Epstein (1985), Koerner (2014) and Foa and Kozak (1997) have all called for 
a more explicit synthesis of already acquired knowledge. They argue that the 
conceptualization, understanding, and treatment of psychopathology and, specifically, 
chronic worry can best be advanced by the ‘cross-fertilization’ of clinical psychology 
and nonclinical experimental psychology (e.g., cognitive psychology, social 
psychology, personality). In other words, a large-scale synthesis of research related to 
worry/GAD and its processes that explicitly incorporates theories of normative 
behaviour into clinical models is required. One such example of this synthesis is the 
incorporation of principles from dual-process models of information processing, and 
models of anxiety and worry. 
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Recent models and theories of anxiety and worry have indeed attempted to 
explain worry as a consequence of voluntary/rational and involuntary/experiential 
processes (Ouimet et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Specifically it is an 
imbalance between the two distinct systems of information processing; the 
experiential system that is a fast, impulsive system (attentional bias, interpretation 
bias) and the rational system, which is a regulatory executive system that can 
moderate the impact of the experiential system (Epstein, 1998c; Salemink & Wiers, 
2012). Individuals with a dominant experiential system and a weak rational system 
are thought to be most vulnerable for the development and maintenance of 
psychopathological behaviour (Epstein, 1998c; Salemink & Wiers, 2012). With this in 
mind, the current project aimed to explore the applicability of dual-process theory in 
accounting for worry, and its well-established processes (e.g., cognitive biases). 
This project reports findings from four studies that assessed the relationship 
between processing style (as measured by self-report questionnaires), individual 
differences in patterns of information processing (as measured by implicit tasks), and 
worry. In particular, it was hoped that the consideration of individual patterns of 
processing and processing style within a dual-process framework would improved our 
understanding of heightened levels of worry over and above existing models. The first 
study was a proof of concept study, which examined participants’ self-reports of 
individual processing style and worry symptoms in a large sample of undergraduate 
students. In addition to examining individual processing style, the remaining four 
studies used experimental tasks designed to place the two systems in conflict, and 
included the assessment of problem-solving and rational judgment, attentional control 
task, and biases of attention and interpretation.  
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Findings from Study 1 (Chapter 3, pp. 101-116) demonstrated a relationship 
between individual processing style and worry/GAD symptoms. Overall, when faced 
with active worry (i.e., situational processing style) participants with high, compared 
to low, levels of worry demonstrated increased levels of rational processing. 
However, the findings from Study 2 (Chapter 4, pp. 117-135) showed no relationship 
between processing style, reasoning scores and levels of worry. Therefore, it appears 
that the relationship between symptom scores and processing style do not reflect 
actual strengths or deficits in rational thinking or reasoning skills, per se. The findings 
in Study 2 did, however, offer support for two modes of processing information which 
reflect performance on reasoning tasks; a rational mode, which is more responsive to 
statistical than heuristic principals, and an intuitive-experiential system that exhibits 
the opposite pattern reflecting heuristic principals (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). 
These findings reflected previous research that has also demonstrated an association 
between higher reasoning scores and aspects of a more rational processing style 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Klaczynski & Daniel, 2005; Stanovich et al., 2008; 
Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich & West, 2008; Stupple et al., 2011). However, as 
there was no evidence of a relationship between reasoning, processing style and 
symptom scores, the findings were not consistent with one of the central tenets of 
CEST, which argues that the dominance of one system over the other is predictive of 
psychopathology (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009).  
In addition to the findings in the current project offering limited support for 
CEST, Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) and Ouimet et al’s, (2009) models were also 
unsupported; there was no evidence of attentional control deficits, and no attention or 
interpretation biases were observed in relation to worry or individual processing style 
(Study 3 and Study 4). Notably, in terms of attentional control, the antisaccade results 
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were difficult to interpret. However, overall, the current findings do not support 
previous research, which demonstrates a relationship between attentional biases, 
impaired attentional control and worry. Furthermore, different time courses in 
interpretation and attentional biases did not vary as a result of worry and GAD 
symptoms. Therefore, current findings cannot offer insight into the impact of worry 
on processing biases.  
 7.1.2 Intended Scope of the Project 
To date, research has not simultaneously explored the relationship between  
cognitive biases of attention and interpretation, attentional control, and individual 
processing style in order to test the assumptions of the aforementioned models. 
Therefore, an overarching aim of this project was to undertake Structural Equation 
Modelling to test the fit of possible dual-process models (Epstein,1983; 1990; Ouimet 
et al., 2009; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), which best incorporate the variables in the 
current project and their ability to account for the process of worry. Although there is 
evidence to support some of the central tenets in each of these dual-process models, 
the majority of the research has investigated these processes separately (see: Bar-
Haim et al., 2007, for review; Bardeen et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2008; Hazlett-
Stevens & Borkovec, 2004; Mathews et al., 1989; Rozenman et al., 2014; 
Stefanopoulou et al., 2014). This was the major rationale for having administered the 
range of experimental tasks to the current sample.   
However, as the bivariate relationships did not offer support for the basic 
relationships that were predicted by the models (see Appendix J, p. 378, for 
correlation matrix, which is mentioned in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.4, p. 190), Structural 
Equation Modelling was not undertaken and it was not possible to test the potential fit 
of possible dual-process models. The results showed that of the possible 138 
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correlation co-efficents that were conducted, only six were significant. Therefore, it is 
likely that the current pattern of results reflect Type 1 errors and, for this reason, 
Structural Equation Modelling was not undertaken. Overall, due to the the large 
number of correlations and only moderate to weak significant associations observed, 
there is a strong likelihood of Type 1 error, whereby an effect is detected that is not 
actually present. Thus, if we controlled for Type 1 error by, for example, conducting 
bonferonni corrections, the correlations would no longer be significant. Further, the 
correlations themselves are small, therefore, their clinical relevance is unclear. This 
raises the conundrum that although the project set out to provide a stringent test of 
dual-process theories in relation to worry - by including both self-report and implicit 
measures - the data provide very little support for dual-process theories. What is 
perhaps most perplexing is that if one relies more heavily on implicit measures 
employed, which actually test the processes rather than report about the processes 
incorporated in dual-process models, the support for these models is even more 
limited. As such, the theory was unsupported. 
7.1.3 Summary 
Taken together, the overall conclusion one draws from the current project 
findings is that dual-process models, specifically Epstein’s CEST, was unable to 
account for the process of worry/GAD symptoms. However, theory cannot be 
falsified or dismissed on the basis of one set of studies on a single sample and further 
research must be conducted in order to reach firmer conclusions. Therefore, caution 
needs to be taken in the conclusions drawn from the current data and the potential 
benefits of dual-process theories should not be overlooked, especially as they have the 
potential to offer detailed, specific, and integrative frameworks from which to study 
cognitive biases in relation to worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
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Thus, the current findings need to be considered in the context of methodological 
limitations in the various studies. 
7.2 Project Limitations 
7.2.1 Sample 
Although participants in the high worry group had scores of self-reported 
worry and GAD symptoms that were within the clinical range, a possible explanation 
for the lack of current findings may be the use of a non-clinical analogue sample. 
However, as discussed in the methodology section (Chapter 2, Section 2.2, pp. 66-69) 
clinical and non-clinical populations have a qualitatively similar experience of worry, 
thereby offering justification for the adequacy of non-clinical samples for research 
into worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). Additionally, we 
examined a relatively large sample and attempted to create distinct groups of 
individuals with high and low levels of worry by taking an extreme groups approach, 
rather than employing a median split.  
It could be argued that examining linear relationships may have been a more 
appropriate way of analyzing the current date. However, even when correlations were 
examined (see Appendix J, p. 378) the results were not significant. As neither the 
linear relationships nor the extreme group analyses produced significant findings, we 
can be confident in the lack of significant findings. Furthermore, according to 
G*power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) we had sufficient power (80% power) at an alpha 
level of 0.05 to predict a small effect size (0.25). Therefore, any effect that was not 
observed in the current findings is also unlikely to have clinical relevance. 
Nonetheless, the results need to be replicated in a clinical sample of individuals who 
meet criteria for generalised anxiety disorder before we can have confidence in their 
wider applicability.  
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Further exploration across a broader age range, as well as exploring gender 
differences more thoroughly, would also be beneficial. Both rational and experiential 
processing decrease with age and the current sample consisted of predominantly 
young adults (Sladek et al., 2010). In addition, although Study 1 had a sufficiently 
large sample size to explore gender differences, the lack of gender related findings in 
Study 1 and the low ratio of male participants in the remaining studies meant that 
gender was not further examined. Gender differences with regard to the study of 
attentional biases and attentional processes towards emotional stimuli in individuals 
with high and low levels of worry have been largely overlooked (Sass et al., 2010). 
However, significant gender differences are apparent in relation to prevalence rates of 
anxiety disorders (McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011), as well as observed 
differences between men and women in attentional processes towards emotional 
stimuli (Sass et al., 2010; Tran, Lamplmayr, Pintzinger, & Pfabigan, 2013).  
The final limitation with regard to the current project is that essentially the 
same sample of participants was examined; all participants completed Study 1 and a 
subsample of those participants completed Studies 2-4. This was necessary as we 
wished to examine multiple worry related processes simultaneously. Thus, the testing 
protocol was such that it required the same participants to be individually run through 
the various tasks; data was collected from one participant at a time and took a total of 
two and a half hours (over two testing sessions) per participant. Due to the use of the 
same sample the generalizability of the findings are questionable. In addition, it 
cannot be ruled out that the limited significant findings are related to the specific 
sample employed. Further research with both clinical and non-clinical populations 
would help determine the generalizability of the findings from the sample included in 
the current project. 
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7.2.2 Task parameters 
A range of limitations with regard to various tasks employed in the project 
must also be acknowledged. 
7.2.2.1 Self-report measures 
Despite the symptom and processing style measures being found to have good 
psychometric properties (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5, pp. 73-78 for further 
discussion), responses to self-report measures given by individuals high in worry are 
limited to an individual’s perceptions, which are open to distortion (Eng & Heimberg, 
2006). It must also be noted that the observation of two thinking styles (as observed in 
studies employing processing style questionnaires) does not necessarily provide 
evidence for dual-processes arising from two distinct cognitive systems. Furthermore, 
processing style questionnaires present reports of participants’ perceived rather than 
preferred processing styles.  
7.2.2.2 Experimental measures 
Although, overall, the use of experimental measures was a strength of the 
current project, it was a limitation that the attentional control scale (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002) was not included in the questionnaire battery. Previous studies have 
predominantly employed the attentional control scale (ACS) to examine the 
relationship of attentional control to anxiety/worry, as well as its moderating role 
between attentional bias and anxiety/worry. Therefore, the lack of significant findings 
with regard to attentional control may be due to the methodology employed (i.e., not 
using the ACS). Such suggestions are supported by the data presented in Study 2, 
which showed that significant findings related to rationality and reasoning on self-
report measures did not reflect performance deficits per se. Therefore, it could be that 
previous findings with regard to the ACS are reporting findings based on beliefs about 
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attentional control rather than actual attentional control abilities (Fergus et al., 2012; 
Spada et al., 2010). It would have been beneficial to clarify this by incorporating the 
ACS in the current project. 
Overall, with regard to the experimental measures used in the current studies, 
the failure to replicate previous findings may reflect limitations inherent in implicit 
reaction time measures of behaviour. Despite their limitations, implicit measures are 
perceived as not being so open to biased responding, such as social desirability, and 
the lack of requirement for introspection or accessing of mental states beyond self-
awareness. However, LeBel and Paunonen (2011) have raised the general issue of 
replicability and relatively poor psychometric properties across implicit tasks (Fazio 
& Olson, 2003), including poor convergent validity between implicit measures 
(Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). There has also been suggestion that implicit 
measures access momentary personal and contextual factors. These are argued to 
impact on the ability to replicate findings (Barden et al., 2004; LeBel & Paunonen, 
2011), and may explain the poor test re-test reliability that is often observed 
(particularly with relation reaction time measures; Schmukle, 2005). For example, the 
current literature on attentional biases largely incorporates studies examining RT 
measures of attention (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), yet RT measures vary 
considerably as a function of physiological, hormonal, emotional and other changes in 
the respondent (LeBel & Paunonen, 2011).  
7.2.2.3 External factors 
A combination of both internal (e.g., participant motivation) and external (e.g.,  
complexity of the task) factors have been found to impact participant performance on 
experimental tasks such as the antisaccade task (Berggren et al., 2013). For example, 
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with regard to antisaccade task performance, tasks with a high perceptual load that 
fully occupy an individual's attentional resources, yet are not so demanding that they 
deplete attentional control, reduce observed differences between high and low trait-
anxious individuals (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011b; Basten et al., 2011; Bishop, 2009; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007; Osinsky et al., 2012; Pilar 
Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2012). Moderate to high task demands allow anxious 
individuals to engage increased effort and additional cognitive resources in order to 
compensate for any potential deficits in inhibitory control (Ansari & Derakshan, 
2011a; Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Osinsky et al., 2012). Due to the task 
employed in the current project being more complex than those predominantly 
reported in the literature (i.e., due to threat/neutral stimuli and the presence of a task-
switching component, with antisaccade and prosaccade tasks presented 
simultaneously), it could be that the lack of findings are a result of moderate to high 
task demands leading participants with high levels of worry to engage in increased 
effort and to utilize additional cognitive resources. 
Task demands also affect the impact of emotional stimuli (King & Schaefer, 
2011; MacNamara et al., 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). Due to their potential 
implications for wellbeing (Clarke & Johnstone, 2013) emotional stimuli are 
preferentially and automatically processed, at times without the need for attention 
(e.g., Morris et al., 1998; 2001; Dolan and Vuilleumier, 2003). However, cognitive 
load can act to reduce the salience of threat stimuli and eliminate response differences 
between emotional and neutral stimuli (King & Schaefer, 2011; Pessoa, Kastner, & 
Ungerleider, 2002; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). Specifically, the current studies used 
tasks that examined various aspects (e.g., task switching in the antisaccade task; 
masked and non-masked stimuli with a varied time course for stimuli presentation in 
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the dot probe task) and it is possible that the cumulative effects of the various tasks, 
not just the tasks themselves, contributed to create high load conditions. In the 
presence of high, but not low load conditions, threat information is processed but 
actively prevented from interfering with performance by engagement of top-down 
regulatory mechanisms and increased cognitive effort (Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; 
Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). The impact of task load is supported by experimental 
(King & Schaefer, 2011; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009) and neuroimaging (MacNamara 
et al., 2011) studies. Therefore, further research that more directly tests and controls 
for the impact of task load, particularly when multiple tasks are presented is required. 
Questions also exist around the robustness of the psychometric properties of 
experimental reaction time tasks (Schmukle, 2005). For example, using differences in 
RTs to measure cognitive biases has, in general, been argued to be unreliable 
(Borkenau et al., 2010). Different findings have been observed with the dot probe task 
between RT measures and more direct measures such as ERPs and eyetracking data 
(Kappenman et al., 2014). For example, where no evidence of attentional bias is 
apparent with RT data, eyetracking data on the same task has been found to show 
clear attentional bias for threat (Kappenman et al., 2014). Recent findings suggest that 
a lack of significant findings with RT based measures may be a result of the failure to 
map and analyze the dynamic temporal nature of emotional attention, which is a 
process that is expressed repeatedly and continuously over time (Zvielli, Bernstein, & 
Koster, 2014a). For example, Zvielli et al. (2014a) found that traditional measures of 
attentional bias (as used in this study) had very low levels of reliability and argued 
that this was a result of the failure to accurately capture attentional bias across time. 
Their findings demonstrated that attentional bias is a dynamic process expressed as 
shifts toward or away from relevant stimuli in phasic bursts over time (Zvielli et al., 
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2014a), as opposed to the previously held conceptualization whereby attentional bias 
was thought to be static and stable (e.g., Mogg and Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Eye-tracking apparatus has successfully demonstrated 
the tendency of some participants on the dot probe task to ignore the presented stimuli 
and to instead search only when the probe appears (Bradley et al., 2000). Therefore, it 
is possible that due to the “snapshot” of attentional bias recorded in RT measures on 
the current study, the participants may have engaged in such a strategy, which may 
have obscured the presence of attentional bias in our sample (Staugaard, 2009).  
7.2.2.4 Internal factors 
Internal factors might also have had a pervasive impact across the tasks 
employed in the current project. High levels of motivation have been found to 
increase the likelihood that anxious individuals will employ compensatory strategies 
to modulate their performance in the presence of anxiety (Hayes et al., 2009). 
Research examining cognitive control in relation to worry has demonstrated that 
although worry creates cognitive interference it also has a specific motivational 
function, whereby increased effort maintains or improves performance (e.g., on tasks 
examining updating, inhibition, and shifting) through the employment of 
compensatory strategies (Visu-Petra et al., 2013). Therefore, under the right 
conditions, such as in when completing more complex, higher load tasks (see Chapter 
5, p. 136 for further details), individuals with higher levels worry can potentially 
match or outperform their less anxious counterparts.  
As this research included multiple tasks and was completed over two testing 
sessions (total of 2.5 hours) it is possible that participant fatigue may have impacted 
upon the findings. The failure to replicate commonly reported findings on all of the 
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tasks employed could be explained by fatigue, which may have led participants to 
respond in an automated way, thereby resulting in non-significant findings on all the 
implicit measures. Additionally, some authors have argued that the mixed results 
reported in studies on attentional bias in anxious participants may be accounted for by 
cognitive factors, such as attentional control, which have considerable impact on 
biased attentional processing of threatening information (Cisler & Koster, 2010). For 
example, low attentional control would lead participants with high levels of worry to 
be more easily distracted by both internal (e.g., worrying thoughts) and external (e.g., 
threatening stimuli) factors than their non-anxious counterparts (Beckwe, Deroost, 
Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). However, the 
current findings offered no support for this suggestion because no relationship was 
found between attentional control and levels of worry, or for attentional control 
moderating the relationship between attentional bias and worry. 
7.2.2.5 The role of state versus trait worry  
 As mentioned previously in relation to Study 2 (Chapter 4, p. 119), the 
current studies did not contain a worry induction component. The results from the 
self-report questionnaires on processing style demonstrate that participants report 
different results when asked how they respond in situations in which they worry, 
compared to how they respond more generally. Overall, it is possible the current 
findings reflect the absence of worry with regard to its direct impact on task 
performance. For example, although the experimental tasks were carefully selected 
based on previous research it is possible that the hypothetical nature of these problems 
(e.g., with regard to the reasoning tasks) and the lack of a component inducing worry 
(on implicit tasks) meant that they failed to elicit a disruption to processes which may 
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occur in real-life worry episodes. To date, studies have predominantly focused upon 
trait worry at the cost of more subjective measures of worry. However, Oathes et al. 
(2010) found that PSWQ scores were not correlated with measures of threat vigilance, 
which highlighted the importance of worry inductions for promoting threat bias; 
induced worry exacerbates worry related findings with responses to threat being faster 
due to facilitation by the presence of worry (McKay, 2005; Oathes et al., 2010). 
Salemink and Wiers (2012) also found that state, but not trait, worry impacted 
findings, in terms of attentional control; attentional control moderated the relationship 
between state, but not trait, worry and interpretive bias. 
Emotions are multifactorial in nature and are made up of subjective feelings, 
physiological and neurological responses, as well as cognitive processes and action 
tendencies (Scherer, 2000). Therefore, examining processes when participants are in 
an active worry phase would be beneficial. Future research should include 
methodologies that actively induce worry in order to determine the impact of active 
periods of worry on the variables of interest.  
7.2.2.6 Stimuli 
A further potential limitation with regard to the experimental tasks examining  
attentional control, and attentional and interpretation biases relates to the stimuli 
employed. It is possibly difficult to identify sufficiently threatening stimuli as GAD is 
not associated with any specific target of anxiety, with the nature of individuals’ 
worry concerns being both diffuse and idiosyncratic (Craske et al., 1989; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006; Roemer et al., 1997; Salters-Pedneault, Tull, & Roemer, 2004). 
Therefore, the stimuli employed in the current study may not have sufficiently 
reflected individual participant worry themes to elicit the hypothesized responses. 
!-215- !
However, as the current studies employed well-documented methodologies (including 
employing stimuli found to elicit biased responses) that have been used frequently, 
and reported significant findings, the lack of replication remains unexpected. To 
address these limitations, future research would benefit from employing threatening 
stimuli generated to be specifically relevant for each individual participant, as 
individuals have been found to demonstrate more extreme reactions to such stimuli 
(Oathes, Siegle, & Ray, 2011; Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003; 
Staugaard, 2009). 
7.3 Project Strengths 
These methodological limitations notwithstanding the studies had a number of 
strengths. This was the first time that the antisaccade task had been employed with 
both threatening stimuli and a task-switching component in order to examine 
participants with high and low levels of worry. Second, the presentation of a dot 
probe task with valenced stimuli across such a range of time courses was novel. Third, 
although erroneous information processing is implicated in the development and 
maintenance of chronic worry (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hirsch et al., 2011; Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012; Mathews et al., 1989), to our knowledge, this was the first attempt 
at comparing individual differences in processing style - as characterised by CEST - 
between individuals with high and low levels of worry. In addition, a strength of this 
study included the substantial sample size, which was larger than those employed in 
the majority of previous studies using similar experimental paradigms. As discussed 
previously (see Section 7.2.1, p. 206), according to G*power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) 
the substantial size of the sample recruited for the current project resulted in sufficient 
power (80% power) at an alpha level of 0.05 to predict a small effect size (0.25). 
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Thus, one can be fairly confident that an effect that was not observed in the current 
findings is also unlikely to have clinical relevance.  
A further strength of the project was the use of experimental paradigms. For 
example, the current results corroborate and expand previous findings by 
demonstrating - with the use of behavioural and verbal reasoning task methodologies 
rather than self-report questionnaires - that worry is unrelated to problem-solving and 
reasoning skills per se (Davey, 1994b; Ladouceur et al., 1998). In addition, previous 
studies examining regulatory control processes and their moderating role in the 
relationship between attentional bias and anxiety/worry have predominantly 
employed a questionnaire of regulatory control – the attentional control scale 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The reliance on self-report measures has consistently 
been stipulated as a limitation to this area of enquiry and it has been argued that the 
current self-report measure examines beliefs about attentional control rather than 
providing an index of actual attentional control abilities (Fergus et al., 2012; Spada et 
al., 2010). 
Lastly, the concurrent examination of attentional control and biases in 
attention and interpretation via experimental measures was a particular strength of the 
current study. To date, research has tended to focus on the examination of only one of 
these variables as they relate to worry, although theory implicates a range of 
processes (Teachman et al., 2007). Despite the convincing evidence supporting 
theoretical suggestions of the role of attention and interpretation in the development 
and maintenance of worry, these variables have rarely been examined simultaneously, 
particularly in an adult population (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Rozenman et al., 
2014). As the current study evaluated attentional bias over a variety of presentation 
times (that covered early and late stages of processing) it also offered the opportunity 
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to explore not only the aspects of attention most related to interpretation bias, but the 
variety of possible effects of attention with regard to worry more generally (Ouimet et 
al., 2012; Zvielli et al., 2014b). Understanding the stages of processing that are related 
to attentional bias, as well as the relationship between attentional and interpretation 
biases is important as it has the potential to improve our understanding of the 
processes involved in worry, and to ultimately advance diagnosis and inform 
intervention (Beck & Clark, 1997; Cisler et al., 2009). Overall, although the current 
study presented limited significant findings, it aimed to overcome a number of 
limitations that exist in the extant literature in regard to worry/GAD. To this end, an 
attempt was made to synthesize existing knowledge regarding worry and its processes 
and to incorporate theories of normative behaviour (dual-process models) into clinical 
models with the aim of furthering knowledge.  
7.4 Theoretical Implications 
Ouimet et al. (2009) have argued that the application of dual-process theory to 
anxiety disorders might lead to important theoretical developments by clarifying the 
relationship between voluntary and involuntary processes involved in anxiety and 
worry (Ouimet et al., 2009). Individuals with relatively strong automatic processes 
(experiential system) and weak regulatory control (rational system) are thought to be 
particularly vulnerable to develop (and then maintain) psychopathology, such as 
worry (Epstein, 1992; Pacini et al., 1998; Salemink & Wiers, 2012). Although the 
findings in the current study offer some support to this notion with a relationship 
observed between processing style and symptom scores, overall, the findings did not 
support the dual-processing models. 
In accounting for the present findings of a dominant situational rational 
processing style in participants with high levels of worry, both Wells’ and Borkovec’s 
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models are supported, as they stipulate that worry is a cognitive activity which 
individuals employ as a coping strategy. The pattern of individual processing style 
observed in individuals with high levels of worry appears to reflect the future 
orientated cognitive nature of worry, rather than the emotional symptoms which 
accompany worry. Overall, the current findings related to processing style emphasise 
the importance of considering both situational and dispositional processing style, 
particularly when exploring the relationship of processing style to psychopathology 
(Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes, Witteman, & van den Bercken, 2009). These 
findings also clearly highlight the importance of context, as self-reported differences 
were recorded between situational and dispositional processing style. Therefore, 
taking into account the impact of both internal and external context in relation to both 
perception and behaviour is an important consideration in future research examining 
worry. For example, as discussed in the project limitations, the importance of 
undertaking research with an induced worry component would be beneficial as the 
current findings suggest this would more accurately capture the experience and 
performance of individuals with high levels of worry. 
The findings with regard to relationships between a situational rational 
processing style and higher levels of worry are consistent with current of models of 
worry, which stipulate worry to be a cognitive strategy in which people attempt to 
cope and solve the worrying situation (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Davey, 1994a). 
However, overall, there was limited support for the tenets of CEST. Cognitive 
Experiential Self Theory would argue that individuals who both perceive themselves 
to have a less rational disposition and to engage in more experiential processing 
would be most at risk for pathological levels of worry. CEST assumes that the 
dominance of one system over the other is predictive of reasoning, problem-solving 
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performance, and non-normative responding, as well as being associated with 
psychopathology (Burns & D'Zurilla, 1999; Claes et al., 2009). However, the results 
of this study do not support this contention. That is, there was no relationship 
observed between worry, processing style, and reasoning scores, which, thereby, 
highlights the limited applicability of CEST in accounting for worry.  
The discrepancy observed in the current project between self-reported 
rationality and actual performance on reasoning tasks has significant implications for 
research into worry. It highlights the fact that self-report is an individual’s assessment 
of their abilities, which are influenced by the perceptions and biases that they hold. 
Therefore, the biases common to those who worry (e.g., increased self-doubt, lack of 
self-efficacy in problem-solving) are likely to influence their judgments in reporting 
on their cognitive abilities and deficits. Hence, the current results strongly argue for 
the importance of beliefs and self-perceptions in understanding the development, 
maintenance, and treatment of worry (Davey, 1994a; Dugas et al., 1995; Shewchuk et 
al., 2000). The findings also argue for the use of experimental paradigms to directly 
assess cognitive processes, rather than simply asking participants to characterize their 
own cognitive processes. The lack of association between self-reported processing 
style and cognitive biases in the current study suggest that implicit cognitive biases of 
attention and interpretation, that have been found to be present in pathological worry 
(e.g., Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), may 
be too qualitatively different from belief related biases and heuristic thinking to be 
able to draw parallels between these processes.  
The current project also highlights that, unlike the content of thoughts and 
beliefs that are relatively easy to assess by explicit enquiry, there are significant 
difficulties inherent in examining information processing biases.  For example, in 
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terms of attentional bias and the dot probe task, the lack of findings in the current 
study calls into focus recent evidence for the questionable psychometric properties of 
the dot probe task (Cisler et al., 2009; Dear, Sharpe, Nicholas, & Refshauge, 2011; 
Oathes et al., 2011; Schmukle, 2005; Zvielli et al., 2014a; Zvielli et al., 2014b). 
Schmukle (2005) were the first to examine the internal consistency and retest 
reliability of the dot probe task, employing both words and pictorial (scenes) stimuli. 
They concluded that the inconsistent findings, particularly with non-clinical samples, 
rendered the dot probe task an unreliable measure of attentional allocation. The 
psychometric properties have since been examined with regard to facial stimuli, and 
although facial stimuli were more robust than pictorial scenes or word based stimuli, 
no stable relationship was found between attentional bias scores for individual 
participants across testing sessions (Staugaard, 2009). However, as a group anxious 
compared to non-anxious participants demonstrate consistent vigilance for emotional 
faces reflecting research that facial emotion captures attention. Research examining 
the dynamics of emotional attention in time, as well as the processes that influence it 
(e.g., attentional control), require further attention in order to permit a more accurate 
understanding of the nature of attentional bias, as well as ultimately advancing 
intervention (Zvielli et al., 2014a).!
 Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) cognitive model of pathological worry proposed 
that negative thoughts and worry arise from an interaction between involuntary 
processes (e.g., habitual biases of attention and interpretation) favoring threat content, 
and insufficient or misdirected voluntary resources, such as attentional control. 
Therefore, accounting for individual differences in attentional control is argued to 
have implications for information processing biases and development of 
psychopathology such as worry emerging (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Salemink & 
!-221- !
Wiers, 2012). The theoretical assumption that worry impairs attentional control is 
based on the view that there are two attentional control systems: a voluntary or goal-
driven system (i.e., influenced by individual goals) and an involuntary or stimulus-
driven system (i.e., influenced by salient stimuli; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Miller 
& Cohen, 2001). Recent dual-process models (e.g., Ouimet et al., 2009) propose that 
regulatory control processes play an important role in psychopathology by moderating 
the impact of information processing biases. Although the two systems are interacting 
(Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001),  Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo’s 
(2007) attentional control theory suggests that worry is particularly attention 
demanding and, consequently, consumes more voluntary attentional resources 
required to control it. As such, worry impairs attentional control by enhancing the 
influence of bottom-up processes over the more efficient top-down, goal-driven 
processes. It is the combination of low attentional control and symptomatology that 
are suggested to be particularly problematic (Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011; Schoorl et al., 
2014); higher levels of attentional control facilitate disengagement from threat, which 
in turn may improve emotional well-being (Fergus et al., 2012). Therefore, greater 
attentional control may act as a protective function to increase functioning of top-
down control processes to reduce negative emotional arousal leading to enhanced 
engagement (i.e., attentional bias) and habituation to anxiety provoking stimuli 
(Bardeen et al., 2014; Fergus et al., 2012).  
Despite such theoretical suggestions, the impact of attentional control on the 
relationship between attentional bias and worry has received little attention. However, 
preliminary findings highlight the moderating role of attentional control on attentional 
biases in anxiety/worry (Beckwe et al., 2014; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Overall, the 
current findings were not consistent with these preliminary studies demonstrating a 
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link between attentional control and worry, which argues for individual differences in 
top-down attentional control being of considerable importance in the expression of 
attentional bias in anxious psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2008; Schoorl et al., 2014; 
Stefanopoulou et al., 2014). However, the current study was the first to use the 
antisaccade task to explore attentional control in relation to worry in an adult 
population. Despite reaction time tasks becoming increasingly popular, previous 
studies examining regulatory control processes and their moderating role in anxiety 
(e.g., PTSD and trait anxiety) and attentional bias have predominantly employed a 
questionnaire of regulatory control – the attentional control scale (Bardeen et al., 
2014; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Therefore, although the current experimental 
methodology impoved on previously employed self-report measure of attentional 
control, the lack of current findings may have arisen due to limitations inherent in 
experimental tasks.  
With regard to experimental measures, findings are often impacted by an 
interaction between situational and personality factors (Visu-Petra et al., 2013). For 
example, in relation to cognitive control in worry, Derryberry and Reed (2002) 
propose that individual differences in anxiety and coping result from the interplay of 
automatic and strategic processes, which affect anxious individuals’ capacity to use 
voluntary attention to enact control in the effort to cope. It is possible that individuals 
in this study, although endorsing GAD symptomatology, applied attentional resources 
in a manner which supported their coping. Thus attentional control may relate to a 
processing style rather than a processing deficit (Bishop, 2009). Derryberry and Reed 
(2002) found that anxious “good attenders” demonstrated better inhibition to 
dominant response codes than anxious “poor attenders”. Thus, attentional control 
deficits should not be viewed as common to all individuals with GAD, rather one’s 
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capacity to voluntarily control attention in both in general, as well as in specific 
situations will effect perfomance and coping. Therefore, understanding the interplay 
between involuntary and voluntary processes has important implications; individual 
differences in attentional control may serve a protective function and individuals with 
poor attentional control may be those most vulnerable to clinical disorders (Clarke & 
Johnstone, 2013). However, good attentional control may contribute to anxiety in 
circumstances when effortful attention facilitates maladaptive coping strategies, such 
as when efforts are made to to control uncontrollable situations  (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002).  
Overall, the lack of significant findings in this thesis may have implications 
with regard to the administration of multiple tasks. To date, the majority of research 
examining attention and interpretation biases is based on single task studies. Within 
each of the task components there are limitations such as order effects. For example, 
one study observed interpretive bias only in the first half of the task (Mogg et al., 
1994). Therefore, such effects may have been compounded with the use of multiple 
tasks in the current studies. However, in order to test for the applicability of dual-
process models, and cognitive models more generally, we require the capacity to 
simultaneously examine a variety of processes by administering multiple tasks. Future 
research that addresses such challenges is vital in order to advance our current 
understanding of the processes involved in worry. 
The potential benefits of dual-process theories should not be overlooked, 
especially as they have the potential to offer detailed, specific, and integrative 
frameworks from which to study cognitive biases in relation to worry. Additionally, 
dual-process models have the potential to serve as a guide to enable the development 
of more effective intervention, as well as to increasing our insight and understanding 
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of chronic worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Ouimet et al., 2009). Although the 
current study presented limited findings, it aimed to address the current limitations 
with regard to research into worry and GAD. Synthesizing existing knowledge 
regarding worry and its processes, and attempting to incorporate theories of normative 
behaviour (dual-process models) into clinical models, are important to furthering 
knowledge (Koerner, 2014). Foa and Kozak (1997) call for a ‘scientific synchrony’ 
across disciplines in order to progress cognitive-behavioural therapy, which is 
suggested to be hindered by the current oversight of ‘cross-fertilization’ between 
clinical and experimental psychology (Koerner, 2014). Therefore, attempting to 
address such concerns is a necessity in moving the worry/GAD research agenda 
forward (Koerner, 2014).  
7.5 Clinical Implications 
Until further research is undertaken to examine the variables in the current 
project in a clinical population with chronic worry, the clinical implications of the 
current project must remain tentative. However, the findings suggest that in terms of 
treating individuals who present for treatment of worry and GAD, several factors may 
need to be considered. First, when faced with a situation in which they worry, 
individuals with high levels of worry perceive themselves to engage in a more rational 
processing style than those with low levels of worry. This highlights the cognitive 
nature of worry, whereby worry is a cognitive strategy that individuals engage in to 
cope with future potential problems (thoughts/doubts). It needs to be understood that 
the perceptions of processing style were not supported by performance on the 
reasoning tasks, with an obvious discrepancy between perceptions and actual 
observable behaviours. This may indicate that individuals high in worry rely on a 
particular form of rational processing to try and solve the problem that is at the source 
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of their worry. For example, previous research has shown that during worry episodes 
the very nature of worry requires increased engagement in problem-solving attempts, 
which rely on rational processing (Fong et al., 1986; Szabo & Lovibond, 2006), as 
well as automatic biases in anxiety disorders requiring cognitive resources rather than 
being capacity-free (McNally, 1995). Not only does it call into question the accuracy 
of a person’s assessment of themselves and their abilities, it focuses attention on the 
influence of perceptions and biases that are intricately linked to the beliefs an 
individual holds about themselves, others, and the world.   
Therefore, in line with more recent meta-analyses and randomised control 
trials of successful treatment outcomes, current treatments should focus on cognitive 
based therapies (e.g., cognitive threapy, meta-cognitive therapy; Cuijpers et al., 2014; 
van der Heiden et al., 2012; Wells & King, 2006). Currently, the gold standard 
treatment for worry and GAD is still Cognitive and Behavioral Therapy (CBT; Arch 
& Craske, 2008), and, it is argued that treatment should focus on the role of beliefs 
with regard to perceptions of rationality, rather than other standard Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy treatment components such as problem-solving (Cuijpers et al., 
2014; Durham et al., 2004; van der Heiden et al., 2012; Wells & King, 2006). If 
future research confirmed the applicability of dual-process models, these processes 
could be targeted. For example, although interpretation biases may occur rapidly 
and/or outside awareness, cognitive intervention aimed at developing strategic 
cognition to intervene so one has the capability to explore the situation thoroughly, 
rather than responding on the initial interpretation, would be beneficial. Furthermore, 
educating individuals about the involuntary nature of their anxiety related responses 
may also be useful in supporting individuals to understand why they feel anxious 
when logically they are able to state no known reason for their worry (Teachman & 
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Woody, 2004). Overall, the areas of enquiry undertaken in the current project are 
important in order to further our understanding of the processes involved in chronic 
worry so that research can better inform interventions, which, to date, are often 
ineffective in treating chronic worry (Borkovec et al., 2002; Borkovec & Ruscio, 
2001; Brown et al., 1994; Gould et al., 2004; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006). 
7.6 Future Research 
 Future research should continue to focus on examining the distinction between 
automatic and strategic processes within the same sample in order to further explore 
the theoretical suggestion of the applicability of dual-process theory in worry (Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; McNally, 1995; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
However, the tendency for oversimplification of current dual-process models, which 
are argued to suggest two overly separate systems (Keren & Schul, 2009), needs to be 
considered. Therefore, it would also be beneficial to examine the applicability of 
multilevel, interactive and iterative models (e.g., Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van 
Bavel, 2007), which are not restricted to unidirectional sequences. It should also be 
noted that overlaps have been observed between worry, and other negative cognitive-
affect phenomenon (e.g., rumination; Beckwe et al., 2014; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2002). Therefore, although the current study did not examine 
other measures of negative repetitive thinking, it would be beneficial for future 
research to assess to what degree the relationships examined in the current body of 
research are unique to worry. 
In addition, although it has been well established that worry is automatic in 
nature, and that maladaptive schemata and implicit and explicit information 
processing biases are clearly implicated (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Bradley 
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et al., 1999; Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews et 
al., 1989; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1993; Mogg et al., 1992; 
Mogg et al., 2000; Teachman et al., 2007), the clinical applications of these findings 
have been limited (Teachman & Woody, 2004). Future research could focus on the 
benefits of such findings in terms of their potential to enhance both assessment and 
intervention (Palfai & Wagner, 2004; Teachman & Woody, 2004). For example, 
despite CBT being the most validated treatment, the mechanisms guiding successful 
treatment remain elusive and many clients continue to receive minimal benefits 
(Borkovec et al., 2002; Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Brown et al., 1994; Gould et al., 
2004; Hofmann & Smits, 2008; Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006). Therefore, examining 
implicit cognition may only offer a greater understanding of the mechanisms guiding 
successful treatment, but also provide additional tools to respond to those who have 
minimal treatment success (Teachman & Woody, 2004).  
To this end, there are several aspects that would be beneficial for future 
research to focus upon. First, examining a clinical sample is important. Second, as 
variation in results (e.g., in interpretation bias tasks and attentional control tasks) have 
been found to be linked to levels of state, but not trait anxiety (Salemink et al., 2007a; 
Salemink & Wiers, 2012), inclusion of a worry induction procedure would be 
beneficial. Third, to date, there is no ‘process pure’ measure of information 
processing, with all measures comprising of a mix of multiple distinct automatic and 
strategic processes (Eysenck, 1992; Sherman et al., 2008). Therefore, research that 
continues to untangle the stages of basic cognition within the chain of information 
processing has important implications. Furthermore, it offers the opportunity to better 
understand the mechanisms underlying worry so that clinical interventions can 
continue to be developed and refined (Rozenman et al., 2014). For example, 
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employing cognitive bias modification procedures for both interpretations (CMB-I) 
and attention (CMB-A) would be beneficial. These methodologies allow for the 
manipulation of factors implicated in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders (Amir & Taylor, 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), and have had some 
success in demonstrating differential emotional vulnerability under conditions of 
heightened stress (e.g., Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008).  
The CBM-A trains attention away from threat related stimuli, and can also be 
used to train attention towards threat related material to provide experimental 
comparisons, whilst the CBM-I trains interpretation of emotionally ambiguous 
material in a negative or positive way in order to induce a negative or positive bias. 
Previous findings have demonstrated that experimentally manipulating, for example, 
interpretation of ambiguous information can causally influence worry and related 
outcomes (e.g., negative thought intrusions; e.g., Hayes et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
Interpretive training has been shown to alter both interpretive and attentional biases 
(Amir et al., 2010) and, thereby, reduce trait and state anxiety in those with GAD 
(Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011). Further exploration of such 
findings might offer more insight into dual-process models of anxiety which propose 
that information processing biases work together (e.g., Ouimet et al., 2009), as well as 
those models which suggest the biases stem from a common mechanism to maintain 
symptoms (e.g., Bishop, 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Ouimet et al., 2009). 
Such research has the potential to reveal possible determinants of threat-related biases 
(Salemink et al., 2013), which in turn may lead to information about mechanisms 
underlying worry. Understanding the mechanisms underlying worry would offer the 
ability to modify them, thereby affecting symptoms of psychopathology.  
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Addressing the many methodological limitations that beset this research 
literature (see discussion in limitation section) is also necessary, such as employing 
eye-tracking and neurophysiological (e.g., event-related potential studies), rather than 
reaction time (RT) methodologies on the dot-probe task. Eye-tracking methodologies 
are becoming increasingly popular as they allow for a direct and continuous 
measurement of covert visual attention (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Eye-tracking 
and neurophysiological methodologies demonstrate more robust findings than manual 
RTs for several reasons. Namely, they have the ability to more directly examine 
attentional responses to threat and, therefore, allocation of attention does not have to 
be inferred. In addition, the distal relation between key presses, which may be open to 
confounding effects, do not have to be taken into account (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). In 
terms of confounding effects, response execution has been found to be susceptible to 
disruption effects that are particularly problematic in highly emotional participants or 
when using emotion provoking stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). Furthermore, eye-
tracking and neurophysiological methodologies offer the opportunity to examine 
multiple timeframes in one continuous trial rather that the “snapshot” nature of RT 
measures whereby data is restricted to a single time point within a trial, which 
imposes limits on the ability to effectively and efficiently examine dynamic 
attentional processes (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Kappenman et al., 2014; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006).  
Further research exploring attentional control would also be beneficial due to 
its potential capacity to serve a protective role, whereby greater attentional control 
allows an individual to remain in a threatening situation in order to facilitate 
habituation rather than engaging in less adaptive regulation strategies such as emotion 
avoidance (Bardeen et al., 2014; Fergus et al., 2012). In addition, further research 
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with experimental measures that include a worry induction methodology would be 
useful to further clarify the moderating role of attentional control in cognitive biases 
in individuals with high levels of worry, and psychopathology more generally 
(Bardeen et al., 2014). 
Lastly, as discussed with regard to theoretical implications, we require the 
capacity to simultaneously examine a variety of processes by administering multiple 
tasks in order to test for the applicability of dual-process models, and cognitive 
models more generally. The specific combinations of the tasks and their novel 
components may have generated a constellation of previously unexamined factors 
and, therefore, an important aim of future research is to addresses the apparent 
challenges in administering multiple tasks in order to advance our current 
understanding of the processes involved in worry. The current findings suggest that it 
might be beneficial to present shorter tasks in several separate testing sessions. Future 
research that effectively examines multiple tasks in one sample is vital to synthesize 
existing knowledge regarding worry and to advance our current understanding of the 
processes involved in worry (Koerner, 2014). 
7.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In summary, despite the theoretical promise (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; 
Ouimet et al., 2009) of the applicability of dual-process models to the processes 
involved in chronic worry, research exploring dual-process models has been limited. 
The current project attempted to address this gap in the literature with four studies 
that assessed attention and interpretation biases, attentional control, reasoning, and 
individual differences in perceived processing style and their relationship to worry. In 
addition, the current studies also attempted to address a gap in the literature and test 
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multiple processes, as opposed to previous studies, which have tended to focus on the 
examination of one aspect (e.g., attention bias, interpretation bias, or reasoning). 
Across the studies, symptom scores were only found to be related to higher levels of a 
situational rational processing style, and with regard to implicit measures there was a 
failure to replicate previous findings, with no significant worry related findings 
observed. Unfortunately this meant that a full structural model that incorporated all 
these processes could not be tested. The results highlight the discrepancy between 
self-report and experimental measures, and bring into focus the role of beliefs and 
self-perceptions in relation to worry. The findings are discussed with regard to 
methodological limitations, for example, limitations inherent in implicit measures of 
psychological processes, which may have been compounded in the current project by 
the administration of a series of various tasks. Despite the lack of worry related 
findings, the importance of the capacity to simultaneously examine a variety of 
processes - by administering multiple tasks - is highlighted in order to test for the 
applicability of dual-process models, and cognitive models more generally. Future 
research focusing on such challenges is vital in order to synthesize existing 
knowledge regarding worry, as well as to advance our current understanding of the 
processes involved in worry (Koerner, 2014). This ultimately has clinical implications 
and may support progress in improving the insufficient current treatments for 
pathological worry (i.e., Cognitive Behavioural Therapy), which are suggested to be 
hindered by the current oversight of ‘cross-fertilization’ between clinical and 
experimental psychology (Foa & Kozak, 1997; Koerner, 2014). 
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16 February 2010 
 
Associate Professor Caroline Hunt  
School of psychology 
The University of Sydney 
Email: caroline@psych.usyd.edu.au 
 
 
Dear Associate Professor Hunt  
 
Title:   An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized 
Anxiety 
Protocol No.:  12374 
 
Your request to modify the above application was considered by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee (HREC) Executive at its meeting on 12 February 2010 and the following has been 
approved:  
 
1. Study 2 and 3 of the project are to be amended. Participants who score high/low on the 
DASS or GADQ-IV will be recruited through the mass screening procedure administered at 
the beginning of each academic year by the School of Psychology. Participants will 
participate in a 2-Part study that takes a total of 3 hours over 2 testing sessions, with 3 
credit points being given for participation. 
2. Combining study 2 and 3 will require only 50 participants, rather than the 100 initially 
approved. 
 
The Committee found that there were no ethical objections to the modifications and therefore 
recommends approval to proceed.   
 
Chief  Investigator  /  Supervisor’s  responsibilities  to  ensure  that: 
 
1. All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 
hours for clinical trials/interventional research. 
 
2. All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should 
be reported to the HREC as soon as possible. 
 
3. All changes to the protocol must be approved by the HREC before continuation of the 
research project. 
 
4. All research participants are to be provided with a Participant Information Statement and 
Consent Form, unless otherwise agreed by the Committee. The following statement must 
appear on the bottom of the Participant Information Statement: Any person with concerns 
or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Deputy Manager, 
Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); + 61 
2 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
5. Copies of all signed Consent Forms must be retained and made available to the HREC on 
request. 
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6. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting 
agencies if requested. 
 
7. A report and a copy of any published material should be provided at the completion of the 
Project. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact the Human Ethics Office should you require further information or 
clarification. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Associate Professor Ian Maxwell 
Chair 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
cc: Sophia Drysdale, Sophia@psych.usyd.edu.au  
 
 
Encl. Approved Online study advertisement 
 Approved Participant Information Statement (Study 1) 
 Approved Participant Information Statement (2nd testing session) 
 Approved Participant Consent Form 
 Approved Debriefing Statement (part 1) 
 Approved Debriefing Statement (part 2) 
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APPENDIX B  
Participant Information and Consent Statement and Debrief Form: Study 1 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT  
(preceded online questionnaire) 
 
An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized Anxiety 
 
 
1) What is the study about? 
 
This research will allow us to investigate the relationship between cognitive styles, worry and 
generalised anxiety. 
 
2) Who is carrying out the study? 
 
This study is being conducted by Sophia Drysdale (as the basis of the degree of Master of 
Science/Doctor of Philosophy) at The University of Sydney under the supervision of 
Associate Professor Caroline Hunt. 
 
3) What does the study involve and how much time will it take? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to fill out questionnaires over the 
web, which will take about 30 minutes. You may also, at a later date, be asked if you are 
willing to participate in other research, which further investigates cognitive styles. This will 
involve completing various tasks that examine the way in which you think about things, as 
well as exploring the way that you attend to information and your unconscious associations to 
pictures. If you are invited back, you will need to attend the School of Psychology at the 
University of Sydney for approximately 60 to 70 minutes. 
 
4) Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
This study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to consent to 
complete the questionnaire. During the research you are free to withdraw at any stage. 
Withdrawing from participation will not penalize or affect you in any way. Submitting a 
completed questionnaire is an indication of your consent to participate in the study. Once you 
have submitted your questionnaire your responses cannot be withdrawn. 
 
5) Will anyone else know the results? 
 
You will be requested to provide an email address so that we can email you a debrief sheet. 
You will also be asked permission for us to email you an invitation to participate in Study 2 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
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or 3 of this project. Once you have completed participation in the study(s), your email address 
will be destroyed and the data will be coded so that your participation in this study will be 
completely anonymous. The program of research will be submitted for the requirements of 
the Master of Science/Doctor of Philosophy and reports will be submitted for publication, but 
individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report (only group data will be 
presented). 
 
6) Will the study benefit me? 
 
While we intend that this research should further the existing knowledge and understanding of 
the relationship between cognitive processing styles, worry and generalised anxiety, it may 
not be of direct benefit to you. 
 
7) Can I tell other people about the study? 
 
It is important that you do not discuss the details of this experiment with fellow students as 
this may impact upon the outcome of the study. 
 
8) What if I require further information? 
 
If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Sophia Drysdale on 
(02) 9351 7479, sophia@psych.usyd.edu.au or Associate Professor Caroline Hunt on (02) 
9351 5446, caroline@psyh.usyd.edu.au 
 
9) What if I have a complaint or concern? 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the 
Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 8627 8176 
(Telephone); (02) 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or human.ethics@usyd.edu.au (Email). 
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DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
 
An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized Anxiety 
 
 Thank you very much for participating in this research. You completed a set 
of questionnaires, two of which measured cognitive processing style: the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), and the Perceived Modes of 
Processing Inventory (Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999). You were also given questionnaires 
that are used to screen individuals with anxiety and depression, and to examine 
levels of worry. 
 
 One area of research that has not received much attention concerns the 
potential impact of a person’s cognitive processing style on the development, and 
maintenance of anxiety. There are at least two partially independent modes of 
thought that contribute to individual processing style: the rational system (RS) that 
operates at the conscious level, and the preconscious experiential system (ES) 
(Epstein et al., 1992; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). This is an exploratory study that 
will help us to understand how processing style might be related to excessive worry 
and anxiety. By investigating this relationship further, we hope to gain insight into 
whether it would be beneficial to study processing style in more depth with clinically 
anxious participants. Ultimately it has the potential to increase our knowledge and 
understanding of generalized anxiety so that more effective treatment programs can 
be tailored for individuals suffering from generalised anxiety disorder. 
 
 If questions in this study have raised any issues that you wish to discuss 
further, please contact either Associate Professor Caroline Hunt at the School of 
Clinical Psychology (see details below) or, alternatively, please feel free to make use 
of one of the following free services: 
  Lifeline    Counselling Service (USYD)  
  Phone: 13 11 14  Phone: (02) 8627 8433  
   
 Because some of the questionnaires in this study are used to screen for 
generalized anxiety disorder and depression, we are obliged to make contact with 
people whose scores indicate referral to support services may be warranted. 
Associate Professor Caroline Hunt will email these people, asking them to contact 
her so that she can discuss the implications of their scores, and support resources 
that are available to them. Though it is recommended, these people are under no 
obligation to make an appointment with Associate Professor Hunt. 
 
 If you wish to know the results of this study, or wish to discuss it further, 
please contact either Sophia Drysdale or Associate Professor Caroline Hunt using 
the details below. 
 
 Thank you again for your time. 
 
Sophia Drysdale (MSc Student)  Associate Professor Caroline Hunt 
sophia@psych.usyd.edu.au   caroline@psych.usyd.edu.au  
      (02) 9351 5446 
 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
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APPENDIX C 
Participant Information and Consent Statement, and Debrief Form:  
Studies 2-4 
 
 
An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized Anxiety 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT: PART 1 
                                 
1) What is the study about? 
This research is investigating the relationship between cognitive styles, worry and 
generalised anxiety. 
 
2) Who is carrying out the study? 
This study is being conducted by Sophia Drysdale (as the basis of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy) at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Caroline Hunt.  
 
3) What does the study involve and how much time will it take? 
This is a 2-Part study. If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
complete four tasks, which we anticipate will take around 90 minutes. The tasks will 
include: 
 
a. An online questionnaire. 
!
 
 
 
Discipline of 
Psychology 
School of 
Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
  
  ABN 15 211 513 464  
  Sophia Drysdale / Ass. Prof. Caroline Hunt 
 DCP/Ph.D Student / Ph.D. 
                                  M.Psychol. (clinical) 
                                 Clinical Training Director 
 
 
Room 153 
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The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 5446 
Facsimile:  +61 2 90365223  
Email: 
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b. Categorizing threatening/neutral pictures as fast as possible by pressing 
one of two buttons on a keyboard.  
 
c. Asking you to listen to a list of words and respond whether they are 
related or unrelated to other words presented on a computer screen.  
 
d. Examining the way you respond to threatening and neutral faces by 
tracking your eye movements. 
 
Some of the images used in this study are unpleasant and may cause distress. You 
are free to withdraw at any stage. 
 
4) Can I withdraw from the study? 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to 
participate. During the research you are free to withdraw at any stage. Withdrawing 
from participation will not penalize or affect you in any way. Signing and submitting 
an informed consent form is an indication of your consent to participate in the study. 
Once you have submitted your consent form and participated in the research your 
responses cannot be withdrawn. 
 
5) Will anyone else know the results? 
You will be requested to provide an email address so that we can match your 
responses from the first part of this study to those you give in Part 2 of this study. 
Once you have completed participation in this study, your email address will be 
destroyed and the data will be coded so that the data that you provided will be 
completely anonymous. The program of research will be submitted for the 
requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy and reports will be submitted for 
publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report (only 
group data will be reported).  
 
6) Will the study benefit me? 
While we intend that this research should also further the existing knowledge and 
understanding of the relationship between cognitive processing styles, worry and 
generalised anxiety, it may not be of direct benefit to you. 
 
7) Can I tell other people about the study? 
It is important that you do not discuss the details of this experiment with fellow 
students as this may impact upon the outcome of the study. 
 
8) What if I require further information? 
If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Sophia 
Drysdale on (02) 9351 7479, sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au or Associate Professor 
Caroline Hunt on (02) 9351 5446, caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au 
 
9) What if I have a complaint or concern? 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a 
research study can contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics 
Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 8627 8176 (Telephone); 
(02) 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or human.ethics@usyd.edu.au (Email)
!
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        An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized 
Anxiety 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT: PART 2 
 
  
1) What is the study about? 
 
This research is investigating the relationship between cognitive styles, worry and 
generalised anxiety. 
 
2) Who is carrying out the study? 
 
This study is being conducted by Sophia Drysdale (as the basis of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy) at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Caroline Hunt.  
 
3) What does the study involve and how much time will it take? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete three tasks, 
which we anticipate will take no more than an hour (60mins). The tasks will include: 
 
a. Answering questions (multi-choice) about the way you explain, predict and 
reach conclusions with restricted or limited information. 
b. A game of chance where you will be asked to choose jelly beans from one 
of two containers. 
c. An eye tracking task that will examine the way you respond to threatening 
and neutral pictures. 
 
4) Can I withdraw from the study? 
 
Being in this study is completely voluntary and you are not under any obligation to 
consent to complete the research. During the research you are free to withdraw at 
any stage. Withdrawing from participation will not penalize or affect you in any way. 
!
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Signing and submitting an informed consent form is an indication of your consent to 
participate in the study. Once you have submitted your consent form and participated 
in the research your responses cannot be withdrawn. 
5) Will anyone else know the results? 
 
You will be requested to provide an email address so that we can match your 
responses to those you gave in Part 1 of this study. Once you have completed 
participation in this study, your email address will be destroyed and the data will be 
coded so that the data that you provided will be completely anonymous. The 
program of research will be submitted for the requirements of the Doctor of 
Philosophy and reports will be submitted for publication, but individual participants 
will not be identifiable in such a report (only group data will be reported).  
 
6) Will the study benefit me? 
 
While we intend that this research should also further the existing knowledge and 
understanding of the relationship between cognitive processing styles, worry and 
generalised anxiety, it may not be of direct benefit to you. 
 
7) Can I tell other people about the study? 
 
It is important that you do not discuss the details of this experiment with fellow 
students as this may impact upon the outcome of the study. 
 
8) What if I require further information? 
 
If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Sophia 
Drysdale on (02) 9351 7479, sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au or Associate Professor 
Caroline Hunt on (02) 9351 5446, caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au 
 
9) What if I have a complaint or concern? 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a 
research study can contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics 
Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 8627 8176 
(Telephone); (02) 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or 
human.ethics@usyd.edu.au (Email). 
!
!
!
!
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  ABN 15 211 513 464  
  Sophia Drysdale / Ass. Prof. Caroline Hunt 
 DCP/Ph.D Student / Ph.D. 
                                 M.Psychol. (clinical) 
                                Clinical Training Director 
 
 
Room 153 
Mackie Building K01 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 5446 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9036 
5223 
Email: 
 sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au 
caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au  
Web: http://www.usyd.edu.au/ 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I, .............................................................................[PRINT NAME], give consent to 
my participation in the research project 
 
TITLE:  An Exploration of the Role of Processing Style in Generalised Anxiety: 
PART 1 
 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been 
explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given 
the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the 
project with the researcher/s. 
 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without 
affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of 
Sydney now or in the future. 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no 
information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not 
under any obligation to consent. 
 
 
Signed:  .....................................................................................................................  
 
 
Name:  .....................................................................................................................   
 
Date:  .....................................................................................................................  
!   
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Debriefing Statement: 
 
An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized Anxiety: PART 
1 
 
 Thank you very much for participating in this study. Previous research has 
shown that anxiety is related to biases of attention, interpretation, and memory. The 
tasks that you just took part in consisted of: 
 
1) Online Questionnaire  
You completed a set of questionnaires, two of which measured cognitive 
processing style: the Rational Experiential Inventory (Epstein & Pacini, 
1999), and the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (Burns & D’Zurilla, 
1999). You were also given questionnaires that are used to screen 
individuals with anxiety and depression, and to examine levels of worry.  
2) Homophone word task  
Homophones are words that sound the same but are spelt differently e.g., 
“sleigh/slay”. Previous research has found that anxious individual show an 
interpretation bias for threatening words when resolving ambiguity; they 
perceive homophones to be related to threat predominantly more than being 
related to the neutral version of the word (e.g., Mathews, Richards & 
Eysenck, 1989; Blanchette & Richards, 2003). 
3) Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)  
This measured your automatic associations (by measuring the time that it 
took you to classify stimuli into different categories) between 
threatening/neutral pictures and yourself. Research has found panic 
disorder and social phobia to be related to biased automatic associations in 
memory (Teachman, 2005; and Teachman, Smith-Janik & Saporito, 2007). 
4) Modified probe detection task  
You were shown threatening/neutral faces and your eye movements were 
tracked which allowed us to examine your attention processes. Past 
research has shown that anxious individuals attention is biased toward 
threaten faces (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; Bradley et al., 1997; 
Mogg, Miller & Bradley, 2000). There were some conditions in this task 
!   
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where threatening faces were presented beyond conscious awareness; this 
was necessary in order to measure your attention that is beyond conscious 
awareness (implicit attention). 
  
 We did not tell you before your participation in the research exactly what we 
were measuring, or the exact intent of some of the tasks. The reason for this is that 
there is some evidence that suggests that people’s behaviour can be changed when 
they are told the intent behind the task. For example, in the homophone word task, if 
the true intent had been revealed it would not be possible to distinguish whether you 
may have a bias to interpret ambiguous words positively/negatively. 
 
One area of research that has not received much attention concerns the 
potential impact of a person’s cognitive processing style on the development, and 
maintenance of anxiety. There are at least two partially independent modes of 
thought that contribute to individual processing style: the rational system (RS) that 
operates at the conscious level, and the preconscious experiential system (ES) 
(Epstein et al., 1992; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Whilst there is extensive research 
examining individual cognitive biases in relation to anxiety, one area of research that 
has not received much attention concerns the potential relationship between these 
biases, how they may relate to anxiety, and the potential impact of a person’s 
cognitive processing style. This is an exploratory study that will help us to understand 
the pattern of cognitive biases and how these relate to processing style and whether 
or not an individual suffers from excessive worry and anxiety. By investigating this 
relationship further, we hope to gain insight into whether it would be beneficial to 
study processing style in more depth with clinically anxious participants. Ultimately it 
has the potential to increase our knowledge and understanding of generalized 
anxiety so that more effective treatment programs can be tailored for individuals 
suffering from generalised anxiety disorder. 
 
  If any aspects of this study have raised any issues that you wish to discuss 
further, please contact either Associate Professor Caroline Hunt at the School of 
Clinical Psychology (see details below) or, alternatively, please feel free to make use 
of one of the following free services: 
 
Lifeline    Counselling Service (USYD)  
 Phone: 13 11 14  Phone: (02) 8627 8433  
 
Because some of the questionnaires in this study are used to screen for 
generalized anxiety disorder and depression, we are obliged to make contact with 
people whose scores indicate referral to support services may be warranted. 
Associate Professor Caroline Hunt will email these people, asking them to contact 
her so that she can discuss the implications of their scores, and support resources 
that are available to them. Though it is recommended, these people are under no 
obligation to make an appointment with Associate Professor Hunt.    
  
If you wish to know the results of this study, or wish to discuss it further, please 
contact either Sophia Drysdale or Associate Professor Caroline Hunt using the 
details below. 
 
Thank you again for your time. 
 
Sophia Drysdale (Ph.D Student)  Associate Professor Caroline Hunt 
sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au   caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au    
(02) 9351 5446!
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
I, .............................................................................[PRINT NAME], give consent to 
my participation in the research project 
 
TITLE:  An Exploration of the Role of Processing Style in Generalised Anxiety: 
PART 2 
 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been 
explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the 
opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with 
the researcher/s. 
 3.! I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting 
my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the 
future.!
 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information 
about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under 
any obligation to consent. 
 
 
Signed: .................................................................................................................   
 
 
Name: ....................................................................................................................    
 
Date:  ..................................................................................................................... 
!   
-340- 
!
  
Discipline of Psychology 
School of Psychology 
Faculty of Science 
  
  ABN 15 211 513 464  
  Sophia Drysdale / Ass. Prof. Caroline Hunt 
 DCP/Ph.D Student / Ph.D. 
                                 M.Psychol. (clinical) 
                                Clinical Training Director 
 
 
Room 153 
Mackie Building K01 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 5446 
Facsimile:  +61 2 9036 5223 
Email:  
sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au 
caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au  
Web: http://www.usyd.edu.au/ 
 
Debriefing Statement 
 
An Exploration of the Role of Processing Styles in Generalized Anxiety: 
PART 2 
 
 Thank you very much for participating in this research that is investigating the 
relationship between inhibition, rational reasoning ability, processing style and 
anxiety. The tasks that you just took part in consisted of:  
 
 1) Antisaccade task (Hallett, 1978; see Hutton & Ettinger, 2006, for a 
review of research): this measures (by tracking your eye movements) your ability to 
inhibit your reflexive responding, and control your attention to threatening/neutral 
images. Previous research has found that highly anxious participants are less able to 
inhibit and control their attentional responses when threatening images are presented 
(see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; & Derakshan et al., 2009). 
  
 2) Reasoning tasks: you completed three tasks measuring different types of 
reasoning. The jellybean game investigated your probabilistic reasoning ability; 
choosing from the smaller container has a higher chance of resulting in the drawing 
of a red bean, and thus represents a higher level of probabilistic reasoning ability. 
Using this task research has shown that high probabilistic reasoning ability is related 
to a rational processing style (Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994). You also completed two other reasoning tasks that asked you to answer a 
series of questions about the way that they arrive at conclusions, and how you 
explain and predict events with limited information. Responding to these tasks tends 
to either be analytical or heuristic-based (inappropriate over-generalised responses), 
and has been found to be related to individual processing style (Markovits & Nantel, 
1989; Sá, West & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998; Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 
1986; and Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
  
 One area of research that has not received much attention concerns the 
potential impact of a person’s cognitive processing style on the development and 
maintenance of anxiety. There are at least two partially independent modes of 
!   
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thought that contribute to individual processing style: the rational system (RS) that 
operates at the conscious level and the preconscious experiential system (ES) 
(Epstein et al., 1992; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). This is an exploratory study that 
will help us to understand how processing style might be related to whether or not an 
individual can engage their RS (and inhibit their ES) in order to apply rational 
reasoning in threatening situations. By investigating this relationship we hope to gain 
insight into whether it would be beneficial to study processing style in more depth 
with clinically anxious participants. Ultimately it has the potential to increase our 
knowledge and understanding of generalized anxiety so that more effective treatment 
programs may be tailored for individuals suffering from generalised anxiety disorder.
If any aspects of this study have raised any issues that you wish to discuss further, 
please contact either Associate Professor Caroline Hunt at the School of Clinical 
Psychology (see details below) or, alternatively, please feel free to make use of one 
of the following free services: 
   
     Lifeline              Counselling Service (USYD)  
  Phone: 13 11 14  Phone: (02) 8627 8433  
   
 
If you wish to know the results of this study, or wish to discuss it further, please   
contact   either Sophia Drysdale or Associate Professor Caroline Hunt using the 
details below. 
 
Thank you again for your time. 
 
 
 Sophia Drysdale (PhD Student)  Associate Professor Caroline Hunt !sdry2707@uni.sydney.edu.au   caroline.hunt@sydney.edu.au 
                    (02) 9351 5446
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APPENDIX D 
Questionnaires: Study 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 What is your gender?      female !     male !      No answer  ! 
 
How old are you? ___________________ (or tick here if >40  !) 
 
What is your Major(s):    
!   Arts Degree    
! Science Degree        
! Commerce Degree  
!  Law Degree 
!  Other  
 
What is your predominant Ethnicity:       
! Indigenous Australian 
! Australian    
! Maori 
! New Zealander 
! Pacific Islander (e.g., Fijian, Samoan) 
! Melanesian (e.g., Papua New Guinean, Solomon Islander) 
! North-Western European (e.g., UK, Irish, German) 
! Southern and Eastern European (e.g., Italian, Macedonian, Polish, 
Russia) 
! North African and Middle Eastern (e.g., Turkish, Iranian, Egyptian) 
! South-East Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Indonesian) 
! North-East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean) 
! Southern and Central Asian 
! North American 
! Central and Southern American 
! Sub-Saharan African (e.g., South Africa, Zimbabwean) 
! No Answer 
 
     
Is English your first Language?        yes !     no !  
 
What language do you speak at home?  
 
___________________________________ 
 
 As part of this study you will need to answer the following questionnaire. This 
survey will take approximately 30 minutes and should be completed in one go. 
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Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI) 
 
Below is a series of statements that describe the way some people think, feel, and act when 
faced with situations, which cause them WORRY in their daily lives. A situation that causes 
you to feel worried is any situation that involves uncontrollable negative and emotional 
thoughts and images about events that you are afraid might happen in the future. They are 
situations in which you attempt to avoid possible negative events and outcomes or in which 
you prepare for the worst often by engaging in ‘What if…” thinking (for example “What if I 
fail”).  
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then select the number from the scale below that 
best describes the extent to which you feel the statement is true of you. Consider yourself as 
you TYPICALLY cope with situations which cause you worry in your life.  
 
1= Not at all true of me       2=Slightly true of me           3= Moderately true of me 
4= Very true of me              5= Extremely true of me 
1 
 
To cope, I usually go with my instincts rather than trying to 
reason things out.     (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
2 I often think about the situations that make me worry and then 
try to find new ways to resolve them.    (RP)* 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
3 My feelings usually determine how I will cope.   (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
4 I usually try to cope with a situation that causes me to worry by 
breaking it down into smaller parts and dealing with them one 
at a time.   (RP)* 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
5 When I am trying to decide how to cope, I usually go with my 
“gut” feeling.    (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
6 When I am attempting to cope, I depend a great deal on my 
feelings to help me find the best way to cope.     (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
7 I am often aware of how to cope with situations in which I feel 
worried even before I review all its aspects.    (AP)* 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
8 I usually think of as many alternative ways of coping as 
possible before I decided what I am going to do.     (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
9 If an approach works I use it again and again so I don’t have to 
come up with a new one for each situation I face that causes me 
to worry.    (AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
10 I’ve had enough experience to just know what I need to do to 
cope most of the time without trying to figure it out every time.   
(AP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
11 Before trying to cope, I usually decide on a specific goal so that 
I know exactly what I should try to do.  (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
!-344- !
12 “Gut” feelings are more important to me than logic and 
evidence when I have to cope.  (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
13 The right way to cope usually comes to mind almost 
immediately.    (AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
14 Rather than spend my time trying to think of how to cope, I 
prefer to use my emotional hunches.    (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
15 I usually try to get all the facts that I can before deciding how to 
cope.  (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
16 I usually set aside enough time to think things through carefully 
and figure out what is the best thing to do.    (RP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
17 I typically figure out the way to cope swiftly.     (AP) 1      2      3      4     5 
18 Instead of acting on the first idea that comes to mind, I carefully 
consider all my options.  (RP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
19 Before I attempt to cope, I think of all my options and carefully 
consider the pros and cons of each one.    (RP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
20 Emotions are usually more useful than thoughts for coping   
(EP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
21 I quickly do the right thing when coping because I’ve often 
faced almost the same thing before.  (AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
22 I usually do what feels right.     (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
23 Most of the time, I use the same method to cope.    (AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
24 When I am attempting to cope, one of the first things I do is 
gather as many facts about the situation as possible so that I will 
be able to understand what it is all about.  (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
25 I rely mostly on my past experience to find a way to cope.   
(AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
26 I usually put a lot of mental effort into figuring out what is the 
best thing to do.   (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
27 I trust my emotions to guide how I should cope.    (EP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
28 I usually stick to the “facts” and try to use a logical approach to 
cope.   (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
29 I rarely need to mull things over; how to cope usually becomes 
quickly apparent. (AP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
30 When I am attempting to cope I can usually trust my “gut” 
feelings to tell me what to do.  (EP) 
1      2      3      4     5 
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31 For me, deciding how to cope takes a lot of time and mental 
effort.  (RP) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
32 When a situation occurs in which I start to worry I know right 
away what I need to do to cope with it. (AP)* 
1      2      3      4     5 
 
*Change to original wording from ‘stressful’ to a derivative of ‘worry’. 
RP = Rational Processing, EP = Emotional Processing, AP = Automatic Processing 
 
 
 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (v.1999) 
 
 
Please read each statement carefully, and then select the number from the scale below that 
best describes the extent to which you feel the statement is typically true of you. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
1= Definitely not true of me       2=Slightly true of me           3= Moderately true of me 
4= Very true of me         5= Definitely true of me 
1 
 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about 
something, (re-) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
2 I am not very good at solving problems that require careful 
logical analysis, (ra—) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
3 I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking, (re-) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
4 Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity, (re—) 1      2      3      4     5 
5 Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me 
little satisfaction. (re-) 
1      2      3      4     5 
6 I don't reason well under pressure, (ra—) 1      2      3      4     5 
7 I enjoy thinking in abstract terms, (re) 1      2      3      4     5 
8 Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems 
in my life, (ra) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
9 Knowing the answer without having to understand the 
reasoning behind it is good enough for me. (re-) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
10 I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions, (ra) 1      2      3      4     5 
11 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions, (ee) 1      2      3      4     5 
12 I believe in trusting my hunches, (ea) 1      2      3      4     5 
13 Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems, (ee) 1      2      3      4     5 
14 I trust my initial feelings about people, (ea) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
15 I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition, (ee-) 1      2      3      4     5 
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16 I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on 
feelings, (ee—) 
1      2      3      4     5 
17 I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make 
decisions, (ee-) 
1      2      3      4     5 
18 My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's, 
(ea-) 
1      2      3      4     5 
19 I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions, (ee) 1      2      3      4     5 
20 I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are 
accurate, (ea—) 
1      2      3      4     5 
21 I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems, (ra—) 1      2      3      4     5 
22 I enjoy intellectual challenges, (re) 1      2      3      4     5 
23 I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking, (re) 1      2      3      4     5 
24 I am not a very analytical thinker, (ra—) 1      2      3      4     5 
25 Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points, 
(ra—) 
1      2      3      4     5 
26 I prefer complex problems to simple problems, (re) 1      2      3      4     5 
27 I am much better at figuring things out logically than most 
people, (ra) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
28 I have a logical mind, (ra) 1      2      3      4     5 
29 I have no problem thinking things through carefully, (ra) 1      2      3      4     5 
30 Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. (re) 1      2      3      4     5 
31 I don't have a very good sense of intuition, (ea—) 1      2      3      4     5 
32 Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out 
problems in my life, (ea) 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
33 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action, 
(ee) 
1      2      3      4     5 
34 When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut 
feelings, (ea) 
1      2      3      4     5 
35 If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make 
mistakes, (ea—) 
1      2      3      4     5 
36 I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition, 
(ee) 
1      2      3      4     5 
37 I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for 
important decisions. (ee-) 
1      2      3      4     5 
38 I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings 
to find an answer. (ea) 
1      2      3      4     5 
39 I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or 
herself as intuitive. (ee-) 
1      2      3      4     5 
40 I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't 
explain how I know, (ea) 
1      2      3      4     5 
 
!-347- !
* The name of the subscale to which each item belongs appears in parentheses, ee = Experiential 
Engagement; ea = Experiential Ability; re = Rational Engagement; ra = Rational Ability. A 
minus sign (—) with a scale name denotes reverse scoring. 
 
 
 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS) 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3, which indicates how 
much the statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
  1 I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things    (S) 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth     (A) 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all    (D) 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid 
breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)     (A) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I just couldn't seem to get going   (D) 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations    (S) 0      1      2      3 
7 I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g., legs going to give way)    (A) 0      1      2      3 
8 I found it difficult to relax    (S) 0      1      2      3 
9 I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended     (A) 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to    (D) 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting upset rather easily    (S) 0      1      2      3 
12 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy   (S) 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt sad and depressed       (D) 0      1      2      3 
14 I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way 
(e.g., lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting)     (S) 
0      1      2      3 
15 I had a feeling of faintness       (A) 0      1      2      3 
16 I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything  
(D) 
0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person      (D) 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy   (S) 0      1      2      3 
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19 I perspired noticeably (e.g., hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion    (A) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason  (A) 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life wasn't worthwhile    (D) 0      1      2      3 
 
  
 
Reminder of rating scale: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
22 I found it hard to wind down    (S) 0      1      2      3 
23 I had difficulty in swallowing   (A) 0      1      2      3 
24 I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did  (D) 0      1      2      3 
25 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)   
(A) 
0      1      2      3 
26 I felt down-hearted and blue   (D) 0      1      2      3 
27 I found that I was very irritable   (S)  0      1      2      3 
28 I felt I was close to panic    (A) 0      1      2      3 
29 I found it hard to calm down after something upset me  (S) 0      1      2      3 
30 I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but 
unfamiliar task    (A) 
0      1      2      3 
31 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything  (D) 0      1      2      3 
32 I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing  
(S) 
0      1      2      3 
33 I was in a state of nervous tension   (S) 0      1      2      3 
34 I felt I was pretty worthless    (D) 0      1      2      3 
35 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing    (S) 
0      1      2      3 
36 I felt terrified   (A) 0      1      2      3 
37 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about   (D) 0      1      2      3 
38 I felt that life was meaningless    (D) 0      1      2      3 
39 I found myself getting agitated (S) 0      1      2      3 
40 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 0      1      2      3 
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a fool of myself                                 (A) 
41 I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)    (A) 0      1      2      3 
42 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things   (D) 0      1      2      3 
 
 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GADQ-IV) 
 
 
1. Do you experience excessive worry?  Yes ____     No   ____ 
2. Is your worry excessive in intensity, frequency, or amount of distress it 
causes?          Yes ____  No ____ 
3. Do you find it difficult to control your worry (or stop worrying) once it 
starts?        Yes ____ No ____ 
4. Do you worry excessively and uncontrollably about minor things such as 
being late for an appointment, minor repairs, homework, etc.?   
                   Yes ____   No ____ 
5. Please list the most frequent topics about which you worry excessively and 
uncontrollably: 
a.  ___________________________________   
b.  ___________________________________ 
c.  ___________________________________  
d.  ___________________________________ 
e.  ___________________________________   
f.  ____________________________________ 
6. During the last six months have you been bothered by excessive and 
uncontrollable worries more days than not? Yes _____   No_____ 
 
IF YES, CONTINUE. IF NO, SKIP REMAINING QUESTIONS. 
 
7. During the past six months, have you often been bothered by any of the 
following symptoms? Place a check next to each symptom that you have had 
more days than not: 
____ Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge   
____ Irritability  
____ Difficulty falling/staying asleep or restless/unsatisfying sleep 
____ Being easily fatigued 
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____ Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank     
____ Muscle tension 
  
 
8. How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work, 
social activities, family, etc.? Circle one number: 
  
                 0     1         2          3        4          5          6        7         8       
____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/____         
            None           Mildly     Moderately       Severely       Very Severely 
 
9. How much are you bothered by worry and physical symptoms (how much 
distress does it cause you)? Circle one number: 
 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7          8        
___/ ____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/_____/___ 
No distress    Mild            Moderate         Severe             Very 
                             distress           distress          distress          severe                                                                                                                  
                          distress 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 
     
PENN STATE WORRY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, marking 
the number next to the item. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
1=Not at all typical         2=Slightly typical        3=Somewhat typical 
4=Typical         5=Very typical 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
1 
 
If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry 
about it 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
2 My worries overwhelm me 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
3 I do not tend to worry about things 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
4 Many situations make me worry 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
5 I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
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6 When I am under pressure I worry a lot 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
7 I am always worrying about something 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
8 I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
9 As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything 
else I have to do 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
10 When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not 
worry about it any more 
1      2      3      4     5 
11 I never worry about anything 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
12 I have been a worrier all my life 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
13 I notice that I have been worrying about things 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
14 Once I start worrying I cannot stop 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
15 I worry all the time 
 
1      2      3      4     5 
16 I worry about projects until they are all done 1      2      3      4     5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!-352- !
APPENDIX E 
Reasoning Questionnaires: Study 2 
 
Inductive Reasoning –Statistical Reasoning Problems 
(see: Stanovich, & West, 1998; Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; and Nisbett, & Ross, 
1980).  
1.  It is the first week of the winter term. Henry has signed up for five classes, but 
plans to take only four. Three of the classes he knows he wants, so he must decide 
between the other two. Past student course evaluations indicate that Course A is better 
taught. However, Henry attended the first meeting of both classes and found that 
Course B seemed to be better. What do you think the Henry should do? 
Circle One: 
a. He should definitely take Course A. 
b. He should probably take Course A. 
c. He should probably take Course B. 
d. He should definitely take Course B. 
2.  The Caldwells had long ago decided that when it was time to replace their car 
they would get what they called "one of those solid, safety-conscious, built-to-last 
Swedish" cars -- either a Volvo or a Saab. When the time to buy came, the Caldwells 
found that both Volvos and Saabs were expensive, but they decided to stick with their 
decision and to do some research on whether to buy a Volvo or a Saab. They got a 
copy of Consumer Reports and there they found that the consensus of the experts was 
that both cars were very sound mechanically, although the Volvo was felt to be 
slightly superior on some dimensions. They also found that the readers of Consumer 
Reports who owned a Volvo reported having somewhat fewer mechanical problems 
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than owners of Saabs. They were about to go and strike a bargain with the Volvo 
dealer when Mr. Caldwell remembered that they had two friends who owned a Saab 
and one who owned a Volvo. Mr. Caldwell called up the friends. Both Saab owners 
reported having had a few mechanical problems but nothing major. The Volvo owner 
exploded when asked how he liked his car. "First that fancy fuel injection computer 
thing went out: $400 bucks. Next I started having trouble with the rear end. Had to 
replace it. Then the transmission and the clutch. I finally sold it after 3 years at a big 
loss." What do you think the Caldwells should do? 
 Circle One: 
a. They should definitely buy the Saab. 
b. They should probably buy the Saab. 
c. They should probably buy the Volvo. 
d. They should definitely buy the Volvo. 
3.  David L. was a senior in high school on the East Coast who was planning to 
go to university. He had compiled an excellent record in high school and had been 
admitted to his two top choices: a small liberal arts college and an Ivy League 
university. David had several older friends who were attending the liberal arts college 
and several who were attending the Ivy League university. They were all excellent 
students like himself and had interests similar to his. The friends at the liberal arts 
college all reported that they liked the school very much and that they found it very 
stimulating. The friends at the Ivy League university reported that they had many 
complaints on both personal and social grounds and on educational grounds. 
  David initially thought that he would go to the small liberal arts college and 
since he could visit only one school he went there for a day. However, he did not like 
what he saw at the private liberal arts college: Several people whom he met seemed 
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cold and a professor he met with briefly seemed abrupt and uninterested in him. These 
things about the liberal arts college campus turned him off. Please say which school 
you think David should go to. 
Circle One: 
a. He should definitely go to the liberal arts college. 
b. He should probably go to the liberal arts college. 
c. He should probably go to the Ivy League university. 
d. He should definitely go to the Ivy League university. 
4.  The admissions committee of the psychology department of a Midwestern 
university was considering which 10 of 30 applicants to admit to their graduate 
program. The department keeps records on the performance of all its graduate 
students and relates this performance score to all kinds of background information 
about the students. There was a debate on the admissions committee about whether to 
admit a particular student from Maynard College. The student's scores on the GRE 
and his GPA were marginal. Almost all students previously admitted to the 
department had higher scores. The student's letters of recommendation were very 
good, but none of the writers of the letters were personally known to any admissions 
faculty. One member of the admissions committee argued against admission, pointing 
out that department records show those students who graduate from small, 
nonselective colleges like Maynard perform at a level substantially below the median 
of all graduate students in the program. This argument was countered by a committee 
member who noted that 2 years ago the university had admitted a student from 
Maynard who was now among the three highest ranked students in the department. 
What do you think the committee should do? 
Circle One: 
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a. They should definitely admit the student. 
b. They should probably admit the student. 
c. They should probably not admit the student. 
d. They should definitely not admit the student.  
5.  The superintendent of schools was urging the school board to make a shift to a 
new "augmented learning" curriculum. He cited a study of 120 school systems that 
had recently begun to try the augmented learning curriculum and 120 school systems 
that had a curriculum similar to the district's current one. The "augmented learning" 
school systems, he said, were producing students who scored half-a-year ahead of the 
students in the other systems on objective tests of reading, mathematics, and science. 
Of the 120 school systems which had changed to "augmented learning", 85 had 
shown improved skills for students in the system vs only 40 with improved skills in 
the 120 systems which had not changed. One of the school board members took the 
floor to argue against the change. This board member cited the fact that she had three 
nephews who were doing poorly in a neighboring school district that used the 
"augmented learning" curriculum. She said that the boys had all been tested and found 
to have very high intelligence and learning aptitude. Therefore, the problem could be 
due to the curriculum and thus it would be a mistake for the board to adopt the 
"augmented learning" curriculum. What do you think the school board should do?  
Circle One: 
a. They should definitely adopt the "augmented learning" program. 
b. They should probably adopt the "augmented learning" program. 
c. They should probably not adopt the "augmented learning" program. 
d. They should definitely not adopt the "augmented learning" program. 
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6.  Kevin, a graduate student in sociology, decided to do a research project on 
"factors affecting performance of major league baseball players". One finding that 
interested Kevin concerned the 350 married players in the league. About 68% of these 
players improved their performance after getting married, while the remaining 32% 
had equal or poorer performance. At a social hour sponsored by the Office of the 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball, he mentioned his finding to a staff member 
of the office. The staff member listened to Kevin's results and then said, "Your study 
is interesting but I don't believe it. I'm sure that baseball performance is worse after a 
marriage because the ball player suddenly has to take on enormous responsibilities: 
taking care of his spouse and children. Plus the factor of being stressed by having to 
be on the road so much of the time and therefore away from the family. The player 
will no longer be able to devote as much time to baseball as before he was married. 
Because of this he will lose that competitive quality that is necessary for good 
performance in baseball." Who do you think is right about the effects of marriage on 
performance, Kevin or the staff member. 
Circle One: 
a. It's highly likely that Kevin is right. 
b. Kevin is probably right. 
c. The staff member is probably right. 
d. It's highly likely that the staff member is right. 
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Deductive Reasoning: Syllogisms 
(see: Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Sá, West & Stanovich, 1999) 
1. Premises: Inconsistent 1 (P,Q) 
All things that are smoked are good for the health. 
Cigarettes are smoked. 
Conclusion: 
Cigarettes are good for the health. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
2. Premises: Consistent 2 (NP,NQ) 
All things made of wood can be used as fuel. 
Gasoline is not made of wood. 
Conclusion: 
Gasoline cannot be used as fuel. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
3. Premises: Neutral 3 (Q,P) 
All lapitars wear clothes. 
Podips wear clothes. 
Conclusion: 
Podips are lapitars. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
4. Premises: Consistent 4 (NQ,NP) 
All nuts can be eaten. 
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Rocks cannot be eaten. 
Conclusion: 
Rocks are not nuts. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
5. Premises: Inconsistent 2 (NP,NQ) 
All unemployed people are poor. 
Rockefeller is not unemployed. 
Conclusion: 
Rockefeller is not poor. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
6. Premises: Consistent 3 (Q,P) 
All guns are dangerous. 
Rattlesnakes are dangerous. 
Conclusion: 
Rattlesnakes are guns. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
7. Premises: Inconsistent 4 (NQ,NP) 
All things with four legs are dangerous. 
Poodles are not dangerous. 
Conclusion: 
Poodles do not have four legs. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
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b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
8. Premises: Neutral 1 (P,Q) 
All ramadions taste delicious. 
Gumthorps are ramadions. 
Conclusion: 
Gumthorps taste delicious. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
9. Premises: Inconsistent 3 (Q,P) 
All living things need water. 
Roses need water. 
Conclusion: 
Roses are living things. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
10. Premises: Neutral 4 (NQ,NP) 
All selacians have sharp teeth. 
Snorlups do not have sharp teeth. 
Conclusion: 
Snorlups are not selacians. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
11. Premises: Consistent 1 (P,Q) 
All fish can swim. 
Tuna are fish. 
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Conclusion: 
Tuna can swim. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
12. Premises: Neutral 2 (NP,NQ) 
All hudon are ferocious. 
Wampets are not hudon. 
Conclusion: 
Wampets are not ferocious. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
13. Premises: Neutral 3 (Q,P) 
All opprobines run on electricity. 
Jamtops run on electricity. 
Conclusion: 
Jamtops are opprobines. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
14. Premises: Consistent 4 (NQ, NP) 
All things that are alive drink water. 
Televisions do not drink water. 
Conclusion: 
Televisions are not alive. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
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15. Premises: Consistent 2 (NP,NQ) 
All bats have wings. 
Hawks are not bats. 
Conclusion: 
Hawks do not have wings. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
16. Premises: Inconsistent 1 (P,Q) 
All mammals walk. 
Whales are mammals. 
Conclusion: 
Whales walk. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
17. Premises: Consistent 3 (Q,P) 
All large things need oxygen. 
Mice need oxygen. 
Conclusion: 
Mice are large things. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
18. Premises: Inconsistent 2 (NP,NQ) 
All African countries are hot. 
Canada is not an African country. 
Conclusion: 
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Canada is not hot. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
19. Premises: Inconsistent 4 (NQ,NP) 
All things that move love water. 
Cats do not love water. 
Conclusion: 
Cats do not move. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
20. Premises: Neutral 1 (P, Q) 
All tumpers lay eggs. 
Sampets are tumpers. 
Conclusion: 
Sampets lay eggs. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
21. Premises: Inconsistent 3 (Q, P) 
All things that have a motor need oil. 
Automobiles need oil. 
Conclusion: 
Automobiles have motors. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
22. Premises: Neutral 4 (NQ, NP) 
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All snapples run fast. 
Alcomas do not run fast. 
Conclusion: 
Alcomas are not snapples. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
23. Premises: Consistent 1 (P, Q) 
All birds have feathers. 
Robins are birds. 
Conclusion: 
Robins have feathers. 
*a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
24. Premises: Neutral 2 (NP, NQ) 
All argomelles are kind. 
Magsums are not argomelles. 
Conclusion: 
Magsums are not kind. 
a. Conclusion follows logically from premises. 
* b. Conclusion does not follow logically from premises. 
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APPENDIX F 
Procedural Information: Study 3 
 
International Affective Picture System picture codes  
(Lang et al., 1999; see: Mogg et al., 2004) 
High threat-neutral pairs: 2053-7320; 3010-4510; 3030-1440; 3053-2040; 
3060-7283; 3071-7330; 3080-7410; 3100-4500; 3102-7390; 3110-5626; 3120-2600; 
3130-2160; 3140-4530; 3150-5510; 3170-2050; 3400-8280; 3550-2500; 6230-5300; 
6313-4599; 6510-2650; 6570-5201; 9040-1600; 9140-1590; 9252-4533; 9400-7550; 
9410-8460; 9420-2360; 9570-7040 
Mild threat-neutral pairs: 1270-5760; 1280-1910; 1930-5660; 2100-2000; 
2110-2210; 2661-7282; 2691-8350; 2700-2370; 3280-2840; 6000-5800; 6010-7710; 
6200-7090; 6610-7035; 6800-7000; 6940-7570; 7361-8130; 9001-5780; 9010-7500; 
9110-7060; 9120-5250; 9160-1810; 9230-7501; 9404-7510; 9440-1710; 9440-1710; 
9452-8490; 9490-5830; 9621-8170; 9622-5700 
Antisaccade Task Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment. In this experiment you will be presented with a 
number of different images. These images will vary in arousal (neutral, mild threat 
and high threat). Here are some examples of the pictures that you may see: 
High arousal may depict mutilations or graphic injuries 
 Mild arousal may be images of dangerous animals 
 Low arousal may depict objects like a watch 
Warning: due to the nature of the images used you may be exposed to highly 
disturbing pictures. If you have any questions about the pictures presented please ask 
now. Remember: your participation is voluntary and you may stop participating at any 
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time without penalty. At the beginning of each trial you will be required to focus on a 
white dot in the middle of the screen. A picture will appear then the dot will change to 
an instructional cue which will be green, meaning you will have to look at the image, 
or red which means you will have to look away from the image (this was visually 
depicted for participants). You will be required to focus on the black dot until a 
picture is presented. DO NOT MOVE YOUR EYES FROM THE DOT UNTIL IT 
CHANGES COLOUR. Once the dot changes colour you will need to make a quick eye 
movement either towards the picture (following a green dot) or away from the picture 
(following a red dot). If you have any questions about the experiment please ask them 
now. 
During the practice trials, when a response was incorrect the following 
message was presented:  
INCORRECT. Remember a red dot means to look away from the picture whilst a 
green dot means you should look at the picture. Press any button to continue. 
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APPENDIX G 
Procedural Information: Modified dot probe task Study 4 
Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment. In this experiment you will be shown pairs of 
faces. These will be followed by the presentation of a small white dot to the left or 
right of a central fixation cross, in the position previously held by one of the two 
faces. The aim of this experiment is to identify the location of the target dot as quickly 
as possible by looking at the target dot and pressing either: The LEFT button of the 
target dot appears on the left OR the RIGHT button if the target dot appears on the 
right. Throughout each trial a white cross will be presented in the center of the screen 
(visual depiction). Please look at this fixation cross at the start of each trial. Please 
keep your head still during each trial and use your eyes to look towards the target dot. 
If you have any questions about the experiment please ask now. Each block of trials 
will begin with a calibration of the eyetracker. 
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Ekman and Freisen (1976) pictures used: 
Angry faces:  
MEN: EM5-14; PE2-21; WF3-1; GS2-8; JJ3-12 
WOMEN: A1-14; C2-12; SW4-9; JM5-3; MF2-5; MO2-13; NR2-7 
Neutral faces:  
MEN: EM2-4; PE2-4; WF2-5; GS1-4; JJ3-4 
WOMEN: A1-2; C2-3; SW3-3; JM1-9; MF1-2; MO1-5; NR1-3 
Eight ER40 FACES were used to create the four mask and two trial face pairs 
 
The ER40 FACES are black and white images [acquired under the protocol explained 
in the  following paper:  
 
Erwin et. al. (1992) Facial emotion discrimination: I. Task construction and        
                      behavioral findings in normal subjects.  Psychiatry Research 42, 231-  
                      240. 
           These faces has been used to construct the Penn Emotion Recognition Test - 40 
Faces version (ER40).  There is text copied below that serves as a filename key by 
which you may identify the gender, emotional expression and intensity of the face 
within each respective image file in this set. Please refer to this when trying to 
identify images. 
 
            The Erwin images are black and white images of male and female actors 
making mild and extreme neutral, happy and sad facial expressions. The 
demographics of each actor in this set can be found in the "Facial Emotion Files" 
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(either acrobat or plain text format) on our website. 
 
To access our 2D facial emotional stimuli, please visit the following   
URL: 
http://www.med.upenn.edu/bbl/downloads/2Dfaces/faces 
 
ER-40 and PERT96 File Key 
 
The stimulus files for the ER-40 and PERT96 are labeled ABC_###.jpg 
 
A is either F or M to indicate gender 
B is the emotion either A for Anger, F for Fear, H for Happy, N for 
Neutral, or S for Sad (or D for Disgust - PERT96 only) 
C is the intensity, either X for mild or Z for extreme 
 
We have two sets of 2D facial emotional stimuli available on our website: 
 
Black and White images [acquired under the protocol explained in the following 
paper: Erwin et. al. (1992) Facial emotion discrimination: I. Task construction and 
behavioral findings in normal subjects. Psychiatry Research 42, 231-240.] 
 
Color Images [acquired according to Gur et. al. 2002 J NeuroSci Methods. 115: 137-
143, and referenced in Kohler et. al. 2003 Am J Psych 160:1768-1774] . 
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APPENDIX H 
Procedural Information: Crossmodal homophone task Study 4 !
List of the Stimuli !
Words taken from Blanchette and Richards (2003), and Mathews, Richards and 
Eysenck (1989)   
      Practice trial 
Spoken words Context words Context words 
Moderate Average Marriage 
Yield Give Nappy 
Rapid Fast Mouth 
Nursery Children  Minute 
Shallow Deep Expectant 
Sanction Allow Hour 
Rational Irrational Dark 
Uncle Aunt Button  
   
Experimental trials 
Neutral words Context words Context words 
Absorb soak trying 
Academy arts sock 
Acquaint pearl recognise 
Actor actress press 
Bag nine shopping 
Balance please scales 
Barbecue phone sauce 
Bathe probe swim 
Bread food tool 
Butter margarine wool 
Chicken eggs okay 
Civilian chips soldier 
Context friends question 
Deduct canoe subtract 
Expert professional sister 
Factory almond work 
Fan cool doll 
Fashion clothes speed 
Fragment content piece 
Gear disc stick 
Gene chromosome fish 
Grass roots suggest 
Green blue clever 
Incline regal slope 
India ghandi quest 
Italian handy spaghetti 
Jacket coat history 
Juice orange shine 
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Kitty cat treaty 
Ladder rungs wind 
Lawn lively mower 
Lens camera water 
Library books reserved 
Lock hello key 
Maple female leaf 
Margin litter paper 
Nearby bench close 
Neck arm eager 
Onion bed peel 
Oyster end shell 
Package camping parcel 
Palm hand trials 
Pen here ink 
Pianist lions piano 
Pink panther situation 
Porch door your 
Pottery clay space 
Quarter food half 
Quick slow this 
Quote decide unquote 
Recruit army birthday 
Refund repay wink 
Replace put school 
Resident home separate 
Restore occasion repair 
Retained kept subtle 
Rhythm beat ungainly 
Salad lettuce money 
Sandwich cheese daughter 
Signal founder sign 
Slate roof start 
Solar pop sun 
Somehow been somewhere 
Sooner hypothesis later 
Theatre once play 
Total sum under 
Transfer metal move 
Tray belt tea 
Validity tight truth 
Vitamin pill stupid 
Voltage current thin 
Wagon  jet wheel 
Whatever out wherever 
Willow plum tree 
Wrist  post watch 
Writing  reading sane 
Yellow colour donkey 
Youngest nurse oldest 
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Zero nothing red 
Zone area rough 
   
Homophones 
 Context words Context words 
Threat/neutral 
homophones 
  
Ale_ail sick above 
Bore_boar pig shield 
Bruise_brews cabinet drinks 
Bury_berry fruit ground 
Die_dye death hair 
Flu_flew plane virus 
Foul_fowl chicken smell 
Groan_grown aged grunt 
Guilt_gilt gold innocence 
Hail_hale healthy rain 
Hoarse_horse animal chance 
Lone_loan isolated money 
Moan_mown clip complain 
Mourn_morn early grieve 
Pain_pane agony window 
Patients_patience calm hospital 
Skull_scull head paddle 
Slay_sleigh hint kill 
Tear_tier cry knife 
Whine_wine alcohol complain 
Week_weak days frail 
Positive/neutral 
homophones 
  
Bridal_bridle horse search 
Dear_deer animal beloved 
Fair_fare absence charge 
Flower_flour away baking 
Heal_heel cure gentle 
Hymn_him her song 
Peace_piece exam part 
Presents_presence absence event 
Pride_pried car interfered 
Real_reel film lack 
Right_rite correct majestic 
Rose_rows flowers lines 
Sweet_suite apartment edge 
Trust_trussed end faith 
Won_one huge lost 
Neutral/neutral 
Homophones 
  
Allowed_aloud keen let 
Ate/Eight food nine 
Bare_bear hug naked 
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Cent_sent beauty dollar 
Close_clothes fashion lifetime 
Eye_i active ball 
Hi/High hello low 
Hole_whole entire gap 
Knew_new old rescue 
Mail/Male post female 
Meet/Meat red friends 
Mode_mowed cut eternal 
Passed/Past out history 
Plain/Plane Jane jet 
Pole_poll north pious 
Route_root origin road 
Sea_see look shore 
Stair_stare eyes shove 
To_two store three 
Weather_whether forecast infinite 
Son/Sun daughter shine 
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APPENDIX I  
Study 4 Moderation Analyses with worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
 
Descriptive statistics for centered and un-centered variables can be found in 
Table AI1 and bivariate correlations for centered variables in Table AI2. To test the 
moderating role of attentional control on the relationship between attentional bias and 
worry/GAD symptoms, a multiple moderated regression analysis (Aiken & West, 
1991) was performed for each attentional bias calculation (see: Table AI3- AI8). The 
predictor variables were mean centered to minimize multicollinearity and arrive at 
correct beta weights and an interaction term was computed by multiplying the 
centered predictors (Aiken & West, 1991). In the first step of the model attentional 
bias and attentional control (at various stimulus presentation times) served as 
predictor variables with worry/GAD symptom scores (PSWQ/GADQ-IV) acting as 
the outcome variable. The second step of the regression included an interaction term - 
that was constituted from attentional bias scores and attentional control scores – that 
was also entered as a predictor variable. 
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Table AI 1: Descriptive statistics for centered and un-centered variables 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
RT_button_bias_16ms 11.8485 38.07521 
RT_button_bias_33ms 4.8264 35.39869 
RT_button_bias_100ms 8.6557 32.47293 
RT_button_bias_200ms -4.0482 34.15813 
RT_button_bias_500ms 1.1459 38.78456 
RT_button_bias_1500ms -7.5609 52.43334 
ctrd_bias16 -.0015 38.07521 
ctrd_bias33 -.0036 35.39869 
ctrd_bias100 -.0043 32.47293 
ctrd_bias200 .0018 34.15813 
ctrd_bias500 -.0041 38.78456 
ctrd_bias1500 -.0009 52.43334 
ctrd_16xatt_control 8.2495 119.63618 
ctrd_33xatt_control 5.0620 118.56624 
ctrd_100xatt_control 4.2192 100.58903 
ctrd_200xatt_control -9.7546 109.16648 
ctrd_500xatt_control 2.8207 113.67647 
ctrd_1500xatt_control -16.9023 177.67643 
Note: N = 58 
Table AI 2: Bivariate correlations for centered variables  
 
Att.co
n.scor
e 
ctrd_b
ias16 
ctrd_b
ias33 
ctrd_b
ias100 
ctrd_b
ias200 
ctrd_b
ias500 
ctrd_b
ias150
0 
ctrd_1
6xatt_
con 
ctrd_3
3xatt_
con 
ctrd_1
00xatt
_con 
ctrd_2
00xatt
_con 
ctrd_5
00xatt
_con 
ctrd_1
500xat
t_con 
att_control_score 1 .105 .101 .132 -.223 .053 -.291* .104 .040 .161 -.205 .025 -.217 
ctrd_bias16 .105 1 .029 -.006 .145 .164 -.273* .886** -.035 .106 .033 .165 -.343** 
ctrd_bias33 .101 .029 1 .035 .268* .131 .056 -.037 .910** .190 .273* .019 .026 
ctrd_bias100 .132 -.006 .035 1 .052 -.132 -.135 .105 .176 .879** .091 -.005 -.135 
ctrd_bias200 -.223 .145 .268* .052 1 -.103 .019 .033 .261* .094 .895** -.021 .003 
ctrd_bias500 .053 .164 .131 -.132 -.103 1 -.358** .154 .017 -.005 -.020 .860** -.352** 
ctrd_bias1500 -.291* -.273* .056 -.135 .019 -.358** 1 -.370** .027 -.147 .003 -.407** .920** 
ctrd_16xatt_con .104 .886** -.037 .105 .033 .154 -.370** 1 -.070 .168 .000 .189 -.436** 
ctrd_33xatt_con .040 -.035 .910** .176 .261* .017 .027 -.070 1 .269* .311* -.026 .024 
ctrd_100xatt_con .161 .106 .190 .879** .094 -.005 -.147 .168 .269* 1 .130 .049 -.162 
ctrd_200xatt_con -.205 .033 .273* .091 .895** -.020 .003 .000 .311* .130 1 .013 -.011 
ctrd_500xatt_con .025 .165 .019 -.005 -.021 .860** -.407** .189 -.026 .049 .013 1 -.454** 
ctrd_1500xatt_con -.217 -.343** .026 -.135 .003 -.352** .920** -.436** .024 -.162 -.011 -.454** 1 
Note: N  = 58 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table AI 3: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 16ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 16ms .129 .957  1.329 .189 
Attentional control high_low -.021 -.158  -.065 -.483 
ΔR2 .016  .033 
F .458  .926 
Step 2      
Attention bias 16ms -.215 -.748  .970 .336 
Attentional control high_low -.016 -.120  -.491 .625 
Att. bias16ms x att.control .388 1.354  -.401 .690 
ΔR2 .032  .003 
F .922  .662 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05 
 
 
 
 
Table AI 4: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 33ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 33ms -.148 -1.105  .004 .029 
Attentional control high_low .012 .088  -.039 -.290 
ΔR2 .022  .002 
F .610  .042 
Step 2      
Attention bias 33ms -.556 -1.739  -.378 -1.167 
Attentional control high_low .019 .142  -.033 -.242 
Att.bias33ms x att.control .447 1.402  .419 1.296 
ΔR2 .034  .030 
F 1.070  .588 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05 
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Table AI 5: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 100ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 100ms .134 .997  .101 .753 
Attentional control high_low -.014 -.106  -.048 -.354 
ΔR2 .018  .012 
F .497  .325 
Step 2      
Attention bias 100ms .118 .418  -.001 -.002 
Attentional control high_low -.014 -.104  -.047 -.346 
Att.bias100ms x att.control .017 .062  .116 .409 
ΔR2 .000  .003 
F .327  .269 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05 
 
 
 
 
 
Table AI 6: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 200ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 200ms -.164 -1.209  .075 .550 
Attentional control high_low -.034 -.250  -.024 -.178 
ΔR2 .026  .007 
F .731  .193 
Step 2      
Attention bias 200ms -.134 -.441  .291 .955 
Attentional control high_low -.033 -.242  -.019 -.138 
Att.bias200ms x att.control -.034 -.112  -.240 -.792 
ΔR2 .000  .011 
F .483  .337 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05 
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Table AI 7: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 500ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 500ms -.125 -.937  -.123 -.919 
Attentional control high_low .004 .028  -.033 -.245 
ΔR2 .016  .017 
F .439  .464 
Step 2      
Attention bias 500ms -.107 -.405  -.044 -.166 
Attentional control high_low .004 .027  -.033 -.243 
Att.bias500ms x att.control -.021 -.081  -.092 -.349 
ΔR2 .000  .002 
F .290  .345 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05 
 
 
 
 
Table AI 8: Regression Analyses of High and Low Attentional Control and Attentional bias at 1500ms 
with Worry/GAD symptoms as the Outcome Variables 
Predictor PSWQ  GADQ-IV 
 β t  β t 
Step 1      
Attention bias 1500ms .084 .612  .059 .428 
Attentional control high_low .016 .115  -.036 -.189 
ΔR2 .007  .005 
F .187  .133 
Step 2      
Attention bias 1500ms -.077 -.220  -.182 -.519 
Attentional control high_low .009 .062  -.037 -.265 
Att.bias1500ms x att.control .174 .500  .259 .748 
ΔR2 .005  .010 
F .206  .275 
Note: N = 58. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; GADQ-IV = Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire – IV; * p < .05
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N
ot
e:
 N
 =
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4.
 P
SW
Q
 =
 P
en
n 
St
at
e 
W
or
ry
 Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
; G
A
D
Q
 –
 IV
 =
 G
en
er
al
is
ed
 A
nx
ie
ty
 D
is
or
de
r Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 –
 IV
; P
M
PI
-E
 =
 P
er
ce
iv
ed
 M
od
es
 o
f P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
– 
Ex
pe
rie
nt
ia
l s
ca
le
; P
M
PI
-R
 =
 
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
M
od
es
 o
f P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
– 
R
at
io
na
l s
ca
le
; R
EI
-E
 =
 R
at
io
na
l E
xp
er
ie
nt
ia
l I
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en
to
ry
 –
 E
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er
ie
nt
ia
l s
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; R
EI
-R
 =
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at
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l E
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l I
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ry
 –
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at
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l s
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le
; T
ot
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.R
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s =
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ta
l r
ea
so
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ng
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e;
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bj
.P
ro
b 
= 
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e 
pr
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e;
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tt.
C
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tro
l =
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io
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l c
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l; 
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te
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t.N
 –
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n 
bi
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eu
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l c
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 c
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